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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Successive Canadian federal governments have officially indicated their support of human rights 
in foreign policy, including as they relate to aid-giving. This thesis quantitatively tests this 
rhetoric with the actual practice of bilateral aid-giving in two time periods – 1998-2000 and 
2007-2009. This, however, revealed that Canada has actually tended to give more bilateral aid 
to countries with poorer human rights records. A deeper quantitative analysis identifies certain 
multilateral memberships – notably with the Commonwealth, NATO, and OECD – and the geo-
political and domestic considerations of Haiti as significant and confirms a recipient state’s 
human rights performance is not a consideration.  These multilateral relationships reflect state 
self-interests, historical connections, security, and a normative commitment to poverty 
reduction. It is these factors that those promoting a human rights agenda need to contemplate 
if recipient state performance is to become relevant in bilateral aid decisions. Thus, it is 
necessary to turn to international relations theory, in particular liberal institutionalism, to 
explain Canada’s bilateral aid-giving in these periods.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis searches to find correlation between Canada’s development assistance and 
human rights performance in two three-year periods – 1998-2000 and 2007-2009. These periods 
represent the direction of a Liberal government and a Conservative minority government 
respectively. However, bivariate correlation analyses do not yield results where more Canadian 
bilateral aid is given to recipient states with better human rights records. In fact, the opposite 
outcome occurred; more bilateral aid has been given to more repressive states. When 
multivariate regression models are used, still no significant correlations emerge with the human 
rights variable. Therefore, no empirical evidence is found to support the government’s often 
cited commitment to human rights in development assistance programs, and most notably with 
respect to bilateral aid. However, the regression models reveal connections between bilateral 
aid and certain multilateral organizations. These specific variables do explain some of the 
bilateral aid direction, but multilateralism as a whole is not an independent variable. A 
theoretical examination is necessary to determine the independent variable that conditions 
bilateral aid. Applying Liberal Institutionalism (LI) theory, it can be demonstrated that bilateral 
aid has been guided by the pursuit of Canada’s self-interests and power, its commitment to 
multilateralism, and its dedication to the advancement of liberal democracies. While human 
rights are normative values that are aligned with liberal principles, they are not primary or 
dominate motivations for Canada’s development assistance. Consequently, there is a disconnect 
between the government rhetoric on the importance of human rights and its practices.  
Examining the relationship between aid and human rights is predicated on two 
important considerations. First, successive Canadian governments have claimed human rights 
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are vital to development assistance decisions. This has been confirmed by successive policy 
statements since the late 1980s. This, in conjunction with the 1982 adoption of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, has contributed to the development of a Canadian self-image 
as a domestic and international champion of human rights. Second, and more importantly, 
ignoring human rights violations by recipient states not only supports abusive regimes but 
essentially undermines Canada’s commitment to international human rights. Aid is a limited 
resource. Given that there is greater need in the world for aid than there is available assistance, 
aid to repressive states simply supports oppressive governments and prevents aid from reaching 
where help is also needed, and human rights are violated to a lesser extent. In other words, 
there is an opportunity cost to providing aid – which is a scarce resource – to repressive states.  
This normative argument has been expressed by many academics. T.A. Keenleyside, for 
example, has argued that development assistance must improve the “human condition in all its 
aspects – as “empowering” the oppressed and disadvantaged.”1 Katarina Tomasevski also 
argued that aid to repressive regimes only “contributes to the perpetuation of violations.”2 
Thus, a donor state has at minimum an obligation to ensure aid is not used to repress the basic 
rights of citizens in the recipient state. Because human rights violations are notionally within the 
control of the governing regime, bilateral aid is seen as direct support of that regime’s human 
rights record.3 As Tomasevski makes clear the “denial of human rights is incompatible with 
                                                          
1 T.A. Keenleyside, “Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Human Dignity,” in Canadian 
International Development Assistance: An Appraisal, 2nd ed., ed. Cranford Pratt (Montréal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 240. 
2 Katarina Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 
1993), 97. 
3 Bethany Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid: For love or money? (London: Routledge, 2008); 
Keenleyside, ”Aiding Rights,” 240-267; David Gillies, Between Principle and Practice: Human Rights in 
North-South Relations (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996); Robert O. Matthews 
and Cranford Pratt, “Introduction: Concepts and Instruments,” in Human Rights in Canadian Foreign 
Policy, eds. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt (Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1988). 
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development. ... countries cannot achieve sustainable economic development without the 
recognition and protection of human rights.”4   
This thesis was thus expanded to include analyses of additional variables in an effort to 
identity and explain influences on Canada’s development assistance allocation. These 
multivariate analyses demonstrated there was one broad factor that had some statistical 
significance with Canada’s bilateral aid decisions; this is Canada’s commitment to multilateral 
institutions. However, this finding was limited to Canada’s memberships in the Commonwealth 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Commonwealth 
membership identifies a preference for Canada to give bilateral aid to developing 
Commonwealth members. The OECD variable is based on the degree to which Canada directs 
bilateral aid to states based on the need for poverty reduction. This variable was assessed by 
utilizing the income levels established by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, of 
which Canada is a member. The results show Canada provided more bilateral aid to poorer 
states, which is consistent with the OECD’s emphasis on poverty reduction.   
In addition, aid to the ex-Yugoslavian states and Afghanistan in the first and second 
study periods respectively is also inferred to support Canada’s membership in another 
multilateral organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). No such correlation 
was found to exist for the G-8, la Francophonie, and the Organization of American States (OAS). 
Consequently, commitment to, and participation in, multilateral institutions is not an 
independent variable as it does not apply to all the major organizations to which Canada has 
membership. While this does indicate multilateralism sometimes is correlated to bilateral aid, it 
is not in all cases. Further, no quantitative evidence was found connecting any multilateral 
                                                          
4 Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited, 173. 
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memberships and human rights records the allocation of bilateral aid. Thus, this thesis seeks 
explanations based on qualitative considerations.  
For these reasons, Canada’s development assistance practices can perhaps be better 
understood in the context of International Relations (IR) theory. Specifically, the connection 
between the direction of some multilateral institutions and Canada’s bilateral aid decisions 
point to the validity of LI, with its focus on regimes and institutions, the management of 
anarchy, rules and norms, and in many cases the pursuit of Canada’s own self-interest in its 
foreign aid policy. This has direct implications for the study of Canadian foreign policy (CFP) as it 
re-enforces the utility of traditional middle power and multilateral frameworks used to 
understand and interpret Canada’s foreign relations. And it is in LI theory that the independent 
variables of self-interest and power are found and qualitatively explains Canada’s development 
assistance policies and practices.  
The structure of this thesis begins with a review of earlier, pertinent quantitative studies 
that have either focused on or included human rights considerations. Specifically, this chapter 
focuses on empirical analyses that have attempted to examine Canada’s consistency between 
aid-giving and recipient states human rights records. There are very few empirical studies that 
have examined CFP in this context. Those that have considered human rights and aid have 
typically done so within broader studies collapsing decades of data into single assessments. 
Further, some of these studies have only peripherally considered human rights in studies 
principally focused on other hypotheses. Consequently, human rights have been defined in 
many as part of other variables and have suffered from inconsistencies in definition. A single 
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study, also done as an M.A. thesis, focused directly on bilateral aid and human rights 
performance. That study examined CFP aid-giving in the period 1984-87.5 
The second chapter positions development assistance and human rights in IR theory. 
International human rights are fundamentally founded in liberal theory, yet realism and neo-
realism has historically dominated discussions of global international relations.6 Realism offers 
little in the way of explaining and understanding individual state actions outside the rational 
self-interest of atomized states. However, it is apparent that not all developed states make 
development assistance decisions on this singular motivation.7 A liberal analysis accounts for 
more variables, such as multilateralism, economics and normative considerations, in a state’s 
decision-making. It is from within the liberal context that the influence of international 
institutions and other non-state actors on individual states can be considered. This thesis will 
argue LI provides a more comprehensive understanding of the recent development of 
international interests with regards to human rights concerns and development assistance. 
Chapter three focuses on the evolution of development assistance and human rights in 
CFP. Canada’s foreign policy has consistently supported liberal tenets through international 
institutions and regimes, and the development of multilateral treaties. And while the federal 
state is the primary foreign affairs actor, its commitment to multilateral organizations, such as 
United Nations (UN), NATO, G-7/8, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, and OAS, foster 
international liberalism. Further, Canada’s foreign policies are influenced by domestic views and 
non-state actors, such as provinces, various bureaucratic departments and civil society, further 
                                                          
5 Nola Ann Serkasevich, "The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations: 
An Empirical Analysis" (Master thesis, University of Windsor , 1989). 
6 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 152. 
7 Eric Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance 
(New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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demonstrating that foreign relations have not simply been based on relative international state 
power. Human rights have been discussed relative to development assistance at least since the 
1980s, but there have been competing factors which have brought these into conflict with 
human rights views.  
The next two chapters establish the parameters used in the quantitative analyses and 
the actual findings. This study initially intended to evaluate Canada’s foreign policy commitment 
by empirically testing for correlations between human rights and development assistance to 
determine whether human rights are a deciding factor in the allocation of bilateral aid. These 
quantitative analyses examine Canada’s bilateral aid over two discrete three-year periods; these 
encompass the periods of 1998-2000 under a Chrétien Liberal government which at the time 
had a strong focus on human security issues and a human rights, democracy and good 
governance (HRDGG) agenda; 8  and of 2007-2009 under a Harper Conservative minority 
government which, similar to past governments, declared human rights to be a key pillar of its 
foreign policy.9 Based on a positive view of human rights, it was expected there would be a 
correlation between human rights records and bilateral aid that indicates a greater commitment 
to recipient states that have relatively better human rights performance. By considering these 
periods, two additional decades of data are provided in a bivariate analysis of foreign aid 
relative to recipient state human rights performance. But, neither Serkasevich’s earlier 
quantitative study nor the two periods in this study support this hypothesis, thus confirming the 
                                                          
8 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review 
1995, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp (accessed December 1, 
2011). 
9 Josée Verner, Speech of the Honourable Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation, for 
International Cooperation Days. October 10, 2006. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-
CIDA.nsf/eng/RAC-1030163913-TE3 (accessed March 18, 2012). 
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existence of a ‘rhetoric-practice’ gap. 10 Consequently, it was necessary to explore other 
explanations.  
Yet, it was anticipated that because there are other competing and conflicting factors in 
foreign affairs decisions, inconsistencies in the relationship between bilateral aid and the human 
rights of some recipient states would exist. Therefore, by using regression models, this study 
goes on to test other variables with implications for bilateral aid in conjunction with human 
rights. Specifically, these other variables are Canada’s commitment to multilateral organizations 
and specific temporal political events, such as its involvement in the Afghanistan war and 
Balkans conflict. Thus, the study was modified to include the premise that if the Canadian 
government has given some serious consideration to human rights in their decision-making on 
bilateral aid, then a statistically significant correlation should exist in a multivariate regression 
model that included these additional explanatory variables and controls for specific events. In 
addition to the multilateral organizations noted above, a dummy variable was included for Haiti. 
A logged variable was used to account for the vast population variance. Only Canada’s 
membership in the Commonwealth, NATO and the OECD were significant. Thus, multilateralism 
is identified as of some importance but not as an independent variable to explain Canada’s 
bilateral aid decisions. 
Neither quantitative period confirms a statistically significant relationship between 
human rights and bilateral aid decisions. Consequently, while specific references directly to 
human rights, and also within the context of good governance, have been frequently made by 
Canadian governments and their agencies, these are not substantiated in practice. However, 
                                                          
10 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 121.  
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what is reinforced by this study is that variables related to Canada’s historical commitment to 
multilateralism are pertinent to how bilateral aid has been distributed.  
Not surprisingly, Canada has been criticized for inconsistently granting foreign aid to 
recipient states with questionable human rights performance. In Bethany Barratt’s assessment, 
Canada’s policy on “[h]uman rights may be the most laudable goals of foreign policy...” but then 
adds “…it is also the most inconsistently pursued.”11 Foreign policy decisions are complex, 
involving commercial and political factors in addition to human rights concerns, which are often 
viewed as being of lesser importance.12 This has given rise to a number of critical qualitative 
academic studies highlighting inconsistencies between foreign aid and human rights.13 The 
assessments have typically considered specific incidents and not encompassed bilateral aid with 
the totality of recipient states. The multivariate regression identifies multilateral relationships 
that have promoted historical relationships, poverty reduction, and security. What becomes 
apparent is that Canada pursues multilateralism to enhance its international power, image, and 
its self-interest. Canada’s development assistance practices are best seen through a LI lens. The 
view that many critics have expressed that development assistance has been inconsistent with 
respect to human rights is a reflection of what they view ‘ought’ to be. By seeing multilateralism 
through LI as motivating Canadian development assistance, a more fruitful discussion regarding 
how to influence policy is perhaps possible.  
                                                          
11 Bethany Barratt, “Canadian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights,” in Handbook of Canadian 
Foreign Policy ed. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O’Reilly (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 
235. 
12 David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance 
(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998), 13.  
13 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide;  David Gillies, Between Principle and Practice: Human Rights in North-South 
Relations (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996); Cranford Pratt, “Humane 
Internationalism and Canadian Development Assistance Policies,” in Canadian International Development 
Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, 2nd ed., ed. Cranford Pratt (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1996); Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy: 
Principles and Canadian Practice,” Human Rights Quarterly 7 No. 2 (May 1985): 159- 88; Sharon Scharfe, 
Complicity (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1996);  
9 
 
CHAPTER 1  
 
METHODOLOGY LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review key quantitative studies to glean significant 
findings related to human rights performance and Canadian bilateral aid, and to also inform on 
key methodological design considerations. However, in contrast to the numerous critical books 
and academic articles commenting on Canada’s bilateral aid practices, there are only a few 
quantitative studies relating aid and the human rights records of recipient states.  In the 
majority of these, Canada is one of several donor states whose development assistance is 
evaluated relative to human rights and other variables. There is only one study that actually 
directly addresses bilateral aid and human rights performance of recipient states, and that was 
almost twenty-five years ago. With one exception, these quantitative studies are longitudinal 
covering one or more decades and include several donor states.  
This most ‘on point’ study by Nola Serkasevich actually provided the initial motivation 
for this thesis. Her MA thesis reviewed Canada’s bilateral aid-giving relative to recipient states’ 
human rights records for the period 1984-87.1 Serkasevich used government reports to identify 
bilateral aid provided to sovereign states in this period. Bilateral aid is focused on because it 
most directly supports the recipient government, and by extension its policies and practices.  
To assess human rights records, Serkasevich used Amnesty International (AI) narratives 
and assigned ratings based on a modified five point political violence and terror scale. Category 
1 provides for a secure rule of law where people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture, 
                                                          
1 Serkasevich, "The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations." 
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extrajudicial killings and disappearances and forced migration are extremely rare. Category 5 
reflects a state where the public in general are widely subjected to incarceration for their views; 
torture, extra-judicial killings and disappearances common and forced migration or expulsion is 
routine; and leaders pursue personal or ideological goals. 2 This scale shows progressive 
improvement from 5 through 1, but broadly it was argued that categories 1 and 2 are preferred 
or acceptable scores, whereas 3 through 5 were declining degrees of unacceptable scores. To 
validate these scores a second rater was also used. 3 However, the score results were specific to 
the time frame of this study. Fortunately, these five narrative anchor points are similar to those 
used in the Political Terror Scale (PTS), which has provided consistent score methodology from 
1976 to present. A more significant shortcoming to this study, however, was the lack of AI 
narratives for 30 recipient states.4 This resulted in more than 25 per cent of recipient states 
being unrated and therefore not included in the analysis. Fortunately, since Serkasevich’s study, 
several scales have improved on the number of countries rated.  
However, Serkasevich’s findings do identify some interesting outcomes. The study did 
not find a statistically significant correlation where recipient states with better human rights 
records received a greater share of Canadian bilateral aid. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and 
Indonesia (in descending order) were the largest Canadian aid recipient states based on total 
dollars, even though all committed serious human rights abuses and had category 4 ratings. 
Looking at aid in total dollars it was concluded Canada favoured states which had committed 
serious human rights violations in preference to those with satisfactory records during the 
                                                          
2 Ibid., 53. These five categories are essentially the same as the Political Terror Scale defined in Appendix I, 
which is used in the methodology for this thesis. The wording varies slightly but the categories essentially 
represent the same differentiations. 
3 Ibid., 53-55.  
4 Mark Gibney, Lynette Cornett and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale Levels, 1976-2010, 2010, 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php (accessed November 17, 2011). 
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period of study.5 It is also worth noting that the top three were Commonwealth states and had 
continuously received aid from Canada as far back as the 1950s. Although not explored in 
Serkasevich’s study, it appears Canada’s multilateral obligations stemming from membership in 
the Commonwealth may have taken precedence over human rights considerations.6 The ties 
created by the Colombo plan and the reluctance of governments to discontinue relations may 
have contributed to this result.  
Serkasevich also presents results based on a per capita approach, and by this 
examination Dominica, Grenada, Anguilla, and Belize were the top four ranked recipient states. 
The first two states were rated as category 1 and the latter two states were not rated due to a 
lack of AI data.7 Of the worst human rights abusers only Bangladesh was in the top 45 recipient 
states using the per capita method. To further clarify, Serkasevich’s statistics show Bangladesh 
receiving $109 million on average over the three years (highest among all states), while 
Dominica received only $6.2 million (31st). However, when considered on a per capita basis, 
Dominica topped the list with bilateral aid equalling $81.89 per capita and Bangladesh was 44th 
at $1.08 per capita; demonstrating that when per capita aid is considered a very different 
outcome is apparent. 8  Clearly, the vast range in population distribution has a significant impact 
on the results. Serkasevich reported the per capita measure showed a statistically significant 
                                                          
5 Serkasevich, "The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations," 67. 
Serkasevich found fifty of the recipient states had ratings of 3, 4 or 5, while only 32 of the recipient states 
were in categories 1 and 2. The remaining states were unrated.  
6 The top three bilateral aid recipients in this study were Commonwealth members. 
7 Serkasevich, "The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations," 61, 63. 
Serkasevich observes that the states without ratings are generally considered to have good human rights 
records. It would seem likely these states have not been assessed because of their size or their positive 
human rights records or both.  
8 Ibid., 63-64. 
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Pearson r of -0.3218, demonstrating more Canadian bilateral aid per capita was provided to 
recipient states with better human rights records.9  
Yet, Serkasevich rejects a per capita approach based on the logic that the total amount 
given to these top per capita aid countries made up only a small per cent of the total aid Canada 
distributed in those years. She points out that almost two-thirds of total bilateral aid during the 
study period had gone to the top 15 recipient states. In contrast, roughly 7 per cent of total 
bilateral aid had been given to the top 15 per capita recipients. Only Jamaica was on both lists.10 
On the assumption the largest donation amounts were reflective of government policy, 
Serkasevich’s analysis emphasized total dollars to major recipients.   
Despite the lack of complete data, this study provides a basis from which to build. Given 
the availability of human rights ratings as a result of the increase in country narratives today, it 
is possible to develop more complete human rights data, allowing for more accurate 
information and analysis.  
With a broader and more comprehensive approach, Eric Neumayer conducted two 
overlapping empirical studies focused on bilateral and multilateral aid from 21 states – including 
Canada - based on a wide number of variables, with a primary focus on correlating human rights 
and aid.11 The first period addressed 1985-1997 while the second period spanned 1991-2000. In 
both he identifies Canada as one of the ‘like-minded’ countries, which, among other things, have 
been characterized as having publicly stated policy positions connecting good governance (GG) – 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 60. 
10 Ibid., 62. Noting Jamaica as an exception, Serkasevich quite rightly points out that at the time these 
countries had such small populations, with modest economies, that they had limited ability to effectively 
absorb any larger amounts of aid. 
11 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving; Eric Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid 
Allocation? A Qualitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries,” Social Science Quarterly 84, No. 3 (September 
2003): 650-666. 
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including human rights – with aid-giving. 12 In using GG as his main focus, Neumayer also 
includes political, civil and human rights of the citizenry protected by the rule of law through a 
non-corrupted public service and delivered in a transparent and accountable way.13 GG has 
broad international appeal as it was adopted as an objective by the United Nations (UN) and has 
been included in Canada’s policy statements since 1995. However, this term lacks clarity, is 
overly broad and is prone to subjective considerations. It particularly focuses on democratic 
progress which can overshadow the narrower human rights concerns of personal security and 
safety. GG is also open to criticism for imposing a Western democratic culture on developing 
states.  
However, Neumayer’s study overcame the broad GG term by also providing a more 
detailed analysis using a subcategory of personal integrity rights, which he measures using the 
human rights PTS ratings.14  This scale is a physical integrity rights measure where ratings are 
determined by the political imprisonment, torture and murder perpetrated or allowed by the 
state against its citizens (See Appendix I).15 Category 1 is reserved for countries that have a well-
established rule of law where citizens are not imprisoned and only rarely might be tortured as a 
result of their political views. Political murders are extremely rare. In category 2 there would be 
a limited few people imprisoned over nonviolent political activities with only exceptional cases 
                                                          
12 Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway are identified as the other like-minded countries. The 
inclusion of Canada in this category is based on common rhetoric regarding human rights and aid that 
stemmed from the 1980s. However, while the rhetoric has remained somewhat consistent, the 
commitment to the level of aid giving has not. Canada’s aid level has reduced to roughly half the target of 
0.7% of GNI on average through the 1990s while the other like-minded states have each exceeded the 
target. For this reason, I am reluctant to use this term.    
13 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 9. 
14 Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation?” 
15 Both the current PTS scale and the scale Serkasevich has modified are based on the original political 
terror scale by Purdue University scholars, which was developed from the ‘political terror’ scale published 
by Freedom House in 1980. For further explanation, see: Reed M. Wood and Mark Gibney, “The Political 
Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and Comparison,” Human Rights Quarterly 32 No. 2 (May 2010): 
367-400.  
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of torture and political murder is rare. While this category leaves room for improvement, it is 
markedly superior to the remaining categories. Category 3 is characterized by the acceptance of, 
or a history of, ongoing imprisonment over political views, with or without legal due process. 
Executions, political murders and brutality are common.  Category 4 affects the civil and political 
rights of a broader range of the population where murders, disappearances, and torture 
become common place. The state terrorizes those who are politically active or show political 
interest. Category 5 expands the level of torture to the whole population with no restraints 
placed on the leaders in the actions taken to maintain control.16  
The ratings on this five-point anchored scale are based on independent codification by 
project teams analyzing the narratives provided by Amnesty International (AI) and the US 
Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, resulting in two ratings per 
state (where narratives are available from both sources). Neumayer asserts this dual scale more 
accurately reflects the core of human rights and is not subject to cultural relativism criticisms.17 
In this study the scores from the two coded narratives are averaged, and where one or the other 
rating was missing, the single score was used.18 This presents two problems. First, the anchor 
scale does not have half points so the five anchors are no longer reflected by these scores. 
Second, there were still countries with no scores because neither source had reviewed the 
country. Nevertheless, Neumayer’s approach represents an improvement over that used by 
Serkasevich, both in process and by the simple fact data was available for many more countries.  
                                                          
16 Mark Gibney, Lynette Cornett and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale Levels, 1976-2010, 2010, 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php (accessed November 17, 2011). Category wording is also 
attached in Appendix I.  
17 Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation?,” 652. This is consistent with the 
human rights definition discussed the next chapter.  
18 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 54. 
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In comparing this personal integrity rights measure to aid, Neumayer’s results are 
inconclusive.   In the first study, Neumayer reports that Canada provided more aid to countries 
with better records on personal integrity rights, but this connection did not materialize at the 
much broader measure of GG or civil and political rights.19 However in the second study, 
Neumayer is unable to find a similar empirical evidence of correlation between aid and respect 
for human rights.20 
Besides considering more factors in a multivariate regression analysis, Neumayer’s study 
also differentiates between what he perceives to be a two-step decision-making process. The 
selection of recipient states is a separate decision from that of how much is allocated to each 
chosen recipient state. He asserts these decisions have slightly differing criteria.21 The first 
decision he refers to as the ‘eligibility stage’ and the latter as the ‘level stage’.  
While his second empirical results do not statistically show Canada as taking human 
rights into consideration at either stage, he does conclude recipient state population, actual 
Canadian trade exports, low corruption, low regulatory burden and the percentage of 
Christianity in the recipient state as being significant at the eligibility stage.22 At the level stage, 
population and low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) became most significant, with Canadian 
exports and low regulatory burden also being statistically important. 23 These statistically 
significant variables suggest some interesting but contradictory motivations. On the one hand, 
low GDP and high population variables indicate a humanitarian commitment to poverty 
                                                          
19 Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation?,” 663. Denmark had a similar result as 
Canada, while the only countries to give more aid under both of these human rights measures were Japan 
and the United Kingdom.  
20 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 62-63. 
21 Ibid. These two stages are also referred to as the gate-keeping stage and the allocation stage by others, 
in particular Bethany Barratt and Michelle Allendoerfer. 
22 Ibid., 62-63. However, population and exports were only statistically significant to the 0.1 level. 
23 Ibid., 63-64. 
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reduction, while increased Canadian exports suggest self-interested commercial preferences. 
Neumayer does not explain the connection with exports, but it is most likely a result of the high 
percentage of tied aid Canada required at the time. Tied aid describes the conditions donor 
states place on the recipient to use the aid to purchase goods and services from the donor state. 
Such requirements frequently result in less effective use of aid, but tied aid supports the donor 
state’s self-interest by promoting its domestic economy. 24 
Unlike Serkasevich, Neumayer places an emphasis on the density of the recipient state’s 
population. Neumayer makes the argument that “[i]f total aid is taken to be the dependent 
variable, then at the least population size must be one of the explanatory variables to account 
for the fact that, all other things equal, China [or Bangladesh, as in Serkasevich’s study] is more 
likely to receive more aid than, say, Dominica.”25 Yet he points out that for countries to allocate 
funds based on per capita would be cumbersome and it is more probable aid is distributed 
based on total dollars available in limited and fixed budgets. Per capita is, thus, an outcome 
rather than a consideration. Therefore, at the level stage Neumayer opted to focus on the 
percentage of the total aid committed by the donor state.26  
Neumayer also provided an assessment of aid strategies relative to GG objectives that 
offers a sound basis for determining recipient states eligibility. He asserts a primary preference 
for a selective strategy with secondary consideration for a capacity-building strategy. He rejects 
the persuasion and conditional strategies as ineffective and as yielding inconsistent results.27 
                                                          
24 Stephen Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and The Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” in Readings in 
Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd ed., eds. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. 
Kukucha (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2011), 472. Brown asserts tied aid adds an extra 15 to 30 per 
cent to cost. 
25 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 42. 
26 Ibid., 42. 
27 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 11-15. Selective strategy has the donor state provide more aid to 
states that have demonstrated a commitment and improvement in GG. Capacity build strategy involves 
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More importantly, he alleges these inferior strategies convey an incoherent foreign policy 
message with respect to the human rights expectations of the donor states. The premise is that 
by adhering to a selectivity strategy a donor state should provide more aid to recipients that 
have demonstrated improvements in GG. However, Neumayer also believes a capacity-building 
strategy – which is based on the willingness of the state to improve GG except that the state 
does not have the infrastructure to do so – should also be pursued. Aid in this case would be 
directed to such developments as building a quality police force or independent court system. 
However, critical to applying a capacity-building strategy is the existence of obvious evidence of 
support from the state’s political leadership for these changes, which is often not the case.  
While Neumayer has used these strategies to examine governance commitment, they 
just as easily apply to personal integrity rights. In fact, it can be argued personal integrity rights 
provide an even more straight forward application. The actions of governing regimes that 
commit serious human rights violation and receive bilateral aid are in effect being supported by 
the donor country. Therefore, a selective strategy approach would dictate more aid be given to 
states with proven positive human rights records. A capacity-building strategy would see 
bilateral aid provided to develop the infrastructure to reform the actions of the regime. This can 
only occur in instances where the regime is actually committed to such reforms, which would 
seem to be highly unlikely. An argument for more multilateral and direct aid that bypasses the 
regime would seem to be warranted in such cases.  
In an even longer period of study (1980-2004), Bethany Barratt examines aid from the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia relative to a number of economic, historic, geopolitical, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
providing aid where the state is committed to improving its GG but does not have the necessary 
infrastructure. Persuasion strategy involves diplomatic efforts to convince a state to change. This is the 
least effective strategy. Conditional strategy involves setting targets to be met in exchange for up front 
aid and tied to future aid. This strategy has typically failed because the donor states have not consistently 
followed through when the conditions have not be met or only partially met.  
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strategic, and human rights variables.28 In identifying the human rights variable, Barratt uses the 
US Department of State’s Country Reports on PTS scores. She opts for the scores from the US 
assessments because there were marginally more countries covered by these reports compared 
to the AI narratives. However, she acknowledges there has been a tendency for the AI ratings to 
be more critical, although discrepancies were reduced in later years.29 Similar to Neumayer, 
Barratt separates aid decisions based on gatekeeping and allocation stages.30 With respect to 
Canada, she does not find a significant correlation for human rights at either stage. However, 
Barratt does report a marginal, but not statistically significant, increase in aid-giving by Canada 
to countries where human rights abuses have gone up. She speculates this may be because 
Canada has provided capacity-building aid or conditional aid but acknowledges the study does 
not provide the detailed breakdown necessary to determine this.  
Where Barratt does find a human rights connection to aid-giving is when there has been 
human rights activism critical of a recipient or potential recipient state. In such instances, the 
recipient state is less likely to receive aid, or to receive less aid. From this, Barratt concludes it 
may be possible for non-government organizations (NGOs) to play an important role in shaping 
aid decisions.31  Theoretically, in such cases NGOs inform civil society and thereby promote 
domestic awareness and action which may actually influence government decision-making. 
However, this connection is not tested in the study.  
Barratt concludes domestic economic considerations form self-interests, which are 
superior to and dominate human rights considerations.32 Barratt goes as far as to suggest that 
consideration should be given to potential trade because for many developing countries existing 
                                                          
28 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid. 
29 Ibid., 42. 
30 Neumayer referred to these as the ‘eligibility’ and ‘level’ stages. 
31 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 155. 
32 Ibid., 154. 
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trade with Canada is negligible.33 This reference to potential aid seems to be speculative at best. 
Such a concept might have credence if there was evidence provided where burgeoning trade 
relations have evolved over time with a substantial number of developing states to which 
Canada has provided aid, but this was not the case. It would seem more likely there are both 
economic (for example, in the case of China) and humanitarian motives – such as a commitment 
to poverty reduction – at work in aid decisions. Nevertheless, Canada has benefited 
economically from the high level of tied aid that has been provided; but this is an issue as to the 
effectiveness of the aid as opposed to an economic motive based on potential future 
opportunities.  
Further, Barratt finds a strong correlation based on whether or not aid was given in the 
previous year and concludes “[p]ast aid is a significant determinant of present aid”.34 This leads 
to the speculative conclusion that there is a certain degree of inertia which occurs once a 
recipient state is allocated aid; thus, surmising that getting on the recipient list for aid is more 
difficult than receiving ongoing aid. Since there are very few ‘aid eligible’ states that do not 
receive at least some bilateral aid from Canada, this observation is of limited value.35 Getting on 
the Canadian list seems to be the easy part given the few states that do not receive any aid. But 
looking at aid on a year-to-year basis does not contemplate that aid-giving decisions may be 
made with the long term in mind. Many situations that attract bilateral and multilateral aid span 
longer periods of time and therefore this finding should be expected. In fact, inconsistency and 
uncertainty in aid commitments would have a deleterious effect on the recipient state.  
Neumayer also noted in reference to using a selectivity strategy it is important to be consistent 
                                                          
33 Ibid., 124.  
34 Ibid., 45. 
35 The use of the term ‘aid eligible’ states is meant to exclude other OECD states that also provide aid to 
assist developing states. When Canada provides aid to about 150 states, this only leaves roughly 20 states 
that Canada does not provide any assistance to.  
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in aid-giving otherwise a donor state’s credibility and commitment to the strategy would be 
brought into question.36  
Barratt’s time frame for looking at Canadian aid-giving covers more than two decades 
and spans several governments. Additionally, it includes both the Cold War and post-Cold War 
years and pools many significant events that had major effects on the international 
environment. Clearly, foreign policy changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Canada’s 
fiscal crisis throughout the 1990s also was a major factor as it resulted in severe reductions in 
aid-giving. Further, the aid policy of the Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien, and Martin governments 
were substantively different. Aggregating these periods assumes the federal bureaucracy largely 
controls Canadian foreign policy. While it is possible this may have been the case, there was no 
evidence presented to this effect.  
One of Barratt’s main findings is that Canada’s aid program has been incoherent due to 
competing policy imperatives. While Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has 
focused on poverty reduction, other government department priorities have included 
geopolitical considerations – such as, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and Canada’s 
relationship with the US – and, as mentioned earlier, potential export trade opportunities. It is 
the ‘push and pull’ of these competing imperatives that leads Barratt to conclude that after 
almost sixty years “… Canada’s aid program is still searching for a focus and a distinct identity in 
the donor community.”37 Canada has often been criticized for vacillating between contradictory 
goals. This demonstrates the conflicting priorities between objectives based on realist 
geopolitical power, economic self-interest, and liberal humane international considerations. This 
incoherence may also stem from the long time horizon used in the study. A shorter time frame 
                                                          
36 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 16.  
37 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 160.  
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may be necessary to test for consistency between government rhetoric and practice on bilateral 
aid.    
Jean-Sébastien Rioux, drawing on the results of a broader comparative foreign policy 
study, reported on the relationship between GG in recipient states and the level of Canadian 
Official Development Assistance (ODA).38  Relying on the Freedom House Political Freedom 
Index (including political rights and civil liberties) the research group had concluded Canada 
tends to give less support to politically free states relative to not-free states.39 An underlying 
premise of this study was that not-free states are more likely to misuse or divert aid. While 
human rights are a subset consideration in the Freedom House index, this index is much broader 
and is not limited to gross violations of personal integrity rights. These results would actually 
seem to be more accurately a measure of corruption, and therefore the study is more relevant 
to the efficient and effective use of aid.    
What is of interest in this research project was the examination of the impact media 
coverage had on Canada’s aid-giving from 1985 to 1995. By using media coverage – specifically 
the Globe and Mail – as an independent variable, the authors concluded there were significant 
decreases in aid for each negative newspaper article reporting on political unrest (which did 
include human rights issues). Conversely, there was an increase in aid-giving with reports of 
humanitarian disasters.40 The media connection is an attractive thesis but the independent 
variable was limited to a single English-only newspaper source (the Globe and Mail). Despite this 
                                                          
38 Jean-Sébastien Rioux, "Canadian Official Development Assistance: Juggling the National Interest and 
Humanitarian Impulses," in Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Patrick James, Nelson 
Michaud, and Marc O'Reilly (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006). Rioux reports a summary of the findings he, 
Douglas Van Belle and David Potter had reached based on a larger study reported in Douglas A. Van Belle, 
Jean-Sébastien Rioux, and David M. Potter, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004). 
39 Ibid., 223. 
40 Van Belle et al, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid, 224-5. 
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limitation, the premise that aid-giving is influenced by the views of civil society provides some 
optimism that government foreign aid decisions can be altered by NGOs and societal pressure. 
This outcome is similar to Barratt’s findings correlating aid with the level of human rights 
activism.   
Rioux separately examines aid for the period 1950 to 1999 correlating the dollar amount 
of aid with the recipient state’s membership in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and other 
ODA recipient countries. His analysis identifies a Canadian bias toward Commonwealth states 
over others, with la Francophonie states receiving the least mean contribution.41 This period 
covers many different governments and many different views on aid-giving, government 
policies, and geo-political conditions, which greatly diminishes the value of the results. As a 
glaring example, the value of the aggregated la Francophonie aid-giving data is questionable as 
this organization did not exist until 1971; yet the period of study started in 1950. Further, there 
is significant evidence that Canada’s entrance into development assistance and at least the first 
two decades were strongly linked to its involvement in the Commonwealth.42 Thus, Rioux’s 
observation by itself is somewhat suspect. However, in a similar, but more recent, examination 
Canada’s aid preference for member countries of these two organizations for the period 1985 to 
1995 was tested. These results partially reflected those of Rioux showing a preference for the 
Commonwealth, but found neither a positive or negative bias toward la Francophonie 
countries.43 Certainly membership in the Commonwealth has created enduring obligations and 
responsibilities for Canada and this does suggest a potential connection between multilateral 
membership and aid-giving.  
                                                          
41 Rioux, "Canadian Official Development Assistance," 220. 
42 Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966). 
43 Van Belle et al, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid. 
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Canada is also a member of several other multilateral organizations, many of which 
promote development assistance responsibilities. Despite the fact there was no correlation with 
la Francophonie member states, these other memberships warrant some consideration as 
contributing factors in how Canada distributes aid. If these memberships are correlative, they 
may also provide some explanation for Barratt’s observation that once a state is approved by 
Canada to receive aid there appears to be great reluctance to curtail the aid relationship.  
Lastly, in a recent PhD dissertation, Michelle Allendoerfer examined the impact of 
several variables on the allocation of aid by donor countries aggregated from the 1980s to the 
2000s.44 She considers worldwide aid donation – rather than by individual donor state – to 
create an assessment of how states have performed collectively based on a wide range of 
variables. In this global study, Allendoerfer tests for a relationship between human rights, 
foreign aid, and a number of other explanatory variables including geographic proximity, 
colonial status, NGO publicity, and oil producing countries. Consistent with Neumayer and 
Barratt, Allendoerfer considers aid decisions at the gate-keeping and allocation stages, and 
concludes decisions are affected differently at the two levels. Her main salient finding is a 
conclusion human rights do have some slight influence on aid and more so where there has 
been NGO pressure, but that colonial affiliation and geographic proximity have greater 
influence, particularly at the gatekeeping level. 45 By approaching donors as a collective, 
Allendoerfer makes the assumption states act as consistent, rationale actors with common 
motivations. This is not supported by Neumayer’s studies where a variety of states made 
significantly different aid decisions.46  
                                                          
44 Michelle Giacobbe Allendoerfer, "When Do Human Rights Matter? Finding a Place For Human Rights In 
Foreign Policy" (PhD diss., Deep Blue University of Michigan, 2010).  
45 Ibid., 80. 
46 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving. 
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Allendoerfer uses yet another index to measure human rights by employing a subset of 
the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI). It provides a numerical score between 0 
and 8 as a physical integrity rights measure (where an 8 is considered the best score). This score 
is derived from a 0-2 rating of four specific questions. The ratings, however, are based on two 
vague categories (frequent and occasional violations) and one absolute category (no violations). 
Scale ambiguity creates significant year-to-year fluctuation in state ratings.47 While it can be 
anticipated there will be changes in a state’s rating, frequent variance swings because of 
definition vagueness cannot be expected to be reflected in aid-giving. Further, these scores are 
not anchored to specific descriptors resulting in the middle scores being difficult to compare 
because they can be achieved in many different ways. For these two reasons, CIRI does not 
provide a satisfactory scale.  
Allendoerfer assumes human rights considerations will be subjugated to state self-
interest based on economic, security, and policy concession considerations. 48  Yet, one 
interesting findings is that donor states are likely to give greater aid to more needy states, which 
suggests poverty reduction is a significant consideration. 49  While self-interest is likely 
significant, poverty reduction has not been factored into these premises. This study approaches 
aid strictly from a realist perspective. 
Another key consideration of this study contemplates the mediating role of NGOs at the 
gatekeeping and allocation levels. The explanatory variable used is based only on AI news 
releases, which certainly is a limiting factor. Nevertheless, the study concludes there is a causal 
                                                          
47 CIRI Human Rights Data Project, http://www.humanrightsdata.org/ (accessed December 2, 2012). 
Canada in the period 2007 to 2009 was rated twice as a 6 and once at 8. In the years 1998 to 2000 Canada 
was twice a 7 and once rated an 8. While changes in ratings should be expected, the frequency with which 
they do, indicate issues with using this scale.   
48 A policy concession is non-economic right such as agreement to allow military fly-overs or bases on 
foreign soil.  
49 Allendoerfer, "When Do Human Rights Matter?," 65. 
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relationship for human rights influence on aid where AI has mobilized its efforts. Allendoerfer 
argues: “ … leaders act primarily to avoid the appearance of complicity with violators.”50 This 
finding, on a broader scale, is consistent with the views of the Barratt and Van Belle et al studies 
that governments respond to negative publicity.  
While Allendoerfer’s dissertation provides an interesting approach it has limited value 
because it covers over 20 years of aid-giving and, more importantly, it aggregates all donor 
states and their aid-giving. The studies by Neumayer and Barratt show there are different 
motivations by different states, as does the David Gillies’ comparative study.51 Allendoerfer’s 
aggregation suggests all states are similarly motivated. On the other hand, this study does point 
to the role NGOs and public awareness play in effecting state policy as states act to minimize 
negative images.  
Comparing all these studies is difficult for a number of reasons. They have not had a 
consistent approach to defining the human rights variable and several different human rights 
scales have been used. A further complicating factor is that studies have addressed different 
time periods, both in duration and time frame, which have obscured the effects of distinct 
political environments. With one exception, these studies have looked at spans of ten or more 
years. While this gives a longitudinal look at aid-giving, it does not consider the impact changes 
in policies and international political events can have on policy coherence. Not only do these 
studies include several different governments and policy directives, but there are also issues 
with the time periods spanning Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and periods where Canada 
was engaged in conflicts.  
                                                          
50 Ibid., 101.  
51 Gillies, Between Principle and Practice.  
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There are, however, several key observations that arise from these studies that are 
pertinent to this thesis. First, it is not sufficient to simply define human rights in a general 
manner; it is necessary to determine an appropriate scale of measurement. The fact that 
existing empirical studies used no less than four different scales speaks to a lack of consensus on 
how to measure human rights. This is possibly because these studies have had different 
objectives. However, Serkasevich, Neumayer and Barratt used variants of the PTS anchored 
ratings. Only Serkasevich’s study strictly focused on correlating human rights with bilateral aid. 
Based on these three studies, a variation of the PTS ratings are used in this thesis.  
Second, the vast difference in population of recipient states has some bearing on aid. 
But, per capita measures do not focus on the vast majority of bilateral aid. Yet, it is intuitive that 
there will be major differences in the amount of aid committed to a country of over 1 billion 
people relative to a country of under 100,000. As Neumayer has pointed out, population is 
necessarily an explanatory variable in a multivariate analysis. Therefore, the multivariate 
regression models in this thesis incorporate recipient state population by using logarithms.  
Third, Canada’s membership in multilateral organizations appears to have influence on 
its aid-giving. In particular, the connection to the Commonwealth was found to have relevance 
in the Van Belle et al studies. The Serkasevich research also implies a strong connection with 
Commonwealth developing countries, although this was not specifically tested. Similarly, the 
Neumayer studies have shown a connection between the amount of aid provided and the level 
of income in the recipient state. His findings revealed that countries with lower GDP were likely 
to receive more Canadian aid. Put another way, this is a focus on poverty reduction which has 
been a long held commitment by CIDA. But, it was originally driven multilaterally by the UN and 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This thesis, therefore, tests for the 
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influence of certain multilateral relations using multivariate regression models. These are 
reflective of Canada’s membership in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Organization of 
America States (OAS), and the OECD. The first three are simply represented by membership. The 
latter organization is represented by correlating DAC income level designations with bilateral 
aid. States eligible for official development assistance are categorized as least developed, low 
income, lower middle income or upper middle income countries based on gross national income 
(GNI) per capita.52 All other states that received bilateral aid were above the top GNI threshold 
and have been identified as ‘Other.’ This variable thus imputes a degree of influence to the 
OECD and at the same time recognizes the GDP variable used by Neumayer. 
Additional multilateral-based variables are included in this thesis to consider Canada’s 
membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the G-8. These relationships have 
particular bearing on the time frames examined by this thesis. The NATO obligations associated 
with Canada’s involvement in the Balkans and the Afghan war in the first and second periods 
respectively were significant. Ex-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan were respectively the top recipient 
states in the first and second periods addressed in this thesis. Thus, these states are accounted 
for as dummy variables. The G-8 placed an emphasis on alleviating poverty in the African Union 
(AU) states from the turn of the century. Consequently, this thesis will also test to see if AU 
membership influences Canada’s allocation of bilateral aid.  
Fourth, the concept of evaluating aid decisions based on gatekeeping and allocation, 
while interesting, has minimal applicability given the fact Canada provides aid to all but a small 
number of countries. Canada’s aid-giving has a unique global reach for a country of its economic 
size and population. Perhaps this is caused by the many organizations to which Canada is 
                                                          
52 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, History of DAC Lists of aid recipient 
countries. n.d. http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/historyofdaclistsofaidrecipientcountries.htm 
(accessed February 9, 2012). 
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committed. Or perhaps this outcome results from the fact Canada is a wealthy middle power 
committed to multilateralism, but lacks the specific focus of a colonial past. This question is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis. But the fact remains the gatekeeping stage does not have the 
same importance that it may have with other donor states. As in the Serkasevich study, the real 
focus here is on the allocation to recipient states and whether human rights are considered. 
Therefore, a single level approach is more appropriate for evaluating Canadian bilateral aid.  
And finally, in only one of two periods was Neumayer able to detect a statistically 
significance between positive human rights records by recipient states and Canada providing 
higher levels of aid. Serkasevich’s work suggests the opposite where a weak correlation between 
more human rights abuses and increased levels of aid was found in the 1984-87 period. Yet, 
human rights remain a prominent consideration in government documents and statements.  In 
several of the studies, some connection appears to occur between human rights activism and 
the level of aid. While this finding is also beyond the scope of this study, it does suggest there 
may be merit in raising awareness with civil society as a means of prodding the government to 
close the ‘rhetoric-practice’ gap.  
This thesis looks to add to the existing body of work in two key ways. First, two 
additional periods of data will be added to the Serkasevich study, thereby providing analyses 
spanning over three decades. Bivariate correlations will have been completed on three different 
governments under substantively different political environments. The failure to uncover a 
negative correlation in these two most recent periods confirms the findings in Serkasevich’s 
work and the accusations by several qualitative studies that human rights records have not been 
a consistent factor in Canada’s bilateral aid decisions. More importantly, this thesis goes further 
by including variables representing Canada’s multilateral affiliations along with human rights 
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using multivariate regression models. Although the human rights hypothesis is still not aided by 
these models, affiliations with the Commonwealth and the OECD provide statistically 
significance correlation and point to international relations theory – and particularly liberal 
institutionalism – to explain Canada’s bilateral aid decision making. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
 
 
International Relations (IR) theory is pertinent to this thesis because development 
assistance is a function of foreign policy and relations between sovereign states. Applying these 
theories, scholars have endeavoured to inform and make more intelligible the actions of states 
and international institutions and organizations as they interact.1 The quantitative part of this 
thesis focuses on ascertaining a statistical connection between Canada’s development 
assistance and specific variables – and in particular, human rights performance – but it is IR 
theory that becomes integral to understanding Canada’s actions.  
Human rights have gained international attention in the latter half of the 20th Century. 
These are rooted in liberalism and have been supported through the evolution of the United 
Nations (UN) and a myriad of multilateral institutions and regimes, and, to varying degrees, by 
individual states. Human rights are central to the UN Charter and are frequently invoked in any 
call for international intervention. Yet, it is widely acknowledged that human rights, when 
compared to national security, territorial advantage, and economic competitiveness, are near 
the bottom in relative foreign policy importance for most states.2 Despite this, they continue to 
be cited by governments as a key foreign policy consideration. Concerns over human rights 
often create tension with other foreign policy priorities and are often seen as a direct challenge 
                                                          
1 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2010), 4. 
2 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 9-10; Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 5, 13; Allendoerfer, 
"When Do Human Rights Matter?”. 
31 
 
to another state’s sovereignty. The result is “inescapable tension between human rights and 
foreign policy.”3  
Adherents of competing international relations theories provide substantially different 
interpretations as to the value human rights do – and should – play in foreign relations. 
Traditional realism leave little room to consider aid-giving and human rights concerns other than 
as tools to be used by states in support of their pursuit of military power. However, this chapter 
argues that a liberal institutional approach to foreign relations best explains the evolved role 
human rights have in international relations discourse, and elevates human rights to at least a 
level of dialogue with some commitment to action. Thus, while the focus in this thesis flows 
from the view Canada may contemplate human rights records of recipient states; it does so 
within the context of certain multilateral organizations and institutions.  
This liberal view is in contrast to the historical global dominance of IR theory by realism 
and neo-realism. Consequently, realism/neo-realism will be examined first with a particular 
emphasis on how human rights fail to be a motivating consideration in realist foreign policy 
decisions. Liberalism and liberal institutionalism (LI) are examined in the same context and 
contrasted with realism. Finally, this chapter will discuss the human rights and development 
assistance in international relations.  
 
Realism 
Realism has evolved from the writings of Thucydides, Niccollo Machiavelli, and Thomas 
Hobbes and focuses on the state as a rational unitary actor principally concerned with power 
                                                          
3 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
129.  
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and the survival of the state within an anarchical society. The state is rationally motivated by 
maximizing its power relative to other states. This results in states behaving and acting in 
predictably consistent, but conflicting, ways. More recently, Hans Morgenthau has defined state 
interest as national power, with moral and legal principles being subordinate to state political 
interests and aspirations.4 Moral justness and ‘right and wrong’ do not have relevance in realist 
international relations. Robert Gilpin captures this concept with the statement “… the final 
arbiter of things political is power …”5 Thus, the sovereign state functions solely in its own self-
interest and efforts to enhance its relative position vis-à-vis other states in a ‘zero-sum’ 
approach measured by relative gains. International cooperation is motivated solely by the 
atomized self-interests of individual states where international organizations and institutions 
are seen as tools to be used by the state to further its own goals in the pursuit of an 
advantageous balance of power.6 Economic and social (including human rights) factors are 
secondary and constitute “low politics.”7   
Where there is no power benefit to the state then there is no motivation for the rational 
realist state to intervene. While morality is discussed by both Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, neither 
gives it more than subordinate consideration. Carr is clear that state morality is distinct from 
individual morality and that ultimately “[i]n the international order, the role of power is greater 
                                                          
4 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc., 1967), 4-11.  
5 Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” in Neorealism and its Critics, 
ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 21.  
6 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism,” International Organization 42 No. 3 (Summer 1988), 488. Grieco provides a five point 
definition of realism declaring: states as the major actor in world affairs; behave as unitary, rational 
agents; states respond to anarchy as the principal force in developing and taking action; and states are 
pre-occupied with power and security which inhibits their willingness to cooperate. These four points 
result in his final position that institutions have only a marginal effect on cooperation. 
7 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Realism and Complex Interdependence,” in George T. Crane and 
Abla Amawi, eds., The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A Reader (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 134.  
33 
 
and that of morality is less.”8 In a realist or neo-realist world, human rights and aid-giving are 
not principle based. These are not priorities.  Any concerns about the plight of individuals are 
immaterial in state-to-state relations. Consequently, this would exclude consideration of human 
rights except when human rights could be used to enhance the state’s power. Thus, these are 
circumstantial and subject to the reality of the state’s pursuit of power.   
Realism does not provide for the potential of states cooperating except if it is in support 
of self-interest. Multilateral institutions do not influence the decisions of states, but rather 
institutions are reflections of powerful states and their interests.9 International organizations, 
like the United Nations (UN), serve as tools for states to use in the pursuit of self-interests. 
Where such advantage cannot be gained realist states refuse to participate or agree.  
Similarly, neo-realists view the state as the unitary actor within an anarchical structure, 
but see the structure – rather than human nature – as the driver behind the principal focus on 
security. Balance of power is sought to create stability.10 Neo-realists stress the need for the 
dominance played by hegemonic states in achieving this balance. Nevertheless, this emphasis on 
conflict between states leads to the same conclusion; states are seen as unitary actors rationally 
focused on state self-interest. All other issues are subordinate to and in support of the existence 
of the state and its relative power to all other states. Realism and neo-realism focus on security, 
                                                          
8 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), 168.  
9 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 no.3 
(Winter, 1994-1995): 7.  
10 Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 207; Kenneth N. 
Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in 
International Relations, 3rd ed., edited by Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz (Canada: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 64-65. 
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war and survival of the state but do not provide much insight into economic interdependence or 
the roles of international institutions and regimes.11 
Both realism and neo-realism are dominated by concerns as to which state has the 
greater gain in any interaction because they focus on relative position to determine power, and 
ultimately winners and losers. Conflicts between states are based on individual self-interests 
and inevitably lead to war. Peace is temporary and achieved as a result of a balance of power. 
However, power changes, and hence peace is impermanent.   
It is thus apparent that in a realist world, human rights – especially those in another 
state – are secondary considerations unless they support the state’s self-interest. Consequently, 
at best human rights considerations become a means of complementing state power and 
security objectives. At worst, they are dismissed as insignificant. Accordingly, states are more 
likely to apply human rights standards selectively and thus inconsistently, ignoring 
transgressions by allied states while acting against ‘unfriendly’ states for similar human rights 
violations.12 Likewise, even positive interventions, such as aid-giving, are driven by the self-
interest of the intervening state, and not out of mutual benefit or a sense of humanitarianism 
toward the recipient state. This is not to say realist states do not provide aid-giving, but they do 
so strictly as a means of enhancing their power.   
 
 
                                                          
11 Steven M. Lamy, “Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism,” in The 
Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations, 4th ed., eds. John Baylis, Steven 
Smith and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 138.  
12 Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and 
Western Europe,” in Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change eds. Judith Goldstein 
& Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 157.  
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Liberalism  
Liberalism has had a long history but realism and neo-realism have dominated 
international relations. However, it is the liberal/neo-liberal views in the 20th century that have 
broadened the international relations agenda extending it beyond state security to include 
economic, social issues and the role of non-state actors. An ideal liberalism was fostered by the 
rise of the League of Nations and faltered in the lead up to the Second World War.13 Yet, liberal 
approaches have gained traction with the post-war evolution of multilateral organizations, 
regimes and institutions, and with the development of global economic interdependence.  
Liberalism has emerged from the idealism of the Greek and Roman Stoics with their 
individual-based moral concept of natural law and universal applicability.14 In this view, man is 
governed by a principle of rationality where reason dictates living by moral and social 
precepts.15 While this embraced living within, and having obligations to, the state, it also applies 
to all mankind in the broader cosmopolitan community. Religion has contributed to the 
development of idealism consistent with these natural laws. In fact, as they specifically pertain 
to human rights, all religions perceive they have contributed to the development of idealism and 
human rights.16 Religious writings have typically called for moral treatment of individuals while 
promoting the idea of individual duty.  
                                                          
13 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939.  
14 Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, 21.  
15 David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: Thucydides to the Present (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 178.  
16 Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2008), 18-22; Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of Human Rights: Visions 
Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 4-9; Saroj Pandey, "Human Rights: Historical 
and Developmental Perspective," in Human Rights: Emerging Issues, edited by Pratibha Upadhayay, 
Meenu Gupta, Ranjana Srivastava, and Saroj Pandey Sudha Malhotra (New Delhi: Ratan Press, 2005). 
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In early liberal thought, Hugo Grotius presented the concepts of the Westphalian state 
and international law in the 17th Century.17  He proposed international law and natural law as a 
means of facilitating interaction, and particularly economic exchange, between states to 
facilitate management of global anarchy. The need to develop rules and norms by which 
sovereign states would interact has in effect established international cooperation as a means to 
manage the global anarchy. His work led to the notion natural law includes respect for the rights 
of others – both of states and individuals.18 While Grotius believed citizens were subject to the 
command of the sovereign state and therefore were required to conform to the will of the state, 
he did accept external intervention into domestic affairs where the state has mistreated its 
citizens.19  
In the next century, Emmerich de Vattel more clearly recognized the existence of 
individual rights relative to the state emanating from natural law. He extrapolated from the 
concept that men are equal to reach the conclusion that states are also equal since they are 
composed of individuals.20  Vattel also recognized the independence of states to manage their 
internal affairs, but acknowledges there is a point at which “All nations have therefore a right to 
resort to forcible means for the purpose of repressing any one particular nation who openly 
violates the laws of the society which Nature has established between them, or who directly 
attacks the welfare and safety of that society.”21 So while the state is sovereign, it has an 
                                                          
17 R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 22-
24. 
18 Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, 25.  
19 Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, 23. Grotius expresses the appropriateness of an 
external state coming to the aid of another country’s citizens in the following statement: “If the individual 
is as much a subject of international law as is a state, and if in any dispute his cause can be regarded as a 
just one the service rendered on his behalf ‘is not only permissible, it is also honorable’.” 24 
20 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, 1883 ed., trans. Joseph Chitty 
(Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1883) Preliminary section 18.  
21 Ibid., Preliminary Section 20.  
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obligation to observe certain universal laws. Where a state has grossly violated these norms, 
other states may intercede.  
Liberalism, and LI in particular, finds roots in the writings of Immanuel Kant. His 
Perpetual Peace provides the underpinnings of a republican and pacific based international 
environment. 22 The growth of liberal states would lead to closer economic relations, a stronger 
commitment to peace, a pacific union, and ultimately to an international recognition of 
cosmopolitan law based on natural law and universal hospitality.23  Kant also based his theory 
on autonomous individuals and individual rights.24 The development of the UN Charter and 
subsequent UN international human rights documents were significantly influenced by Kant. 
Contemporary liberalism, however, is difficult to define as it has been used to include a 
broad spectrum of thought, ranging from cosmopolitan idealism to a Grotian liberalism.25 That 
said, there are common liberal themes; one being that the state is a central actor but that 
international cooperation can be facilitated by multilateral institutions and regimes. These, with 
the support of states, have emerged, evolved and grown to support the orderly management of 
global anarchy.26 Rather than focusing on the realist’s relative gains strategy, liberal theory 
                                                          
22 See Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” in International Relations Theory, 4th ed., eds. Paul 
R. Viotti and Mark R. Kauppi (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2010), 153-4. And Michael Doyle, “Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace,” in Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations, 3rd ed., eds. 
Paul Williams, Donald M. Goldstein and Jay Shafritz (Canada: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 21; and 
Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts 
and Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, (Toronto: Addison-Wesley Educational 
Publishers Inc., 2003), 95-107. 
23 Doyle, “Kant’s Perpetual Peace.”  
24 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morality trans. by H.J. Paton (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2009). 
25 Hedley Bull, “Does Order Exist in World Politics,” in International Relations Theory, 4th ed., eds. Paul R. 
Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (New York: Longman, 2010), 268-270. This is an excerpt from his book, The 
Anarchical Society. Hedley Bull places realism and liberalism on oppose ends of a scale with the Grotian 
view in the middle. 
26 This is generally true, however, as an exception Moraviscik actually claims the primacy of societal actors 
and considers states and political institutions as subsets of domestic society. Andrew Moraviscik, “Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, No.4 
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considers absolute gains as a desirable objective. Unlike realism, liberalism places importance 
on the role of the international economy. And economic development is connected with the 
promotion of basic rights internationally.27 
What is also of great importance in the context of human rights is the emphasis placed 
on individual rights and the state’s normative obligation to uphold these rights. Liberalism 
identifies individuals as having certain basic rights stemming from natural law and that the 
state’s authority evolves from its citizenry; thereby supporting democratic rule and the 
associated rights and freedoms.28  State documents, such as the English Bill of Rights, the US 
Constitution, and the French Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen, were influenced by 
John Locke’s assertions that natural rights of the individual preceded the existence of the state 
and that a primary purpose of the state is to protect these rights.29 His emphasis on rights to 
life, liberty, and property, are key underpinnings of the individualism that exists in today’s 
liberalism and reflected by human rights. While there are differences in how states have 
pursued these, human rights are strongly rooted in republican liberalism and democratic 
processes.30 And it is believed democratic states are less likely to engage in war with each 
other.31 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Autumn 1997): 516-520. Yet liberalist would agree with Forsythe’s statement: “Without downplaying the 
importance of international organizations, private non-profit groups, and even multinational 
corporations, it is still state foreign policy that plays a very large role in the promotion and protection of 
international human rights.” Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 184. 
27 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Boos, 2000).  
28 Tim Dunne, “Liberalism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: an introduction to international relations 
4th ed., eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 110.  
29 Ibid., 6-7; Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights In Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), Chapter 5.  
30 Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western 
Europe,” 139-170. For example, Sikkink contrasts the human rights policies of the United States with 
those pursued by the European community during the cold war period.  
31 W. Andy Knight and Tom Keating, Global Politics: Emerging Networks, Trends, and Challenges (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2010), 37.  
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It is the connection between economic development and social concerns that this thesis 
draws upon. Human rights are clearly a secondary concern and as a consequence it can be 
expected that there will be conflicts between the pursuit of economic goals and human rights 
progress. In addition, there have been accusations leveled against the West that the developed 
states are attempting to impose western cultural beliefs on rest of the world. While this will be 
discussed under human rights, it has applicability in a broader liberal context. Liberal theory 
does recognize the individual, not just in terms of rights but in the pursuit of a democratic 
republic. For many leaders, this is not a welcome objective.  
LI, as part of an emerging “neo-liberal” tradition in the 1980s, explored international 
institutions, regimes and conventions pointing to the significant roles these non-state actors had 
in facilitating international relations through multilateralism. Unlike realists who see such 
organizations as being of minor importance and resulting in constraints on the state, LI see them 
as allowing states to accomplish what they could not otherwise do on their own. Based on 
mutual interests, states may cooperate as part of various regimes that operate within some 
level of agreed upon rules and norms.32 Regimes allow states to share the international burden, 
but also to create obligations based on these agreed to standards.33 Follow through is prompted 
by self-interest, concerns over international image, and the expectations of reciprocity.34 
Clearly, LI is not based on altruism. States engage in multilateral relationships to pursue self-
interests, directly or indirectly, but also consider normative values.  
LI, similar to realism, acknowledges the state as the central actor, which acts rationally. 
However, LI sees regimes as a means of managing the anarchical society and rejects that this 
                                                          
32 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 2-5. 
33 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. (Boston: Longman, 2012), 
285.   
34 Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 135. 
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anarchy must lead to war. Instead LI identifies absolute gains, rather than relative gains, as 
being key to pursuing a common good as regimes encourage economic globalization and liberal 
world order.35 States collaborate on a wide range of areas from economic to social agendas, as 
well as security issues, and thereby facilitate a more peaceful international environment. 
Important to this thesis is the fact regimes can influence and even direct state policy 
through the world views and beliefs that become embedded in the institutions.36  Oran Young 
points out that once these institutions are created, they can take on identities separate from the 
original intent contemplated by the member states.37 These beliefs can translate into direction 
within the regime and become policy for member states. An obvious example has been the 
broad adoption of international human rights by UN member states.  
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye assert that regimes help a great power bring pressure 
to bear on lesser powers to ensure compliance by relying on the rules and standards set within 
the regime. But regimes also provide assurances that other member states are also 
committed.38  Of equal importance, regimes give lesser states forums to promote self-interests 
and beliefs with the support of like states.  
Regimes have wide application ranging from the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
UN, and multilateral organizations such as the Commonwealth, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, la Francophonie, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Each regime has a different mandate and varying degrees of standardized rules 
                                                          
35 Richard Little, “International Regimes,” in The Globalization of World Politics: an introduction to 
international relations 4th ed., eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 299. 
36 Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 135. 
37 Oran Young, “The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” International Organization 36 No. 2 (Spring 
1982): 277-297.  
38 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 285. 
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based on their individual purpose and level of collaboration. For example, development 
assistance does not have the same structured level of commitment that is apparent in the WTO. 
However, less structured regimes do provide mutual commitments that morally bind states to 
objectives that could not be accomplished independently.  
As the world has become more interconnected and interdependent, states rely more 
and more on regimes to facilitate the pursuit of their self-interests. Keohane points out that 
these many institutions have led to “a world of thick networks of interdependence.”39 It is this 
that LI predicts facilitates a world order. Development assistance and international human rights 
have both evolved under the influence of such regimes. Canada has been called an “inveterate 
joiner” of multilateral organizations. 40 This makes the LI perspective appropriate to the 
theoretical aspect of this thesis.  
 
Human Rights and Development Assistance 
This thesis supports the liberal view that there are universal human rights, which stem 
from the notion of natural rights. It is important to understand what is meant when the term 
‘human rights’ is used. To many, this means the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). But when a state, institution or individual calls for action to be taken because of human 
rights violations, a much narrower definition is typically used. This begs the question that if 
states are expected to give or not give aid to motivate actions by the recipient state, then what 
human rights are being referenced? As was seen in the previous chapter, there are a number of 
                                                          
39 Keohane, “From Interdependence to Institutions,” 169. 
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human rights measurement scales used by different studies. This thesis favours a minimalist 
view of human rights that encompass universal personal integrity rights.  
Human rights are widely regarded as rights that a human has purely by virtue of being a 
human being.41 Despite the vagueness of this definition, it does provide that human rights are 
inherent and apply universally to all people equally. Human rights of this kind are inalienable or 
immutable, and are limited in number and scope. 42 These are often referred to as ‘basic rights’ 
or ‘fundamental rights’. Although there are varying views as to what constitutes these rights, 
basis rights most appropriately relate to the protection of individual personal security including 
protection from physical harm and, as a minimum, the right to subsistence conditions, 
consistent with the views of Henry Shue, Diana Meyers, and Michael Ignatieff.43  
Henry Shue has asserted that basic rights are hierarchically more important than other 
rights. Security rights focus on the right to life, protection from physical harm and restraint, and 
certain related liberties, while subsistence refers to the right to a minimal level of nourishment 
and physical care. No other right can be enjoyed if the person’s life and personal security are at 
risk, or under the threat of death or torture. But correctly so, he also noted that living without 
sufficient food, shelter or basic medical care also make it impossible to enjoy any other right.44 It 
is these basic rights that all people arguably should reasonably expect, and for Shue form some 
degree of duty on others. In the context of this thesis the responsibility to provide subsistence is 
                                                          
41 Tom Campbell, Rights: A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2006), 34; Michael Ignatieff, The 
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42 Diana T. Meyers, Inalienable Rights: A Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 
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assisted by the developed states through development assistance while the security rights must 
be directly protected by the recipient state. 
Similarly, Diana Meyers makes a distinction between inalienable rights and other rights. 
She identifies four inalienable rights: the right to life, the right to personal liberty – protection 
from slavery and servitude, the right not to be tortured or to suffer gratuitous acute pain, and 
the right to basic needs of food, shelter, medical care in order to survive.45 Other rights may 
exist but they are based on specific circumstances and are not applicable to all people. In other 
words, this would mean these other rights are subject to cultural nuances.  
In a more simplified approach, Ignatieff poses the simple question as to whether other 
humans would want to be on the receiving end of certain actions as a means of establishing 
what constitutes a human right.46 Literally no one wants ‘to be abused in mind or body,’ which 
provides the basis for universal rights. Such rights essentially represent the minimum condition 
necessary for life.47 This is a basic minimalist approach to human rights that supersedes 
relativism.  
These narrow views of human rights are consistent with the personal integrity rights 
envisioned in the Political Terror Scale measure used in some of the quantitative studies in the 
previous chapter. These rights do not include the right to subsistence and basic material needs 
identified above, but these are issues that development assistance normally is targeted at. It is 
difficult to argue personal integrity rights are not claimed by all individuals. Eric Neumayer quite 
                                                          
45 Meyers, Inalienable Rights. 
46 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry,  88-9. 
47 Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution:, 22.  
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rightly asserts: “... personal integrity rights violations are without doubt nonexcusable and are 
not subject to relativist challenges.”48 
The notion of one state having concerns about the human rights performance of 
another state has liberal roots but can be viewed both from idealist and pragmatic perspectives. 
Katarina Tomasevski asserts: “[t]he legitimacy of promoting human rights in other countries 
derives from their universality … rights of people anywhere represent a legitimate concern for 
people everywhere.”49 But on the pragmatic side, states that commit severe human rights 
violations are unstable and threaten regional and, in some cases, global stability. Refugee crises, 
violent oppression, lack of individual freedom and equality are disruptive to peace and 
economic prosperity.  
Aid can be used as a ‘carrot or stick’ to foster specific actions by recipient states. 50 But 
aid also places obligations on the donor state. Aid, particularly bilateral aid, provides support to 
the government of the recipient state. Therefore, aid provided to a government that, as a policy, 
perpetrates violations of human rights directly or indirectly contributes to that state’s 
repression.51 In what is basically a normative argument, Tomasevski states: “... people are the 
centre of development, and the aim of development is to improve the enjoyment of human 
rights and to enlarge human freedom.”52 Logically then aid that does not contribute to this 
outcome should be questioned. And aid that may have the opposite impact should be stopped 
or discontinued. Thus, states, acting collectively or alone, must consider the ramification of the 
aid they provide. 
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49 Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited, 153 
50 Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 6. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
 
 
The intent of this chapter is to explain the evolution of and motives underlying Canada’s 
commitments to development assistance. Canadian foreign policy (CFP) will be considered in the 
context of the earlier International Relations (IR) theory discussion. This will be followed by a 
chronological historical account of how Canadian aid has evolved and the relevance given to 
human rights. This includes a review of the more recent policy statements of significance from 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Key within Canada’s foreign affairs 
policies and decision-making has been its membership in various multilateral organizations, and 
thus its pursuit of a liberal agenda. Canada has been prepared to voice opinions on international 
direction but it has done so within the mainstream of international direction. For this reason 
attention will be paid to Canada’s multilateral memberships. Emphasis will be placed on the 
most recent two decades and in particular the period including the Chrétien and Harper 
governments, as these are pertinent to the quantitative analysis.  
 
Canada and International Relations 
Prior to the Second World War, Canada’s foreign relations were largely dominated by its 
subordinate relationship with Great Britain. However, post-war, Canada – like other middle and 
smaller powers, such as Australia and New Zealand – endeavoured to develop its role within the 
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evolving international social order.1 With the economies of all European states in ruins and 
global economic power being dominated by the United States, Canada was in a position to 
leverage the importance of its relatively superior manufacturing and technological power and its 
geopolitical advantage. Canada also believed it had earned a greater voice given its 
contributions and sacrifices during the war.  
There has been a number of theories put forward attempting to explain Canada’s 
approach to foreign policy. David Dewitt and John Kirton offer that Canada has acted, since the 
late 1960s, as a principal power driven by realism’s self-interest; yet not as a dominant military 
power, but rather as a resource and technology power with an adequate military presence.2 
Kirton has further posited Canada’s position in the world has been determined by a changing 
world order as hegemons and superpowers have declined. As a leading political power, Canada 
predictably has exerted its self-interests and values on a bilateral basis in a complex neo-realist 
approach. 3 Consistent with this theory, it should be expected that Canada would focus 
development assistance where it would primarily benefit Canada’s political and security 
interests, irrespective of recipient states’ needs. Development assistance would be focused on 
current Canadian economic gains and further trade opportunities.  
However, this does not account for the greater emphasis Canada has on many of the 
poorest states. While there have been periods where Canada’s foreign policy has increased 
emphasis on trade opportunities, including those generated through development assistance 
projects, Canada’s aid has been dominated by poverty reduction efforts in numerous least 
                                                          
1 Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights. 
2 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 75. Political challenges and actions by both Quebec and France to orchestra 
support for French-speaking countries prompted Canada to expand its aid program, specifically to French-
speaking African states. Ultimately this resulted in Canada joining la Francophonie in an effort to limit 
Quebec’s involvement internationally. 
3 John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Toronto: Nelson, 2007), 80-84.  
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developed countries that present little, if any, enduring economic benefit for Canada.  Further, 
realist theory is amoral, whereas the emphasis Canada has placed on poverty reduction, human 
rights, democracy, and good governance speaks to a more complex foreign policy driven by 
normative views and not solely based on self-interest. This realist view also understates the 
substantial role Canada has played within multilateral organizations and the internal domestic 
dynamics that are at work in formulating CFP.4  
In an alternate view, Stephen Clarkson claims Canada is a subordinate partner to the US 
from whom it has simply taken its foreign policy cues. Clarkson postulates that due to Canada’s 
dependence on this superpower, CFP decisions have been subject to the direction and approval 
of the US in a form of peripheral dependence. Thus, he asserts Canada has deferred to the US 
without formulating its own identity and policies.5 While this certainly was the case previously 
with regards to Canada’s relationship with Great Britain during Canada’s long transition from a 
colony to a completely sovereign state, its relationship with the US is more complex and 
nuanced. Prime Ministers John Diefenbaker, Pierre Trudeau and, to a lesser extent, Jean 
Chrétien were politically detached from the US, whereas Prime Ministers Lester Pearson, Brian 
Mulroney, and, to some degree, Stephen Harper moved to create closer relations with the US. 
But none of these Prime Ministers have strictly conformed to a US direction in the face of 
contradictory domestic political sentiments. Canada’s interests are also reflected in the interests 
and obligations resulting from its role in multilateral organizations – such as the Commonwealth 
and la Francophonie – in which the US does not have membership. In addition, Canada has on 
                                                          
4 For example, immigrant voices, such as those from the Haitian diaspora, in some cases have been 
influential in the government’s response to international issues and the development of CFP. Similarly, 
the role Quebec has taken in international la Francophonie forums has had significant influence in shaping 
foreign policy.  
5 Stephen Clarkson, “The Choices to be Made,” in Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates 
and New Ideas, 2nd ed., eds. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
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numerous situations taken positions counter to the US – most recently on the Iraq war and 
earlier in its resistance to becoming a full member of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
despite US urgings – and consequently has not demonstrated a consistent dependency on the 
superpower. 
Cranford Pratt offers that CFP, and in particular development assistance, has been in 
support of the dominant class rather than to address third world needs. Pratt’s view is based on 
what ‘ought’ to be as he advocates a humane internationalism that places primacy on the 
requirements of the most needy, instead of using aid to advance the interests of capitalism.6 To 
Pratt, development assistance was borne out of support for commercial business interests. In 
the 1960s and 1970s the focus was also driven by Canada’s role as a middle power and 
expanded to support the Cold War anti-communism agenda. 7  
By the end of the 1980s Pratt differentiated motives within the dominant interest group 
when he acknowledged that the political elite and certain government ministers had prescribed 
a more forceful consideration of human rights only to be thwarted by a civil service bureaucracy  
that choose to apply business-friendly interpretations.8 The theme of Canada development 
assistance principally being for the benefit of the dominant class has continued through the end 
of the century and into the current one. The result has been human rights have only been 
                                                          
6 Pratt, “Humane Internationalism and Canadian Development Assistance Policies,” 334-380, and 
specifically 371.  
7 Ibid., 339; 341. 
8 Cranford Pratt, “The Limited Place of Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Human Rights, 
Development and Foreign Policy: Canadian Perspectives ed. Irving Brecher (Halifax: The Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 1989). Pratt is particular critical of the civil service minimalist handling of The 
Code of Conduct for Canadian Businesses with respect to South Africa business opportunities, and earlier 
lack of action on Chile and El Salvador human rights violations. 173. 
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considered when they have supported security or commercial considerations; otherwise they 
have not been emphasized.9 
Pratt’s view that development assistance is singularly in support of the Canadian 
dominant class is based on a different set of interests from other Canadians. This is not clear at 
all. Despite pointing to examples where the bureaucracy has at times failed to act upon more 
humane internationalist directives from the political elite, he suggests a cohesive dominant class 
is at work. However, while it is the case that the state is ultimately responsible for decisions 
regarding development aid, the fact is every Canadian government has had conflicting factions 
within cabinet, and between departments and the bureaucracy. Decisions have been taken by 
CIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), as well as other 
departments somewhat independently. While these may all be under the same bureaucracy, 
they have frequently had different, conflicting motivations. DFAIT has advocated more politically 
strategic decisions and economic ties with development aid.10 Yet CIDA has demonstrated a 
strong commitment to poverty reduction in countries where there are few ongoing commercial 
opportunities. This conflict is also evident with other departments such as Finance and more 
recently Defence and Public Safety. While the observation economic and security considerations 
have been important self-interests and continue to be, development assistance has been 
provided to many states that have little to offer Canada now or in the foreseeable future.   
The most commonly held theoretical view of Canada’s foreign policy has been liberal 
internationalism (LI), with its focus on sovereign states as dominant actors while recognizing the 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 174. 
10 See Scharfe, Complicity. 
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role and influence of international organizations and institutions. 11  This theory of 
multilateralism stems from the work of John Holmes on Canada as a middle power has 
leveraged its relative global economic strength as a developed state through its commitment to 
international institutions and organizations. This has simply been a pragmatic way for Canada to 
not only achieve its national interests but to demonstrate its skill at providing ideas that are also 
of international benefit, and thereby establishing influence and its image.12 Understanding the 
limitations of being a middle power allows a state to operate within its capabilities in a global 
context and to create space to allow their views and interests to be heard.13 This means being 
selective in the issues it pursues by only participating in activities for which the state has the 
capacity and that provide recognized value to the recipient.14 For Canada, this has led to an 
emphasis on multilateral approaches by aligning with ‘like-minded’ states, where Canada has 
worked cooperatively and collaboratively within global and regional systems. This 
multilateralism has included adopting the rules and norms of the different multilateral and 
global organizations.  
This liberal interpretation provides the most comprehensive and consistent view when 
considering development assistance. In the context of LI, self-interest is an expected 
consideration. And it also allows for world views and principled beliefs to influence state 
decisions. Specifically, this view allows for the contemplation of recipient need as well as donor 
self-interest. If Canada made aid decisions solely or principally based on self-interest, it would 
not focus on the poorest countries and the normative objective of poverty reduction. It also 
                                                          
11 John Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle." In Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy, eds. Duane Bratt and 
Christopher J. Kukucha (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a 
Changing World, 39-43. 
12 John Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle". 
13 Tom Keating, “Update Canada and the New Multilateralism,” in Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: 
Classic Debates and New Ideas eds. Duane Bratt & Christopher J. Kukucha (Don Mills: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 22. 
14 Adam Chapnick, “The Canadian middle power myth,” International Journal 55 no. 2 (Spring 2000): 189.  
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would not be providing assistance to virtually all of the developing countries. Canada has 
traditionally responded similarly to the like-minded states in placing an emphasis on recipient 
needs – specifically with respect to poverty alleviation – and not in a purely self-interested 
manner.15 However, Canada has also demonstrated a commitment to its own interests since it 
has historically conditioned a high level of tied aid. But, after international pressure from the G-
8 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the early 2000s, 
the Chrétien and Martin governments began reducing tied aid until in 2008 the Harper 
government announced it would phase out the requirement for aid to be tied to Canadian 
providers by 2013.  
 
Canada’s Entrance into Development Assistance  
In 1950, Canada began providing development assistance when it committed to assist 
Commonwealth countries in Asia, in particular India and Pakistan, under the Colombo plan.16 
Canada’s initial involvement was hesitant and cautious, but grew from its dual commitment to 
the Commonwealth and the Western powers – in particular the US – as they focused on 
thwarting the growth of communism in the third world.17 Bilateral aid was a mix of grants and 
loans, which were tied to the purchase of Canadian goods, technologies and services for major 
infrastructure projects that in the recipient states.18 While these projects did benefit recipient 
                                                          
15 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 20. Neumayer specifically singles out France for its foreign aid 
being driven by self-interests and contrasts this with the actions of the like-minded states, including 
Canada.   
16 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 33. And, Jean Cermakian, "Canada’s role in the foreign aid programmes to 
the developping nations : a geographical appraisal," Cahiers de géographie du Québec 12, no. 26 (1968): 
225-234. 
17 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 27-28. And, Pratt, “Humane Internationalism and Canadian Development 
Assistance Policies,” 338-339. 
18 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 35.  
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states, the Canadian economy and businesses also profited. Canada’s motives for aid in this 
period have been described as promoting humanitarianism, political interests, and commercial 
interests.19 Canada’s motivation to participate in the Colombo Plan was directly tied to geo-
political and economic strategies that included both international and domestic considerations. 
Participation allowed Canada to be a player with multilateral influence while benefitting 
domestically.  
From these cautious beginnings, Canada expanded its aid-giving in 1958 by committing 
to a modest program in support of Commonwealth Caribbean countries, followed by a similar 
program in Commonwealth Africa two years later. In 1961, Canada extended its development 
assistance program to French-speaking Africa.  Depending on one’s perspective, this initiative 
was either as a result of pressure from Quebec or as a logical next step for a bilingual, bicultural 
donor country.20 Regardless, it is clear there was at least some degree of motivation created by 
the international interests initiated by Quebec. Thus, Canada, as a bilingual, decentralized 
federalist state, was obliged to consider the domestic ramifications of its development 
assistance policies. Canada’s commitment to French-speaking countries grew further with its 
membership in la Francophonie in 1970. Effectively la Francophonie has become the French 
equivalent of the Commonwealth.21 This membership again broadened Canada’s breadth of 
recipient countries and created more associated commitments. 
Also in 1961, Canada, as a founding nation of the OECD, took an active role in assisting 
developing countries. The OECD has been committed to raising the overall global standard of 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 13. 
20 Cermakian, "Canada’s role in the foreign aid programmes to the developping nations,” 231. 
21 However, unlike the Commonwealth, la Francophonie has representation from non-state actors. 
Consequently, Quebec and New Brunswick became members in 1971 and 1977 respectively. Quebec in 
particular has demonstrated a willingness to participate at the international level despite its provincial 
status.  
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living, particularly in developing states.22 As a liberal multilateral institution, the OECD focused 
on improving the economic prosperity of developing countries through development assistance 
and trade. It also promoted democracy and individual rights as a means to create greater global 
stability and discouraged communism in the developing world. Consequently, the OECD has paid 
special attention to the least developed countries and has promoted commitment to poverty 
relief and reduction. While this has some economic benefit for developed states, it has primarily 
aimed at improving the condition of the most in need, and aligns to some extent with Henry 
Shue’s normative view of ensuring at least subsistence conditions.23 
In 1964, Canada agreed to a limited bilateral program in Latin America.24 In the first 15 
years of Canadian aid-giving, 50 per cent went to Commonwealth countries. 25 Canada’s 
motivation at the time has been described as being based on maintaining and enhancing its 
perceived image with other Western states and domestic self-interest.26 
Such development efforts, however, were hampered by the absence of long term aid 
planning, and a lack of clarity and leadership within its bureaucracy. Keith Spicer reported early 
conflicts between External Affairs, CIDA, and the Finance department over governance, with 
                                                          
22 Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, About the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed May 19, 
2012). The OECD was established in 1961 following the success of Organisation for European Economic 
Co-operation in the recovery of the Europe. 
23 Shue, Basic Rights. 
24 Cermakian, "Canada’s role in the foreign aid programmes to the developping nations : a geographical 
appraisal," 225-234. 
25 Spicer, A Samaritan State?, 54.  
26 Kim Richard Nossal, "Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada's Interest in Development Assistance," Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 21, no. 1 (March 1988): 50. Nossal argues this pursuit of status is based on 
seeking prestige as a necessary requirement for a developed state to be member in good standing in the 
international community. However, from a LI view Canada’s actions could also be considered consistent 
with a growing commitment to multilateralism through international organizations.  
54 
 
each department wanting to dictate direction.27 Despite others’ interest in using development 
assistance to create economic opportunities, when CIDA officially became an independent 
agency its primary focus was on the poorest peoples in the world and embraced the values of 
humane internationalism, which exacerbated this internal government conflict.28  This struggle 
would be a reoccurring theme in subsequent decades.   
As Canada’s foreign policy matured it embraced a broader commitment to multilateral 
organizations as a means of bolstering its influence and international image. These 
memberships have been instrumental in the formation of Canadian policy. Kim Nossal cites a 
myriad of organizations, coalitions, and alliances that Canada has found to be of benefit. Some 
relate to national security and world order, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), other military coalitions and alliances, and various UN organizations; others have 
focused on trade and commerce, such as the World Trade Organization, the International 
Labour Organization, and the World Bank; while still other inclusive organizations, such as the 
regional associations, the UN itself, and the Commonwealth have had broad purposes.29 These 
and other multilateral institutions have promoted aid and assistance to developing states and 
have had great influence over Canada’s foreign policy.  
The increase in geographic breadth did result in increases in actual Canadian dollars 
spent on aid, although aid as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) did not increase 
                                                          
27 Spicer, A Samaritan State?, 105-106. Spicer offers insightful comments on these departments (External 
Affairs, CIDA, and Finance) and difficulty in gaining commitment from the civil service on aid projects. 
While Canada moved ahead with broader geographic and program aid projects, the same progress did not 
occur on governance.  
28 Pratt, “Humane Internationalism and Canadian Development Policies,”342-343.  
29 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada 
Inc., 1997), 41-44. 
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initially.30 Canada’s commitment to development assistance was tepid at best, providing just 
enough aid to maintain its international standing and image. But, only the major powers of the 
US, Great Britain, and France provided significant foreign aid, and this aid focused on the Cold 
War objective of thwarting the growing influence of the Soviet Union.31 In fact, similar to 
Canada’s middle power role, it has continued to maintain a position in the middle of the pack for 
providing development aid.  
In 1968 former Prime Minister Lester Pearson, as the chair of the Commission on 
International Development, offered in the report, Partners in Development, a humane 
international rationale for the question ‘why aid?’ with this statement: ‘the simplest answer is a 
moral one: that it is only right for those who have to share with those who have not.’32 This 
international report called for establishing a development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of 
GNP to be in place by 1975 and no later than 1980.33 The Canadian government of the day and 
subsequent governments adopted this as the goal, as did other donor states. And while Canada 
did increase its development assistance, this target would never be achieved (See Appendix II). 
But even in this Canada was following the lead of the major developed countries; only a handful 
of smaller countries have ever reached this 0.7 per cent target.34 
 
 
                                                          
30Cranford Pratt, “Moral Vision and Foreign Policy: The Case of Canadian Development Assistance,” in 
Ethics and Security In Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. Rosalind Irwin (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 339. “By 
1964, Canadian ODA had fallen from an already low 0.19 per cent of Canadian GNP to 0.16 per cent. In 
1961, Canada’s aid as a proportion of GNP ranked 11th of the 12 states then members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC).”  
31Ibid., 65.  
32 Cited in: Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 18. 
33 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 85. 
34 These were the other like-minded states: Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway. Canada has 
been identified as one of the like-minded states but has failed to follow the lead on the percentage target.  
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Development Assistance During The 1970s and Early 1980s  
In 1972, Canada became an observer with OAS but did not become a full member until 
1990. Canada was reluctant to fully participate in OAS because of the dominant role the US 
played in the organization. However, Canada already had a strong development assistance 
connection with the Commonwealth Caribbean countries reaching back to the 1950s fostered 
by Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s enthusiastic support of the Commonwealth.35 In addition, it 
already had an established relationship with Haiti stemming from Haiti’s immigrant and 
language connection with Quebec, Haiti’s status as the only least developed country in the 
Western Hemisphere, and Canada’s membership in la Francophonie. Canada’s subsequent 
involvement in OAS simply reinforced these existing connections. Canada has generally been 
seen as a wealthy, non-superpower OAS member which has been perceived to be less 
threatening relationship, especially with the Caribbean countries.  
In 1976, Canada was invited to become a member of the G-7.36 Unlike the other 
members, Canada did not have a colonial past or an imperialist-superpower outlook. 37 
Generally, the other member states’ agendas related to their past and existing territorial 
interests. Yet as a member, Canada has been expected to participate in initiatives perhaps more 
suited to these other states. This was most apparent when, in 2002, this organization committed 
to address the abject poverty and starvation in Africa.38 While Canada’s history with Africa had 
been relatively limited, the European members of the G-7 had significant past colonial and 
                                                          
35 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 34. 
36 Ibid., 16. 
37 The reference to colonial ties is in the context of Canada not having been a colonial power with 
governance over states or territories outside its own boundaries, and therefore has no direct historical 
interests. The other G-7 members (Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United States) all 
have had significant colonial or imperial connections.    
38 Canada, as host of the Kananaskis Summit, 2002, led this initiative. This is discussed further in the 
Chrétien era. 
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business ties. Nevertheless, Canada significantly increased its African development assistance, 
as did all members. 
The Trudeau government pledged that development assistance would be strongly linked 
with commercial opportunities and political influence. Development assistance was to be based 
on three considerations: first, caring about international poverty creates concern about 
domestic poverty; second, being a good global citizen would increase support for Canada’s 
influence on policies with other countries and international institutions; and third, providing aid 
would initiate and cultivate commercial opportunities for export trade.39 Consistent with LI, the 
Trudeau government was pursuing multilateralism as a means of furthering economic self-
interests, and its international and domestic image through development assistance.  
Despite the emphasis on economic opportunities, CIDA increasingly shifted its aid 
program toward poverty reduction in the least developed countries, consistent with the focus of 
the OECD.40 This shift further alienated CIDA from other government departments’ commercial 
mandates. For example, at that time CIDA was under pressure from the Department of Industry, 
Trade and Commerce (IT&C) to maximize the economic opportunities by giving IT&C greater 
involvement in bilateral aid decisions.41 In fact these kinds of tensions have grown as more 
departments have become interested in international development. By the latter half of the 
1970s, the pendulum began to swing back in favour of self-interest. CIDA – again under new 
leadership – was specifically committed to the support of projects that would have economic 
benefit for Canada.42 Yet, Canada’s core aid recipients continued to be dominated by the least 
                                                          
39 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 92.  
40 Ibid., 104; and, Tomasevski, Development Aid and Human Rights Revisited, 31. 
41 Ibid., 106. 
42 Pratt, “Humane Internationalism and Canadian Development Policies,” 343. 
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developed countries.43 At the same time CIDA’s commitments expanded to include many more 
countries.44 So despite the commitment to increasing domestic economic benefit, poverty 
reduction continued to be considered.  
Prior to the mid-1970s human rights performance was not a consideration in 
development assistance. Canada, with domestic pressure from church groups and NGOs, began 
to recognize it had a responsibility to consider human rights in its foreign policy. While this 
concept was acknowledged, particularly by politicians responding to public concern, human 
rights clearly remained subordinate to other foreign policy objectives, and were little more than 
talking points. 45  Meanwhile, in 1977 CIDA set two main objectives; these were to use 
development to support recipient self-reliance and providing basic human needs – human rights 
were not included.46 In 1978 a committee chaired by External Affairs determined development 
had been overly focused on the least developed countries. The recommended and accepted 
formula for the distribution of aid was 40 per cent on need, 25 per cent based on political 
relations, 20 per cent on economic performance, and 15 per cent on commercial relations.47 
This marked yet another shift in direction away from CIDA’s objectives. 
Domestic pressure on human rights issues continued through the 1980s where several 
Parliamentary reports supported human rights conditionality for aid. For example, David 
Morrison cites a 1981 subcommittee report on Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean:  
                                                          
43 David Morrison, “The Choice of Bilateral Recipients,” in Canadian International Development Assistance 
Policies: An Appraisal, 2nd ed., ed. Cranford Pratt (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
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44 Morrison, “The Choice of Bilateral Recipients,” 135-139. 
45 Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, “Conclusion: Questions and Prospects,” in Human Rights in 
Canadian Foreign Policy, eds. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt (Kingston & Montréal: McGill-
Kingston University Press, 1988), 29; Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 205. In 1977 Parliament 
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Canadian development assistance should be substantially reduced, terminated or not 
commenced ... where gross and systemic violations of human rights make it impossible 
to promote the central objective of helping the poor. 48  
It was recommended that where such violations existed aid be provided through NGOs 
rather than being provided bilaterally where it de facto would be supporting a repressive 
regime. This was met with general agreement that human rights were important but did not 
receive the necessary endorsement for action. Canada was in step with other states as this 
concern over human rights violations had support from the UN and numerous countries but 
generated ad hoc action only. While there are some selective cases where Canada reduced or 
eliminated aid, action was inconsistent and infrequent.49   
There was reluctance within the Trudeau government to withdraw aid except in the face 
of the most serious violations. Allan MacEachern, External Affairs Minister, claimed such actions 
by Canada would do little to change the behaviour of recipient states unless there was 
international support and regardless the most affected would be the poor people who were 
already suffering under a repressive government.50 This again displays Canada’s commitment to 
multilateralism, but in this case it was an excuse for not acting. It also demonstrates the 
problem created by spreading development assistance over too many countries; giving small 
donations does not provide the donor with leverage.  
In summary, the first 30 years of Canada’s development assistance, aid was largely 
promoted by membership in multilateral organizations and conditioned by commercial trade. 
And despite a significant increase, Canada’s development assistance only reached 0.49 per cent 
                                                          
48Ibid., 202.  
49 Keenleyside, “Aiding Rights,” 244-250; Gillies, Between Principle and Practice, 236; and T.A. 
Keenleyside, “Canadian Aid and Human Rights: Forging a Link,” in Human Rights, Development and 
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of Gross National Income (GNI) by 1980 (See Appendix II), against a target of 0.7 per cent.51 The 
only normative consideration was the commitment to alleviating poverty, and was based on the 
influence of the UN and OECD. Human rights concerns were raised in the later years, but with 
little definitive action. Still, Canada’s approach was consistent with that of most other developed 
states.  
 
The Mulroney Progressive Conservative Government Years 
The 1986 Special Joint Committee on International Relations (Hockin-Simard report) 
called for the government to adopt a previous recommendation to tie official development 
assistance to human rights performance. It advocated Canada take a more vocal role 
internationally on human rights violations in a ‘constructive internationalism.’ This report 
faulted CIDA for a lack of direction and raised concerns that Canada’s aid programs had been 
weakened by political and trade pressures.52   
A year later, the Senate report, For Whose Benefit? (Winegard Report), also criticized 
CIDA’s lack of policy coherence and lack of international focus. The report recommended CIDA 
policies be principally based on humanitarianism. This report proposed Canada identify no more 
than thirty core aid partners that would be selected based on their “demonstrated capacity to 
use aid effectively (especially for the poor), and respect shown for human rights.”53 This 
essentially reinforced the Hockin-Simard recommendations. In its view good human rights 
should be recognized with increased aid and serious human rights violations should result in 
                                                          
51 The government uses GNI to calculate the percentage of development assistance. Pratt has instead 
referenced GNP, which is a similar calculation. This study will use GNI as this is consistent with most 
government reports. 
52 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 273-4. 
53 Ibid., 282. 
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reduced aid or even the curtailment of projects.54 Both of these reports cautioned that care had 
to be taken to ensure aid continued addressing the needs of the poorest and was not solely to 
be based on the actions of an abusive government. This concern about harming the poor has 
frequently limited action.  
The government responded to these two proposals in 1987 with Sharing our Future, 
which outlined CIDA’s new vision statement on aid strategy. In addition to reiterating Canada’s 
commitment to address Third world poverty reduction, it also placed an emphasis on women in 
development, ecologically sustainable programs, food security, and programs to provide energy. 
Canada’s position on human rights violations was specifically addressed. Bilateral aid was to be 
directly linked to the cabinet’s assessment as to whether a country’s human right violations 
were systemic, gross and continuous. In such cases, aid could still be redirected through non-
government and multilateral organizations in an effort to ensure those most in need would not 
be doubly penalized. Additionally, humanitarian needs would not be denied because of human 
rights violations, but government-to-government development assistance was to be conditioned 
upon human rights performance.55 However, this policy lacked a clear understanding of which 
human rights were to be considered as the policy simply offered the ubiquitous catchall of “... 
the principles of greater respect for human rights.”56 This of course left decisions subject to 
other political influences.   
Yet, under Prime Minister Mulroney, the government became the most vocally 
committed to human rights of all the Canadian governments. This included Canada being the 
first country to place requirements on recipient countries with respect to human rights 
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obligations.57 But, it generally did so in the context of a human rights discourse other developed 
states were also engaged in.  
Canada did, in some cases, suspend or reduce development assistance over human 
rights abuses. Prior to 1987, Canadian bilateral assistance to Cambodia, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Indonesia, and Vietnam were suspended for various periods.58 T.A. Keenleyside notes 
that in the remainder of the decade Canada suspended or reduced bilateral aid to Haiti, 
Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, and threatened to take similar action with Somalia.59 As the Mulroney 
government entered the 1990s it also reduced or curtailed aid to several Africa states – Kenya, 
Rwanda, and Zaire – over human rights violations.60 None of these states had large programs 
nor did this represent significant commercial opportunities.  
Additionally, Mulroney personally weighed in on certain international human rights 
issues. In 1985, he condemned South Africa on its Apartheid policy and imposed sanctions. He 
followed this by raising the issue at Commonwealth, la Francophonie and G-7 meetings with the 
intent of creating broader international action.61 Uncharacteristically, this was done in spite of 
stiff opposition from other developed states. Mulroney’s human rights commitment was again 
demonstrated in 1991 when he announced at the Commonwealth conference, and later with la 
Francophonie, that “Canada will not subsidize repression and the stifling of democracy. We shall 
increasingly be channeling our development assistance to those countries which show respect 
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for fundamental rights and freedoms.”62 Consistent with LI, he sought to leverage Canada’s 
voice through multilateralism. Partially through Mulroney’s efforts, the Commonwealth, la 
Francophonie, and OAS each adopted good governance statements that encouraged states and 
non-state actors to intervene in to protect economic and political standards in other member 
states.63 In this instance Canada did not look to the multilateral organizations to establish rules 
and standards but was actively lobbying to persuade other states to adopt a principled 
approach.   
However, Canada did not take action in all cases where human rights violations had 
been viewed as severe. For example, aid was continued to such countries as Bangladesh, India, 
and Pakistan, and aid was restarted with Indonesia despite their severe human rights 
violations.64 The most notable example was the muted response to China’s suppression of pro-
democracy students at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Canada’s actions were far more diplomatic 
than they were substantive with only a token suspension of development assistance.65 David 
Morrison points out bilateral aid to China quickly normalized and in 1991-92 and 1992-93 China 
had become Canada’s second largest recipient of government-to-government assistance.66 
Canada had cultivated relations with China over the previous 20 years and had become a major 
trading partner for Canada. In this case clearly economic self-interest took precedent over 
human rights principles.  
While this government had made many rhetorical advances on linking human rights 
with development assistance, these had not translated into consistent, predictable practice. 
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Canada was more likely to respond to human rights violations in pro-Soviet states than those in 
‘friendly’ states. Likewise, steps were more likely to be taken against states with little 
commercial significance. Economic interests on where and how aid was delivered continued to 
take precedence over human rights considerations with few exceptions. These inconsistencies 
demonstrate the glaring gap between rhetoric and practice. It is this that caused Matthews and 
Pratt to offer the observation: 
[a]lthough claimed by the government to be a major principle of Canada’s foreign policy, 
human rights has never been integrated into the decision-making process. ... Canada 
pursues human rights when that interest coincides or overlaps with other foreign policy 
goals, when its interests are negligible, or when the public forces its hand.67  
Consequently, when human rights are not seen by the government as an important factor in 
their own right, then they will always be subordinated to other superior considerations.  
 
The Chrétien and Martin Liberal Governments Era 
Budget restraints that had begun in the late 1980s and continued through the 1990s 
when the Chrétien government applied further budget cuts as it addressed the mounting 
federal deficit and debt problems. CIDA was particularly hard hit. 68  Aid projects were 
eliminated, phased out, reduced in size, or not renewed. As shown in Appendix II, aid as a per 
cent of GNI dropped from 0.45 to 0.29 through the 1990s and it remained below 0.3 per cent for 
the first four years of this century. Particularly hard hit by Canada’s reductions were the least 
developed and low income countries. Canada reduced support substantially in much of Africa by 
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essentially phasing out aid to Central and East Africa, including the discontinuance of a 
longstanding relationship with Tanzania. 69  In fairness, budgetary restraint and spending 
reductions were not strictly a Canadian phenomenon; generally, other OECD states reduced 
their aid commitments at the same time placing further strain on already poverty-stricken 
countries.70   
The election of the Chrétien Liberal government in 1993 marked a substantial change in 
foreign policy. Andre Ouellet, as Foreign Affairs minister, was also in charge of CIDA. However, 
his primary focus was trade promotion and supporting Canadian business through official 
development assistance (ODA) opportunities.71 Ouellet had limited interest in linking economic 
interests with human rights. In one speech he stated that Canada would “…vigorously pursue a 
series of [trade] initiatives in a number of countries irrespective of their human rights 
records.”72 Tom Keating, however, has argued the decline in Canada’s development aid budget 
made Ouellet’s comments more ‘rhetorical rather than practical’.73  
During this period of austerity, Canada revised its foreign policy, including development 
assistance, by adopting Canada in the World in 1995.74  With this policy, Canada embraced the 
UN’s 1994 commitment to human security. Human security looked beyond the state and 
emphasized a greater focus on individual security – security of the person and access to 
necessities of life, such as food and shelter. Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, has defined 
human security as encompassing education and health, democracy and human rights, 
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protection against environmental degradation, and staunching the proliferation of deadly 
weapons. All are interconnected where starvation impedes peace and injustice obstructs 
freedom.75 This view was embraced in 1996 by Ouellet’s successor, Lloyd Axworthy, whose 
personal view strongly aligned with this new international direction. He enthusiastically 
championed human security, reintroducing a humane internationalist approach while 
downplaying the promotion of trade within his department.76 This, however, did not translate 
into broader government policy as Prime Minister Chrétien championed trade through several 
Team Canada trade missions.77  
Yet, foreign affairs under Axworthy committed to be much more responsive by 
providing support to the already stated poverty reduction commitment, focusing on concerns of 
individual security and on humanitarian aid targeted at the welfare of civil society.78  Foreign 
policy laid out six priorities, including: basic human needs; women in development; 
infrastructure services; human rights, democracy, good governance (HRDGG); private sector 
development; and the environment.79 The year Axworthy was appointed, CIDA also issued a 
policy called Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and 
Good Governance, which revised the approach connecting aid with human rights. This policy 
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reiterated objectives related to promoting economic prosperity in a secure world based on the 
Canadian values of democracy, rule of law and culture.80 New programs were to be scrutinized 
using the refined approach to HRDGG and aid effectiveness. While human rights had become 
part of this broader category, they indeed go hand-in-hand with democracy and good 
governance.  
But, the definition of human rights did not become any clearer. These were defined as 
those specified in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 81 Unfortunately, the 
reference to the UDHR brings little clarity on action to be taken. As Gillies had observed:  
Canadian policymakers evaluating complex human rights conditions in the developing 
world will be paralyzed if equal attention and equal weighting is to be given to the 
approximately 60 separate rights entrenched in the International Bill.82 
After a certain point, the more human rights there are to be considered, the less likely any 
meaningful assessment can be done. Democracy and good governance along with poverty 
reduction are more definable concepts.  Not surprisingly, human rights received less emphasis 
than it had in the previous documents.  
CIDA’s new focus was to encourage HRDGG programs at the civil society level in 
recipient states. Where serious human rights violations occurred, CIDA would work through the 
recipient government and where necessary escalate to multilateral organizations or the UN to 
coordinate actions. 83  This again is a demonstration of Canada looking to multilateral 
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organizations for direction where it has felt it lacked leverage. While this policy did not preclude 
the possibility of discontinuing aid over severe violations, it indicated a strong reluctance to do 
so. Effectively, the message was one of support for HRDGG and a commitment to address issues 
short of withdrawing all aid.  
In another of its many policy proclamations, CIDA also reiterated in 1996 its position on 
poverty reduction.84 While positioned as a compatible objective with HRDGG, poverty reduction 
actually results in a focus on lower income countries, many of which have relatively poor human 
rights performance, are not democratic and lack good governance.85 While focusing on these 
countries, it should be noted that it is hard – but not impossible – not to do so at the expense of 
a human rights performance criterion. Consequently, the focus on poverty reduction, a noble 
objective, can work at cross-purposes to HRDGG. 
At the turn of the century, members of the G-8 – most particularly Great Britain, France, 
and Canada – showed concern over the plight of African nations. At the Genoa Summit in 2001, 
preparations began to pave the way for a new aid relationship with Africa. Chrétien, as the next 
G-8 host, took the lead role in developing the diplomatic relations needed for an agreement. By 
the end of 2001, Canada had pledged an additional $1B in official development assistance.86 
However, this commitment must be considered in light of the ‘draconian cuts’ to Canada’s 
African aid that had occurred in the previous decade. Chrétien further committed to double 
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African aid by 2010.87 It is widely viewed that this about face by Chrétien was an attempt to 
create a legacy as he was nearing the end of his political career. 
In one sense his successful efforts marked a turning point in G-8–African relations as 
Africa became a G-8 agenda item for many subsequent summits. However, Chrétien was unable 
in 2002 to convince members to commit incremental aid over what had already been 
committed at a meeting some months earlier. Thus, this was only a qualified success. David 
Black observed that Canada had managed to maintain credibility with both its fellow G-8 
members and the African leaders, but little more was accomplished.88 Rather than being 
principally focused on development aid, greater importance seems to have been on form and 
image for Canada in its multilateral relationship with the G-8.    
Coincidental with the Kananaskis summit, Canada released another policy statement, 
Canada making a difference in the world: a policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness, 
which focused greater effectiveness in aid utilization. This document signalled a change in 
Canadian development assistance for Africa consistent with the already established UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) focusing on the needs of the recipient states – as 
opposed to donor self-interest – but required commitments from recipient states to the 
achievement of development targets. 89 CIDA committed to select a limited number of the 
poorest countries for enhanced partnership programs. Selection was to be based on: the 
recipient state’s ability to effectively use development assistance, states committed to good 
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governance, and a willingness to engage local involvement in poverty reduction and to address 
corruption.90 CIDA’s approach continued to be influenced by the human security agenda with its 
strong emphasis on civil society within the recipient state, and assistance being conditioned by 
civil society’s involvement. Notionally this creates a preference for partnering with states that 
had already demonstrated a commitment to improving governance capacity-building and to the 
reduction of corruption; thus confirming a selectivity strategy.91 However, where a state had 
extremely low governance capacity, CIDA would still commit Canada’s assistance but aid would 
be limited to peace-building, humanitarian assistance and multilateral or NGO projects.92 
Therefore, bilateral aid was to be shaped to be sensitive to good and poor HRDGG performance.  
Prime Minister Paul Martin (2004) stayed the course on poverty reduction and the 
commitment of increased support to Africa. However, he promoted the idea of a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach to developing countries that was characterized by the three Ds of 
defence, diplomacy and development.93 But, this approach, especially when trade was later 
added, meant there were other departments besides DFAIT involved, which further eroded 
CIDA’s role and fragmented aid decisions. While on the face of it, a whole-of-government 
approach would seem to portend greater policy coherence, other states experiences have 
shown that development is likely to become subordinated to other interests.94 
This change culminated in the International Policy Statement in 2005 (IPS 2005). The 
new statement placed DFAIT as the lead department in developing integrated strategies, and 
                                                          
90 Ibid., 11-12.  
91 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 14. He describes a selectivity strategy as one where aid is 
provided based on a recipient state having already demonstrated a good record.  
92 Canadian International Development Agency, Canada making a difference in the World, 10. 
93 Smillie, “Foreign Aid and Canadian Purpose,” 200. 
94 Stephen Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” in Readings in 
Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd ed., eds. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. 
Kukucha (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2011), 478.  
71 
 
promoted the need to focus on Canada’s national interest. Given Canada’s involvement in 
Afghanistan, national interest included a strong emphasis on the role of the Department of 
Defence (DND). Stephen Brown predicted that requiring CIDA to work closely with DFAIT and 
more importantly DND would most likely result in development being compromised for security 
and international trade objectives.95 This was borne out in a later study where Brown reported 
that Afghanistan had received $7M in Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2000 
which then increased to $345M in 2007 when it comprised 8.5 per cent of all Canada ODA.96 The 
long standing philosophical disagreement as to the fundamental purpose of aid between CIDA 
and DFAIT was thus joined by other departments who were essentially aligned against CIDA’s 
humane internationalism and its normative views.  
In spite of this, the stated focus for aid remained on improving aid effectiveness in 
poverty reduction while applying the HRDGG criteria. In IPS 2005, CIDA committed to 
concentrate two-thirds of its bilateral aid on 25 development partners with a narrower focus on 
the types of development initiatives.97 These partners were chosen based on their poverty level, 
on their ability to use aid effectively, and on Canada having sufficient presence to add value.98 
However, as Denis Stairs notes, Canada already committed more than this amount of bilateral 
aid to the top 25 recipient states at the time. And although there were some changes as to 
which states were the top 25 partners, in Stairs’ words “… virtually any variety of development 
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initiative can be accommodated by the framework and rationale that it has created.”99 Thus, this 
policy statement did little more than formally identify development partners based on the 
current aid situation.  
However, the already limited value of this list was further diminished as states not on 
the list continued to receive major levels of Canadian bilateral aid as fragile states. Haiti, which 
had previously been a recognized aid partner, was removed from the list only to be identified 
under a category of ‘failed and fragile states’ and thereby eligible for continued bilateral aid.100 
Haiti continues to be the second largest recipient of Canadian development assistance. Canada’s 
development assistance relationship with Haiti has been long and complicated. Aid to Haiti 
began in the early 1970s. And despite the oppressive and corrupt nature of the Haitian 
governments and military stemming through the Duvalier regimes and the ousting of the 
democratically elected President Aristide in 1991 and 2004, Canada has maintained a strong 
donor status with only short periods where aid was suspended or reduced. This connection has 
been fostered by Haiti’s geographic location, the French language, the existence of a strong 
Haitian diaspora in the Montréal area, and Federal-Québec relations on foreign affairs.101 
Certainly Canada’s multilateral membership in la Francophonie has had some influence on 
Canada’s involvement with Haiti, but more important has been Canada’s response to Québec’s 
efforts to participate in foreign affairs and to the lobbying from the diaspora.102 In 2004 the 
diaspora had called for Canada to provide more aid to Haiti when President Aristide was being 
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ousted for the second time. The Liberal government’s failure to act led, in part, to two cabinet 
members from Montréal losing their seats in the next election.103 
Development assistance to Haiti in the Liberal era has been less focused on poverty 
reduction than it has been on HRDGG. Canada has committed much aid to providing training for 
the Haitian National Police, establishing the rule of law, and infrastructure for democratic 
institutions. These support the neo-liberal framework necessary to promote stable government 
and for the development of economic linkages. While this approach may have an impact on the 
security and bring attention to human rights issues, the underlying problem of extreme poverty 
and severe income inequality has remained.104 This is an obvious case where Canada’s aid has 
been used to pursue its self-interests with minimal consideration for the most basic needs of the 
recipient state.   
Despite commitments to improve the focus on aid to a limited number of partners, it is 
still almost easier to discuss who does not receive aid from Canada. In the mid-1990s, David 
Morrison pointed out that Canada has been unique amongst other similarly placed DAC 
countries. He noted:  
… Canada’s global reach across Asia, Africa, and the Americas has resembled that of a 
superpower and a major power – the United States and Germany – but without 
approaching either’s economic clout or international political interests.105  
The result has been that Canada’s aid is generally characterized by relatively small 
amounts of money spread widely over many countries with development needs. Canada had the 
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lowest level of concentration of any of the DAC countries in the mid-1990s.106 This low 
concentration has continued.   
By CIDA’s own admission, in 2002 they provided bilateral aid to over 100 countries and 
had the least concentrated assistance of all DAC countries.107 But, for fiscal 2003 CIDA reported 
it provided only 18 countries with more than $10M annually in assistance, and it provided less 
than $5M to each of 90 countries, with almost 60 per cent of those receiving less than $1M 
each.108 Bethany Barratt counted 129 countries Canada gave development assistance to in 
2004.109 In 2005 Stairs observed Canada was providing assistance to 155 countries based on 
government documents. He suggests CIDA’s long standing obligations to an overly broad 
recipient list have embedded financial commitments limiting its ability to make short and 
medium term changes.110  This institutionalization of aid has essentially created an inertia that 
has exacerbated Canada’s problem of already being too thinly spread across too many recipient 
states.  
In these Liberal government years, human rights were always mentioned in policy 
statements. However, other competing agendas were present. Trade was the dominant factor. 
But, national security rose in importance due to the war on terror and the Afghan war. On the 
other hand, CIDA’s focus remained on poverty reduction. Given these conflicting and competing 
agendas it is little wonder Canada’s development programs have been criticized for lacking clear 
direction.  
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The Harper Minority Conservative Governments 
The release of the IPS 2005 was quickly followed by a change in government resulting in 
two successive Conservative minority governments. Consequently, the statement was never 
officially adopted, but it has remained a guiding document. Generally, the Harper minority 
government did not engage in a broad public discussion nor did it lay out a comprehensive 
position on development assistance. The Conservative Party had made little mention of aid in its 
election campaign except to allude to focusing on accountability for the distribution and results 
of aid-giving, which was to support Canada’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, free markets and trade.111 The indication that an emphasis would be placed on 
trade relations through aid foreshadowed a stronger neo-liberal approach and commitment to 
self-interest. While only a vague reference to the generally accepted concepts of HRDGG was 
made, the Conservatives most significant proposed change was to replace the longstanding 0.7 
per cent development assistance a Canadian official development assistance target equal to the 
OECD average. Not surprisingly, aid policymaking became more piece meal and somewhat by 
stealth.112  
In 2006, however, Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation, did reaffirm the 
Harper’s government commitment to four key pillars – freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights – in foreign policy and international aid. But, in what was a clear contradiction, she 
announced Canada would be focusing its efforts on Haiti and Afghanistan. Both were singled out 
for continued development assistance where concrete changes could be realized through 
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stabilizing and reconstructing these countries.113 Neither country had acceptable human rights 
records nor was either an official development partner. Both were failed or fragile states at the 
time. It would seem the hope that these states would pursue these pillars was enough to gain 
Canada’s support. In the following three years these states would receive more bilateral aid 
from Canada than any other state by a substantial margin.114 However, the preferential 
treatment of these two states was a consequence of the geo-political and security based self-
interest driven by Foreign Affairs and DND. Stephen Brown reports that it was also the Prime 
Minister’s Office that was influential in this decision, introducing yet another, more powerful, 
bureaucratic group to development assistance decision making. 115  
As earlier noted, the Chrétien and Martin governments had come under international 
pressure to reduce Canada’s conditional tied aid requirements. While both made commitments 
to eliminate tied aid, no timetable was set for such action.116 It was the Harper government, in 
2008, that announced all food aid would be untied, meaning it would no longer be necessary for 
recipient states to use any of Canada’s aid to purchase Canadian food.117 This announcement 
was followed up a few months later with the new Minister of International Cooperation, Bev 
Oda, declaring all development aid would be untied by 2012-13 with the express purpose of 
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making aid more effective.118 This seems to be counter to the pursuit of self-interest but in fact 
Canada does very little export trade with poor developing countries.119 By the end of 2008 
Canadian tied aid only accounted for 9.23 per cent of aid compared to 25.4 per cent in 2007 and 
43 per cent in 2004.120 The commitment to untie all aid by 2012/13 does seem to be a genuine 
effort to give recipient states the ability to maximize the aid provided. However, the efficiency in 
and effectiveness of aid is beyond the scope of analysis in this study.  
Where self-interest seems to be more significant is in the selection of states to receive 
significant development aid. The Harper government signalled such a change in direction when 
it told the G-8 in 2007 that it would follow through on its existing commitments to Africa, but 
that it would be moving its future focus to the Americas.121 African states make up over half of 
the least developed countries, while Haiti is the only state from the Americas in this category. 
With this announcement the government effectively shifted its focus to trade opportunities in 
the Caribbean and South America countries where free trade agreement were being pursued.122 
At the same time, CIDA issued a ten year Caribbean strategic plan focusing on assisting the 
region’s economic development.123 Nevertheless the Conservative government’s commitment 
to fulfill the Liberal’s promise to increase aid to Africa demonstrates this government’s concern 
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over maintaining its international reputation and support for multilateralism. But its willingness 
to resist the G-8’s call for further commitments demonstrated a more independent Canada.  
In May 2008, the minority government passed a private member’s bill creating a 
legislative mandate regarding the conditions for Canadian development assistance. The act 
formally acknowledged the central focus of all international aid as being poverty reduction in a 
manner “that promotes international human rights standards.”124 This bill was initiated by an 
opposition Liberal member and was originally resisted by the Conservative government. 
However, the other parties overwhelmingly supported it, as did the general public, and it was 
passed with minor Senate amendments. Yet, notwithstanding its resistance to the bill, the 
government claimed its was already in compliance and no further action was required.125 It 
would be very optimistic to suggest this was a government endorsement of poverty reduction 
and human rights in Canada’s aid policy. It is necessary to look to the actions of the government 
to inform its real direction.  
In 2009, Oda announced the list of development partners was being reduced to 
concentrate on 20 recipients, and the target allocation was increased to 80 per cent of bilateral 
assistance.126 Reintroduced to the partners list were Afghanistan and Haiti, consistent with the 
2006 announcement to provide significant aid to these states. Both countries fall into the least 
developed category and both have had significant governance and human rights issues, which 
certainly limits the capacity-building potential to effectively utilize aid. In fairness, it should be 
noted that in 2008 and 2009 Haiti was showing some improvements in its human rights scores. 
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Whereas, Afghanistan remained a war zone with the lowest human rights scores.127 With both 
of these countries, Canada’s aid has been focused on building infrastructure through training. 
Clearly, the inclusion of these two development partners demonstrates the program is not 
intended to address poverty reduction but principally to satisfy domestic, geo-political and 
security interests.  
While the Conservative minority government had not developed a new aid policy 
statement, it did commit to making aid more effective. The reduction in the number of key 
development partners in 2009 would seem to be a step in that direction, except that considering 
failed states as preferred partners does not support greater effectiveness. The additions and 
deletions to the ‘partner’ countries perhaps present a much more important change of 
direction. This new list dramatically reduced the focus on Africa where poverty reduction is most 
needed.128 Where the 2005 Partners list included 14 least developed and lower income 
countries the new list reduced this number to seven. Also added were a collection of relatively 
well-off states aggregated as the Caribbean Region, as well as the perennially poverty-stricken 
Haiti, plus four potential free trade partners in South America. How this will actually effect the 
overall direction of Canada’s development assistance is unclear as it will take some years for 
these changes to be fully realized. However, it is apparent this government has reduced the 
emphasis on humane internationalism and the normative goal of poverty reduction in favour of 
commercial interests. Yet, in a subsequent change in direction, the Harper government began to 
re-engage Africa in 2010 by promoting maternal and child healthcare.129 The general consensus 
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is that this government has shown a disinterest toward the international aid portfolio and 
development assistance policy has been adrift.130 
It will be interesting to see if this government’s direction will improve the fragmentation 
of Canada’s aid. Thus far the Harper government has actually increased the level of 
concentration.131  However, this is due to the significant increase in bilateral aid to Afghanistan, 
Haiti and by fulfilling its commitment on Africa. But, the concentration of aid will have limited 
effect if the total number of recipients is not reduced. The total number of recipient states in 
this study only declined by eight from the 1998-2000 period to the 2007-2009 period; a small 
reduction of five per cent.132  
This government continues to claim, albeit in a muted fashion, that it focuses on human 
rights.133  However, related actions are not well articulated.  In addition to the earlier human 
rights announcements, the Harper government has linked its new thematic priorities announced 
in 2009 as supporting recipient states in gender equality and human rights improvements.134 
However, human rights in this instance have moved from being a pre-condition for development 
assistance to an anticipated outcome derived from the benefits of the aid provided. This would 
not seem to bode well for a principled approach to addressing serious human rights violations. 
However, this most recent position occurred at the end of the period of this thesis study and 
therefore will not be reflected in the quantitative analysis.  
                                                          
130 Stephen Brown, ed., Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid (Montréal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).  
131 Gulrajani, “Improving Canada’s Performance as a Bilateral Donor,” 62. 
132 These numbers have been calculated from the aggregation of CIDA’s annual fiscal reports for the two 
periods of this study. In the first period Canada provided bilateral aid to 147 countries compared to 139 in 
the later period. 
133 Kenneth Roth, "Human Rights and Canada's Foreign Policy." In Canada Among Nations 2009-2010: As 
Others See Us, edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2010).  
134 Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 477. 
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With respect to the second period covered in this study, the Conservative government 
initially showed little interest in making changes to the direction set by the Martin government. 
The Conservatives’ decision to follow through on the G-8 promises already in place effectively 
committed Canada to increases in its aid budget particularly for poverty-stricken areas of 
Africa.135 In fact, Canada reached its commitment to double aid to Africa a year in advance of 
the target. The change in direction outlined by the 2009 announcements will not realize their 
full impact for some years into the future.  
                                                          
135 Black, “Between Indifference and Idiosyncrasy,” 251.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
QUANTITATIVE THESIS METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The quantitative section of this thesis attempts to achieve two objectives in its efforts to 
identify correlations between Canada’s bilateral aid-giving and the human rights record of 
recipient states. It first looks to further the academic literature by building on the earlier work of 
Nola Serkasevich. This will be accomplished by adding two additional time periods of analysis. 
These periods focus on bilateral aid during 1998 to 2000 and 2007 to 2009.1 Three-year periods 
have been selected to be consistent with Serkasevich’s study and to allow for coherence in 
government policy. Three-year periods – as opposed to individual years –reduce distortion from 
any anomalies in aid as a result of short term projects. The first period was selected because it 
included the period where the Chrétien government was most vocally committed to the human 
security agenda. As well, the impacts from the reductions associated with the federal fiscal 
restraint program had largely been implemented. The second period is based on the most 
recent data of 2007-2009 under the Harper minority Conservative government. This period 
begins a year after the Conservatives came to power, which afforded that government some 
time to initiate their own direction on international assistance. But as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Harper government did little to advance its own policy, except to 
recommit to major aid increases for Afghanistan and Haiti and confirm the promises already 
made on poverty reduction in Africa. The lack of new direction by this government does not 
mean that this period simply reflects the previous government; the Conservatives, albeit in a 
                                                          
1 For ease of reading calendar years are referenced, however, Canada’s fiscal year runs from April 1 to 
March 31. For example, this study identifies the government foreign aid report for the fiscal year 1998-99 
is identified as 1998.  
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minority government, were in charge and the actions or inaction on this portfolio indicates its 
level of agreement on the existing direction, or its disinterest in development assistance. In 
either case, this period is reflective of the government in power.  
Not only do these periods provide data points in two more decades, they also permit 
analyses for two additional governments formed by different political parties. The analysis first 
focuses on correlating Political Terror Scale (PTS) human rights scores with bilateral aid, 
measured as a three-year average of total aid. On the basis there is a greater need for aid than 
there is aid available from donor states, if human rights compliance is a meaningful 
commitment, human rights would be expected to be a significant factor in determining who 
receives bilateral aid. Also, the relationship between another stated objective, poverty 
reduction, and PTS scores and bilateral aid is considered. While the premise here is that human 
rights violations are purported to be important to Canadian bilateral aid, human rights as a 
factor in aid may be compromised by the commitment by donor states to address poverty.   
The second objective is to consider the impact on bilateral aid, as the dependent 
variable, Canada’s multilateral memberships and the population of recipient states in addition 
to human rights ratings. Recognition is also given to certain outliers and anomalies that reflect 
known geo-political and security-based exceptions. These adjustments recognize there are 
foreign policy drivers other than human rights.2 The key is, however, to determine if human 
rights abuses by recipient states are taken into account or do these other foreign policy drivers 
completely overshadow human rights issues.  
The following subsections define the parameters of the quantitative variables used in 
this study.  
                                                          
2 Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 154. 
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Bilateral Aid 
As in Serkasevich’s study and most other studies, analysis is limited to bilateral aid on 
the rationale that bilateral aid is completely within the control of the Canadian government and 
generally provides government-to-government assistance. On the other hand, multilateral aid is 
excluded because there are multilateral agencies and intermediaries where the direct 
government relationship does not exist. Humanitarian aid targets specific catastrophic events 
and is generally acknowledged as not taking into account human rights considerations. Bilateral 
aid, in effect, represents the Canadian government directly supporting the recipient state and 
therefore the actions of that state. For this reason, and the acknowledged position that serious 
human rights violations are inconsistent with Canadian values, it is where such abuses exist that 
it should be anticipated the greatest negative impact on aid would occur.  
The Canadian Government, through Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), publishes annual fiscal year reports on assistance provided to countries, territories, 
regions, and organizations. These reports provide total development assistance divided into 
various categories and by region, sovereign state, protectorate, or territory. With the exception 
of the West Bank and Gaza under the Palestinian Authority (PA), only states are included in this 
study. The PA is included because of its special status at the UN and the fact it was identified in 
2009 as a Canadian development partner.  
One adjustment has been made to the CIDA bilateral aid numbers used in this study. 
The period 1998-2000 included a number of countries that received official debt relief as 
bilateral aid. In particular, Poland was by far the greatest recipient. This was as a result of a 
number of developed countries, under the auspices of the Paris Club, agreeing to forgive debt in 
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response to Poland committing in 1991 to convert to a market economy.3  In 1998-2000, official 
debt relief to Poland was nearly $525M, which accounted for more than 80 per cent of all debt 
relief given by Canada during this period. Of the remaining official debt relief, more than 10 per 
cent was forgiven to the Ivory Coast. The rest of the recipients were dominated by other African 
countries, but at much smaller amounts.4 Unlike other bilateral aid assistance, debt relief for 
past loans is explicitly predicated on economic policy commitments with no connection to good 
governance or human rights performance. For this reason, and because it is such a significant 
outlier with respect to Poland and the Ivory Coast, official debt relief has been excluded from 
bilateral aid in the first period. However, Table 1 will show both with and without debt relief to 
demonstrate the impact this had on bilateral aid.  
It should be noted that Canada, with other developed countries, participates in the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. This includes funds that are administered by 
the World Bank to provide debt relief in the form of forgiving full or partial debts to afford debt-
stricken states relief while they implement economic policy reforms. Unlike the official debt 
relief mentioned above, HIPC is multilateral aid and temporally outside the scope of this study. 
But in 1999 Canada also set up the Canada Debt Initiative (CDI), a bilateral fund, through which 
Canada would stop collecting debt service payments and forgo the debt owed by eligible HIPC 
                                                          
3 Steven Greenhouse, “Poland is Granted Large Cut in Debt,” NY Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/16/business/poland-is-granted-large-cut-in-
debt.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed August 1, 2012). This debt relief was conditioned on 
economic reforms and was not based on human rights performance. The Paris Club is a financial 
association of 19 developed states, of which Canada is a member, that coordinates loans to developing 
countries. 
4 These countries and official debt relief numbers were extracted from the Statistical Reports for Official 
Development Assistance for the fiscal years 1998-99, 1999-2000, and 2000-2001 prepared by CIDA. 
During this three year period the following countries received official debt relief in bilateral aid: Poland 
($523.31M), Ivory Coast ($85.54M), Cameroon ($34.12M), Ex-Yugoslavia ($10.72M), Senegal ($6.36M), 
Zambia ($4.96M), Congo ($4M), Bangladesh ($.6M), and Benin ($.05M). 
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countries as they met certain conditions.5 The Federal Finance Department reported in January 
2005 that it had completely retired official development assistance (ODA) debt for all 22 HIPCs 
except Myanmar. Canada, over the period of 2001 to 2004 inclusive, had forgiven over $600M in 
debt to HIPCs, including bilateral and multilateral debt. The remaining debt relief (nearly 
another $600M) was related to commitments through the Paris Club and World Bank 
organizations as multilateral debt.6 Consequently, any debt relief in the second period of this 
study is not identified in the CIDA annual fiscal reports as bilateral aid. Therefore, there was no 
need to adjust the numbers in the later period. 
 
Human Rights Rating 
The empirical studies discussed above have approached human rights ratings in a 
number of ways making it difficult to make comparisons. There are essentially three rating 
systems that have been used: Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI), Freedom House 
Civil Liberties, and Political Terror Scale (PTS). As was discussed in Chapter 1, CIRI is the least 
appropriate measure as it lacks consistency and clarity.7 Further, CIRI was only used in one study 
which was not specific to Canada. Therefore, using CIRI would fail to build on any of the 
pertinent work.  
The other two scoring systems – PTS and Freedom House – are more common and 
provide anchored descriptors in their ratings.   As discussed earlier, PTS provides a dual-rating 
system based on narrative inputs from two different sources being scored against a five point 
                                                          
5 Department of Finance, Helping the Poorest – An Update on Canada’s Debt Relief Efforts, Government of 
Canada, January 2005, http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/2005/cdre0105_-eng.asp (accessed July 9, 2012). 
6 Ibid.  
7 Also, for a detailed comparative assessment of CIRI and PTS see: Wood and Gibney, “The Political Terror 
Scale (PTS).”  
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anchored scale. Therefore, PTS effectively provides two sets of scores based on Amnesty 
International (AI) and US Department of State narratives.  Freedom House provides a two-part 
scale based on political rights and civil rights. The questions associated with each cover a broad 
spectrum of human rights encompassing democratic and political rights, freedom of speech and 
of the media, physical security, equality, right to due process and an impartial judiciary. The civil 
liberties scale provides many – but not all – of the questions that are designed to address a 
minimalist approach to human rights. By combining these two scales, the Freedom House scale 
essentially measures democratic practices, and not specifically human rights. For this reason it is 
not preferred. 
The PTS scale, on the other hand, focuses on what is at the core of human rights as 
opposed to the broader scope found in the Freedom House assessments.8 The PTS descriptions 
principally consider human rights in the context of physical security and personal integrity 
rights.9 It is also comparable to the scale and scoring used by Serkasevich. This permits parallels 
to be drawn between her study and the two time periods of this thesis. And, by using PTS as the 
human rights measure, an independent rating is provided. Also because the number of 
narratives for countries has increased, PTS provides a more complete set of scores. Yet neither 
AI nor the US State department produce assessments on all countries. And scores are not 
necessarily the same between the two narratives. Eric Neumayer’s remedy for these problems 
was to average scores where two measures were available. Alternatively, Bethany Barratt chose 
to only use the US Department of State scores because there were fewer missing data points 
over the duration of her study. Serkasevich had chosen to use the AI narratives as these gave 
the appearance of being less biased.  
                                                          
8 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 53. 
9 See Appendix I. 
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An objective of this study was to have scores for all states in both periods based on a 
minimalist view of human rights. This is best accomplished by using PTS with some further 
inputs to fill in the few missing data points. Similar to Serkasevich, this study principally relies on 
scores based on AI narratives. But where AI-based scores were not available, scores from the US 
Department of State narratives have been utilized. While there is some variances between 
individual state scores where narratives from both were available, Barratt reported that the two 
scales had a high correlation at the 0.75 level with the correlation improving over the duration 
of her study (1980 to 2004).10  She also observed that AI tended to assess government human 
rights violations more severely. These differences may be construed as being politically 
motivated by a US bias and therefore AI is preferred.  
In only a few cases were there countries with no ratings under either scale.11 These 
countries typically were sparsely populated and had no history of government oppression or 
abuse. In an effort to have as complete data as possible, human rights scores were assigned 
based on a review of Freedom House country narratives, the Freedom House civil liberties 
descriptions and scores, and validated with the assistance of Professor Alan Siaroff. While the 
preference would have been to have all scores from an independent source, the fact that all of 
these countries were scored in the acceptable 1 and 2 categories accounts for AI’s lack of 
attention to these countries. This outcome is also consistent with Serkasevich’s assertion that 
countries missing human rights narratives was a reflection of what was generally considered 
good behaviour.12  
                                                          
10 Barratt, Human Rights and Foreign Aid, 42. 
11 These countries were: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, St. Kitts & Nevis, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Only 
Micronesia had reached a population of over 100,000 in 1997 and only Micronesia and Tonga were over 
this number in 2006.  
12 Serkasevich, The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Aid and Human Rights Violations, 61. 
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In the interest of completeness, it was necessary to generate a score for the ex-
Yugoslavia in the first period because Canada’s development assistance data was aggregated. 
For its part, PTS did provide a 1997 score for each of the reduced state of Yugoslavia, and the 
former states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia) that had achieved 
independence by that point.  Using the individual PTS scores and the population of each of the 
states, a weighted average was established. With the exception of Slovenia, which had a PTS 
score of 1, all the other states were rated as 3 or 4 and thus the outcome was a weighted 
average score of 3.45. Slovenia’s impact was minimal because it represented only 10 per cent of 
the total population. While the individual score for Ex-Yugoslavia is not material to the overall 
project, this approach did permit completeness. The fact that Canada participated in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the Balkans during the 1998-2000 period did 
have some geopolitical and security implications for aid, which will be discussed in the 
anomalies and outliers subsection.  
Lastly, twenty-three other longstanding Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) states have been excluded from the study based on the view these states 
would not be considered candidates for development assistance.13 The exclusion of these states 
eliminates any statistical distortion their predominately better human rights records would 
cause. 
Given the relatively short three-year periods used in this study, a one-year lag to the 
period was used in establishing the PTS scores. The years used are 1997 and 2006. 
 
                                                          
13 Despite also being OECD states, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, and South Korea did 
receive some bilateral aid in at least one of the periods of this study. All are relatively recent entrants to 
the OECD, but were included in this study.  
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Multilateral Memberships 
Multilateral relationships have been integral to Canada’s involvement and shaping of its 
development assistance programs. Canada’s Commonwealth relationship was instrumental in 
Canada’s otherwise reluctant participation in the Colombo Plan. This was followed up with 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s strong commitment to development for the Caribbean 
Commonwealth. Canada’s membership in the OECD and active participation on its Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) complemented the views held by CIDA. And while every 
government has had internal disagreements over trade opportunities versus humane 
internationalism, Canada has consistently voiced an overarching commitment to poverty 
reduction.  
It is clear Canada’s original international development assistance commitments came 
from its Commonwealth ties and there has been empirical evidence that this strong connection 
has continued up to at least the mid-1990s. In examining Canada’s bilateral aid decisions, Van 
Belle et al and Jean-Sébastien Rioux, through statistical analysis, and David Morrison, through 
his qualitative analysis, have highlighted the potential importance of Canada’s memberships in 
various international organizations. 14 Canada is unique in the sense that it is a middle power 
without any colonial history, yet it is an active member of several multilateral groups. 
Membership has its obligations both in adhering to the international rules and norms 
established by these multilateral organizations and financially. While membership in these 
multilateral institutions has not established rigid rules and requirements for members to follow, 
they have exercised influence and generated public expectations.  
                                                          
14 Van Belle et al, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid; Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide. 
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This has been apparent by the policies Canada has adopted. David Black, Jean-Philippe 
Thérien and Andrew Clark evaluated Canada’s development aid to Africa from the 1960s to the 
mid-1990s relative to direction and actions of the DAC, the World Bank and the G-7. Over two 
decades Canada’s bilateral aid evolved to more closely reflect the DAC priority recipients; 
Canada supported and adopted the World Bank structural adjustment plan recommendations 
and then reduced its commitment in line with other states; and when other G-7 states reduced 
their African aid in the early 1990s, Canada did as well. Black et al acknowledge this does not 
demonstrate strict causation, but assert: “… it lends credence to the idea that Canada is 
increasingly influenced by the principles and rules of the international aid regime.”15 These 
examples are representative of the broader experience in Canada’s commitment to 
development assistance. The initial commitment to aid to Commonwealth Asian countries grew 
from Canada’s commitment to the Commonwealth and the UN; the commitment to poverty 
reduction is consistent with that advocated by the OECD; the 1996 commitment to human 
security was initiated by the United Nations (UN) in 1994; and Canada’s 2002 commitment to 
increase aid to address African poverty was adopted as part of a G-8 initiative. Canada has 
earned the reputation of being the ‘inveterate joiner’ and this is supported by its membership in 
the UN, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Organization of American States (OAS), OECD, 
and the G-8.16 These memberships have led into participation in a number of subordinate 
multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Human 
Rights Commission, and the Paris Club.  
Another important example has been Canada’s involvement in NATO. This membership 
is different because it provides Canada with a level of security. Participation in operations, such 
                                                          
15 Black et al, “Moving with the Crowed: Canadian Aid in Africa:” 267.  
16 Stairs, Confusing the Innocent with Numbers and Categories.  
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as has occurred in the former Yugoslavian states and Afghanistan, is critical to the integrity of 
the treaty. Obligations to NATO initiatives are different than to other multilateral regimes. 
Consequently, Canada has participated militarily in these two conflicts as part of its 
responsibilities to NATO. Development assistance becomes an ancillary consequence of such 
operations. If Canada was not a NATO member it would most likely have had little or no bilateral 
aid involvement in either of these countries. 
Testing for a potential statistical significance of the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, 
and the Organization of American States (OAS) is straightforward. This is accomplished by 
creating dummy variables based on membership/non-membership of donor eligible states for 
each organization.  
The G-8 and OECD institutions are more difficult to quantify. Their influence needs to be 
measured by the commitments Canada makes relative to the stated direction advocated by 
each of these organizations. In the early 21st Century the G-8 committed to alleviating the plight 
of African poverty.  Prime Minister Chrétien, as an influential voice in the G-8, confirmed 
Canada’s commitment to increase its financial and program support to the African Union (AU). 
Thus, the G-8 membership is best assessed through aid provided to AU states. Given that this 
commitment was made in 2002, after Canada made substantial reductions in development 
assistance to Africa and other developing states in the 1990s (as did all developed countries), 
there is no expectation this factor will show a correlation in the first period. The only mitigating 
factor to this expected outcome may be the result of the OECD membership.  
As a founding, and committed, member of the OECD, Canada would reasonably be 
expected to give greater levels of aid to poorer states. DAC has categorized developing states 
based on per capita income as a means of establishing eligibility for official development aid. 
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Thus, states have been identified in one of five categories: least developed countries, low 
income countries, lower middle income countries, upper middle income countries, and ‘Other’ 
states. The least developed countries include the forty-nine states with the lowest income in the 
world. The next three categories are specifically defined by income thresholds. 17  For the 
purposes of this variable, all remaining states have been assigned to the ‘Other’ category. 
Theoretically, recipient states should receive more aid based on a worse level of poverty as 
defined by these income levels, and conversely, those states in the highest categories should 
receive less aid. It should be noted, this prediction is counter to the notion that state will 
operate solely in its own self-interest – militarily or to benefit its economic trade.  
NATO’s influence is far more specific and situational than the other multilateral 
organizations. NATO’s responses to the former-Yugoslavia crisis and involvement in Afghanistan 
as a result of the 9/11 attacks clearly are driven by security interests. While Canada was not 
directly threatened, NATO serves Canada’s broader security needs. Thus, Canada has an 
obligation to support NATO initiatives so that it may expect reciprocal support in the future. 
Bilateral aid was prompted by this commitment to NATO with no consideration given to the 
human rights performance by the states at the center of these conflicts. Both conflicts have 
attracted the largest amount of aid in each of the two periods. Consequently, ex-Yugoslavia and 
Afghanistan dummy variables are used in the first and second periods respectively to account 
for the security and power related motives.  
Based on the analysis of the Commonwealth influence, Van Belle et al and Rioux 
concluded there was a correlation between aid and the Commonwealth, and it is expected this 
will continued in the more recent time frames of this study. Van Belle et al found there to be no 
                                                          
17 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, “History of DAC Lists of aid recipient 
countries,” OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/historyofdaclistsofaidrecipientcountries.htm 
(Accessed February 9, 2012). 
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preference given to la Francophonie countries, which makes it less likely that a correlation will 
exist. Canada’s commitment to aid in the Americas has not been significant, except for Haiti and 
a number of small Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, and therefore it is not expected a 
statistical significance will materialize. And based on Canada’s clearly stated commitment to 
poverty reduction, a correlation based on DAC income levels is anticipated.  
 
Population 
Eric Neumayer identifies the need to consider population when comparing total 
amounts of aid given to recipient states.18 It is simply intuitive that much larger states are more 
likely to receive larger amounts of aid; there is greater need with incrementally bigger 
populations and projects are simply larger. Yet, there is little evidence that would lead one to 
believe decisions on aid are made based strictly on population. Further, Neumayer points out 
that a per capita allocation would be cumbersome and unworkable from a decision-making 
perspective.19 Consequently, using a per capita measure is not an appropriate population 
measure.   
However, the issue remains that using total dollars does not resolve the distortion 
created by the gross discrepancy in population. The largest developing countries, China and 
India, each have well over 1 billion people whereas Nauru has a population of less than 10,000 
and there are numerous states with populations less than 100,000. Direct aid dollar 
comparisons between vastly different sized recipients provides a misleading bias in favour of 
larger states and does not get at the underlying human rights variable. Thus, in the regression 
                                                          
18 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving, 42. 
19 Ibid., 42. 
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modeling, a logarithm is used to create ‘logpop’ variables (logpop1997 and logpop2006) for each 
study period. These factors provide a recognition of the fact more heavily populated states are 
more likely to receive more total aid dollars. The population figures were taken from data 
published by the US Census Bureau. Population figures are also based on the years 1997 and 
2006.20  
 
Anomalies and Outliers 
As discussed in chapter 2, the human rights issue is only one of several factors in foreign 
policy – and it does not dominate. Therefore, there should be no expectation that human rights 
abuses will singularly dictate who receives foreign aid. But, for the human rights rhetoric to have 
some valid basis, it is necessary for there to be some statistically significant influence when clear 
political and geopolitical factors have been accounted for. The anomalies and outliers, if not 
acknowledged, will distort and skew the statistical results. In order to be considered in this 
category the rationale for the bilateral aid had to be clearly tied to another identifiable driver, 
an abnormal or distinctive condition existed, and the amount of bilateral aid had to be 
substantial. 
Already discussed above was the issue raised as a result of official debt relief, 
particularly as it pertained to Poland to the Ivory Coast. But there are other circumstances of 
anomalies that have created outliers, which have the effect of distorting any empirical study. 
Each of these two periods was subject to exceptional political circumstances that led to 
conditions that resulted in Canadian aid supporting governments in conflict zones. In the 1990s, 
                                                          
20 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base Country Rankings, 
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/rank.php (accessed January 17, 2012). 
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Canada through its NATO commitment was militarily involved in the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
While its actual combat role was relatively minor, part of NATO’s – and therefore Canada’s – 
commitment included providing aid to protect human security. And, during the second period 
Canada was actively involved in the NATO-led war in Afghanistan.  
In both of these cases, an underlying condition was the threat to civilians from the 
government and conflicting military forces. Yet, human rights abuses were not the reason for 
Canada’s involvement; Canada was pursuing a multilateral strategy to enhance and maintain its 
position in NATO. A strong NATO is in Canada’s self-interest.21 But the consequence of this 
foreign policy has been a significant amount of bilateral aid being provided to states that have 
committed serious human rights abuses. This is particularly the case in Afghanistan where in the 
second period of this study Canada averaged $300M annually in aid and the next closest 
recipient, Haiti, was almost $100M less. All other recipients received substantially less than 
these two states.  
Haiti has also been an outlier. Canada’s relationship with Haiti has been long and at 
times strained, as was described in Chapter 3. Canada’s policy on Haiti has had multilateral, 
geopolitical and domestic drivers. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and is 
the only country in the Americas on the DAC list of least developed countries. But Canada’s 
connection has actually been defined by the fact Haiti is a French-speaking country that also has 
close geopolitical and domestic implications for Canada mainly through the strong political 
Haitian diaspora in and around the Montréal area. Not only has the federal government 
                                                          
21 One may suggest that based on this argument Canada should have also aligned itself with the 
American-led Coalition of the Willing in the more recent Iraq War. However, the Iraq War was not 
sanctioned by any multilateral organization (the UN or NATO) and therefore did not conform to Canada’s 
commitment to international norms and rules.  
97 
 
provided support to Haiti, but so has the Quebec government, which has brought further 
pressure on the federal government.  
The first period reflected a return in 1994 to the democratic government of President 
Aristide in 1994. In fact, Haiti’s human rights record had actually reached an acceptable level 
suggesting some justification for the development assistance from Canada and many other 
states, all supported by the UN. But from a high PTS score of 2 in 1997, Haiti’s human rights 
record regressed to 3 and 4 ratings for the next 6 years until it received a 5 score in 2004 when a 
second coup occurred.22 Canada significantly increased its assistance in 2004 following this coup 
and before democratic elections were re-established in 2006. It was not until 2008, and again in 
2010, that Haiti again attained acceptable PTS scores.  In both periods Canada has primarily 
provided capacity-building aid in the form of police training. Unlike the other anomalies, the 
special relationship with Haiti existed in both study periods.  
 
Level at which Aid Decision-making is to be Analysed 
Lastly, both Neumayer and Bethany Barratt focused on aid as a two-step decision 
process where the donor state first determined whether a state would receive aid and then 
secondly decided as to how much they would receive. This approach may have merit in studies 
with other donor states, but in Canada’s case the ‘getting on the list’ stage brings little value. As 
was noted earlier, Canada has for many decades been criticized for spreading aid too thinly, 
which CIDA finally acknowledged in 2002. In the two periods of this study, 147 and 139 
                                                          
22 Mark Gibney, Lynette Cornett and Reed Wood, "Political Terror Scale 1976-2010." 2010. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ (accessed November 17, 2011). 
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countries respectively received bilateral aid from Canada.23 Given that 23 other OECD countries 
were eliminated from the study this leaves only a small number of countries that have not 
received at least a ‘diplomatic calling card.’24 Thus, the real issue to be addressed is not who 
gets aid but rather finding explanations as to the wide variance in bilateral aid received by 
recipient states. In the 1998-2000 period the top recipient state received an annual average of 
$182.1M while the lowest recipient state received an average of less than $10,000. In the 2007-
09 period, the range was even greater with the highest average bilateral aid to a recipient state 
being $301.08M and the lowest being $10,000. Therefore, the study considers every non-OECD 
state eligible for aid and focuses on how much bilateral aid is distributed to eligible countries. 
The principal consideration is to assess whether human rights records are a statistically 
significant variable in this determination, and then secondarily whether there are other factors 
that have either mitigated the influence of human rights and whether these factors are 
significant by themselves. 
                                                          
23 These numbers are derived from CIDA’s annual reports used in the quantitative analysis.  
24 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 17. Morrison reference a 1978 government document equating the 
Canadian practice of widely distributing small amounts aid to leaving a diplomatic calling card.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
Comparisons and Correlations   
The 1998-2000 period provides a similar outcome as Nola Serkasevich found in her 
1980s study in that the top recipients of bilateral aid tended to score relatively poorer with 
unacceptable human rights records. This is highlighted by Table 1, which shows the three-year 
average bilateral aid provided to the top 20 recipient states. These 20 recipients received 62.56 
per cent of all the bilateral aid in this period when debt relief is included or 56.63 per cent when 
debt relief is excluded. Unlike Serkasevich’s study, the top aid recipient, Poland – by a 
substantial margin of more than three times the aid received by the next highest state – was 
ranked in category 1 on the Political Terror Scale (PTS). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Poland’s bilateral aid was almost exclusively official debt relief which was driven by the Paris 
Club based on political and economic considerations. Without this debt forgiveness Poland 
would have received less than 5 per cent of its actual total amount. Similarly, Ivory Coast and 
Cameroon also received substantial debt relief, without which they would not have been in the 
top 20 recipients. The fact that the top 20 recipients received roughly 60 per cent of the bilateral 
aid in this time period clearly demonstrates the lack of aid concentration for which Canada has 
been widely criticized.  
Of the top 20 recipient states, 25 per cent were scored category 4 on the PTS score, 40 
per cent were in category 3, 30 per cent were in category 2 and Poland, as the single category 1, 
represented 5 per cent. In other words, almost two-thirds of recipients were in the 
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unacceptable category 3 and below. When debt relief is removed Poland, Ivory Coast and 
Cameroon are not rank in the top 20. The revised list then includes Ethiopia, Mozambique and 
Peru, which all scored in category 4. Accordingly, the distribution across the PTS categories then 
reflects that 75 per cent of the states were scored in categories 3 and 4, and 25 per cent in the 
acceptable category 2. At this aggregated level there is no indication human rights 
Table 1. 1998-2000 Top Recipients of Canadian Aid Based on Average Bilateral Aid 
Rank 
without 
debt relief 
Country 
Annualized Total 
Bilateral Aid 1997 PTS Score 
1998-00 (in Millions) 
  Poland $182.10 ($7.66) 1 
1 Ex-Yugoslavia $  60.24 ($57.67) 3.5** (4) 
2 China2 $54.41 4 
3 Bangladesh1 $50.64 3 
4 Indonesia $36.80 3 
  Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire)2 $  34.82 ($6.31) 2 
5 Haiti1 $32.60 2 
6 Ukraine $25.68 2 
7 India2 $24.34 4 
8 Mali1 $23.56 2 
9 Vietnam, Socialist Republic of2  $23.12 2 
  Cameroon2 $  22.84 ($11.31) 3 
10 Pakistan2 $22.73 3 
11 Russia $22.43 3 
12 Ghana2 $22.42 2 
14 Senegal2 $  21.81 ($19.69) 3 
13 Philippines $21.48 3 
15 South Africa $19.40 4 
16 Tanzania1 $18.72 3 
17 Egypt $18.69 4 
18 Ethiopia1 $17.92 4 
19 Mozambique1 $17.74 4 
20 Peru $14.71 4 
1 Denotes Least Developed Countries                                                                                                                                                                   
2 Denotes Low Income Countries                                                                                                                                                         
*Bracketed dollar figures are the amount of bilateral aid distributed by Canada to the recipient state excluding 
official debt relief.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
** The human rights score used for Ex-Yugoslavia is the weighted average of the PTS scores.  
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considerations played a significant role in determining which states received Canadian bilateral 
aid. For the reasons stated in the previous chapter, debt relief will be excluded in ranking the 
recipient states in the 1998-2000 period and in comparisons to the later period. 
The 2007-2009 time period yields similar results. However, Table 2 shows the total 
annualized bilateral aid to the top 20 recipient states accounted for 71.9 per cent of Canada’s 
disbursements.  Overall, there was erosion of the PTS scores for this top 20 group; 25 per cent 
fell into category 5 (where none were in the earlier period), 30 per cent in category 4, and 25 
per cent in category 3. Only 20 per cent were in category 2 and none were rated category 1. As a 
result, bilateral aid had become significantly more concentrated while the overall percentage of 
top recipients that had unacceptable category 3 to 5 ratings had increased by 5 percentage 
points. Five of the 16 received the worst rating, category 5.  
What also stands out in comparing the recipients from Tables 1 and 2 is the increase in 
the number of least developed countries included on the later list. In the 1998-2000 period six 
of the recipient states were designated by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as 
least developed countries, but in the later period that number nearly doubled to eleven. The 
second period included all six from the 1998-2000 and then added four more African states 
(Sudan, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burkina Faso) plus Afghanistan. The 
addition of African states is consistent with the commitments made in 2002 by the Chrétien 
government in conjunction with the G-8 direction. The emphasis placed on Afghanistan reflects 
Canada’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military commitments. Perhaps of most 
significance, all of the top five recipient states in the later period were designated least 
developed states implying a decisive shift to areas of most severe poverty. But in doing so, a 
greater portion of bilateral aid went to states with relatively worse human rights records. In the 
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earlier period, two-thirds (4 of 6) of the least developed recipients were scored in categories 3 
to 5; whereas, 81.8 per cent (9 of 11) were similarly rated in the 2007-2009 period.  
Table 2. 2007-2009 Top Recipients of Canadian Aid Based on Average Bilateral Aid 
Country Annualized Total Bilateral 
Aid 2007-09 (in Millions) 
2006 PTS 
Scores 
Afghanistan1 
Haiti1 
Ethiopia1 
Sudan1 
Mali1 
Ghana2 
Mozambique1 
Tanzania1 
Bangladesh1 
Iraq 
Russia 
Senegal1 
Indonesia 
Palestinian Authority  
Pakistan2 
Sri Lanka 
Vietnam, Socialist Republic of2  
Dem. Republic of the Congo1 
China 
Burkina Faso1 
 
$  301.08  
 $ 204.91  
 $ 125.67  
 $ 102.86  
 $ 102.48  
 $   98.70  
 $   91.01 
 $   76.52  
 $   75.73  
 $   70.08  
 $   66.87  
 $   61.00  
 $   58.37  
 $   55.10  
 $   54.01  
 $   39.07  
 $   37.11  
 $   35.96  
 $   33.46  
 $   28.86 
 
5 
4 
3 
5 
2 
2 
3 
2 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
2 
5 
4 
3 
 
1 Denotes Least Developed Countries                                                                                                                                                                   
2 Denotes Low Income Countries   
A seemingly competing agenda between poverty reduction and human rights objectives 
in providing bilateral aid is indicated by Tables 3 and 4. The general trend is that the lower 
income level countries are more likely to receive bilateral aid and generally a higher average of 
aid. This implies support for the multilateral-based commitment to poverty reduction. These 
tables also show that the lower the income level the worse, on average, the PTS score is. This, 
however, does not mean that human rights and poverty reduction are necessarily opposing 
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objectives. All categories have countries with acceptable PTS scores. Therefore, the issue then 
becomes to whom and how much bilateral aid is distributed.  
In examining Table 3, the trend shows anomalies. The highest income group (Other) 
received, on average, the second largest amount of bilateral aid. This would appear to reflect 
Canada’s pursuit of economic opportunities. The lower average for the least developed 
countries reveals the reduction of development assistance to Africa because of the 1990s fiscal 
restraint, and was consistent with actions taken by other developed countries. However, fewer 
than 70 per cent of countries in the top two income categories received aid, in contrast to the 
95 per cent of countries in the bottom three categories. The average PTS scores in each of these 
lower categories are substantially worse than the average of the higher income categories. This 
would suggest that, on average, the lower the income level, the worse the human rights score is 
likely to be.  
Table 3. Distribution of Bilateral Aid in 1998-2000 Based on DAC categories 
DAC Category Average PTS 
Score 
Number of 
Countries 
Number of 
Countries 
Receiving 
Bilateral Aid 
Average 
Bilateral Per 
Country Per 
Year 
(in Millions) 
1 – Least Developed Countries 
 
2.65 49 47 $6.98 
2- low income 
(per capita GNP <$765 in 1995) 
2.83 23 23 $14.49 
3 – lower middle income 
(per capita GNP $766-$3035 in 
1995) 
2.53 49 45 $5.55 
4 – upper middle income 
(per capita GNP $3036-9385 in 
1995) 
2.04 23 16 $2.06 
Other 1.73 26 18 $9.33 
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Table 4 indicates a more definitive direction in the 2007-2009 period with respect to its 
commitment to addressing poverty reduction.  In this case there is a clearer alignment between 
average bilateral aid and the DAC income categories; the lower the income level of the 
countries, the higher average bilateral aid is, except for a minor difference between the two 
highest income categories. As well, all the countries in the two lowest income levels receive 
some amount of aid. Most striking is the fact that there is only one country in the highest 
category that received any bilateral aid. Russia received an average of $66.87M, which was 
significant enough to place Russia on the top 20 recipients list for 2007-2009 in Table 2. 
Certainly bilateral aid to Russia was not motivated by poverty reduction or human rights 
performance, but rather economic opportunity. This example demonstrates the need to use 
caution when considering average statistics, as a single anomaly can distort results. The key 
point from Table 4 then is that 26 of 27 states in this higher income bracket did not receive 
bilateral aid whereas in the 1998-2000 period 18 of 26 states had. This pattern may suggest, but 
is not conclusive of, a Canadian commitment to a poverty reduction priority.  
Again, Table 4 demonstrates an inverse trend between PTS averages and DAC income 
levels. Focusing bilateral aid broadly on the poorest countries is certain to result in such aid 
going to countries that have relatively worse human rights records. This may create a dilemma 
between these two worthy, but potentially conflicting, objectives. However, this need not be 
the case. Both periods have countries that are below the low income threshold and have 
acceptable PTS scores. The DAC low income level cut offs were at <$765 and <$825 per capita 
Gross National Income (GNI) for the respective periods. Clearly, these levels demonstrate a 
preponderance of abject poverty. The least developed countries simply represent the bottom of 
this group. Given the breadth of poverty in the developing countries it is possible to target 
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bilateral aid to countries with better human rights records and still address a poverty reduction 
objective.   
Table 4. Distribution of Bilateral Aid in 2007-2009 Based on DAC categories 
DAC Category Average PTS 
Score 
Number of 
Countries 
Number of 
Countries 
Receiving 
Bilateral Aid 
Average 
Bilateral Per 
Country Per Year 
(In Millions) 
1 – Least Developed Countries 
 
2.88 49 49 $29.92 
2 – low income 
(per capita GNI <$825 in 2004) 
3.00 28 28 $19.23 
3 – lower middle income 
(per capita GNI $826-$3255 in 
2004) 
2.96 47 44 $10.42 
4 – upper middle income 
(per capita GNI $3256-$10065 in 
2004) 
2.07 30 27 $1.72 
Other 1.74 27 1 $2.48 
 
However, given that the average PTS scores for the least developed and low income 
country categories are less than 3 indicates there are a number of these countries that have 
acceptable human rights scores. But since Canada provides bilateral aid to almost all countries in 
these lower income categories, Canada is in fact providing bilateral aid to countries that have 
poor human rights performance. As a result, Canada is actually supporting repressive regimes 
while publicly operating under the pretense of championing human rights. For human rights to 
be reflected in bilateral aid decisions more bilateral aid would have to flow to countries with 
better PTS scores while minimal or no bilateral aid would be allocated to countries with 
unacceptable ratings. This is of particular importance when development assistance is viewed as 
a scarce resource. Providing aid to repressive states denies the opportunity to use that aid to 
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help impoverished people in states with better human rights records. By using a selectivity 
strategy actually based on human rights, different decisions would result.1  
For example, 20 African states, based on the 1997 PTS ratings, had PTS scores of 
category 1 or 2 and were also least developed or low income countries. Twelve of these 
received an average of less than $10M annually of Canadian bilateral aid during the 1998-2000 
period. More than half of these countries saw their PTS ratings slip to 3 or 4 by 2006. Three 
countries (Ghana, Mali, and Mozambique) saw their Canadian bilateral aid increase by more 
than a multiple of four between the first and second period. Of these Ghana and Mali managed 
to maintain PTS scores of 2. At the same time, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
despite having a PTS score of 5 in both phases of this study, received an annual average $8.89M 
during the first period which increased to $35.96M in the second period, placing the DRC in the 
top 20 bilateral aid recipients. Similarly, Zimbabwe saw its PTS scores go from 2 to 4 yet its 
Canadian bilateral aid doubled from $11.69M to $22.13M. In contrast, Benin and Burkina Faso 
had PTS scores of 1 and 2 respectively in 1997. By 2006 both had scores of 3. It is only 
speculation but more focused development assistance may have contributed to a different 
outcome.  
Further, the Congo improved its human rights scores from 5 to 2, but received 
essentially the same average dollar amount in the two periods ($2.52M and $3.57M). 
Meanwhile, its neighbour, the DRC, saw its bilateral aid increase fourfold, despite its continued 
horrendous human rights record. The Congo continues to be a low income country and without 
concerted development assistance to raise it out of this category, it is at risk of returning to its 
early level of human rights violations.  
                                                          
1 Neumayer, The Pattern of Aid Giving. 
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Sierra Leone provides an example where the PTS score has improved and Canadian 
bilateral aid has also increased. Its PTS scores were 4 and 2 in 1997 and 2006, and the average 
Canadian bilateral aid in the 1998-2000 and 2007-2009 periods were $4.94M and $17.36M, 
respectively. But, Sierra Leone received less than half the aid amount given to the DRC. Thus, 
there is no motive created for Sierra Leone to maintain or improve its human rights record. 
Sierra Leone continues to be a least developed country and its people would certainly benefit 
from more development assistance. This is not simply an aid effectiveness argument because all 
the states in least developed and low income levels have abject poverty issues. Concentrating 
Canadian bilateral aid on states that have demonstrated a willingness to address human rights 
issues rewards them and allows Canada to play a greater partnership role with these states. 
Conversely, failure to provide sufficient assistance may contribute to the erosion of human 
rights performance as exists in many other parts of Africa.  
Canada’s announced commitment to 25 development partners in 2005 demonstrates 
this point. As discussed earlier, Denis Stairs was critical of this announcement because it simply 
committed to targets CIDA was already achieving. 2  But, this list did point to a strong 
commitment to some of the poorest states in the world. Table 5 highlights this by showing that 
19 of the 25 development partners were among the least developed and low income countries.3  
Further, of this total list, 18 had PTS scores of 3-5.4 But six of the least developed and low 
income countries had acceptable scores of 1 or 2. This shows that the opportunity exists to 
direct bilateral aid to countries that have severe poverty issues and have acceptable human 
rights performance. 
                                                          
2 Stairs, Confusing The Innocent with Numbers and Categories. 
3 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. History of DAC Lists of aid recipient countries. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/historyofdaclistsofaidrecipientcountries.htm (accessed February 9, 
2012). 
4 Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, & Reed M. Wood, Political Terror Scale 1976-2010, 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ (accessed November 17, 2011). 
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Table 5. Canada’s 25 Development Partners Identified by the 2005 International Policy 
Statement 
 
Africa PTS Americas PTS Asia PTS Europe PTS 
Benin1 3 Bolivia 2 Bangladesh1 4 Ukraine 3 
Burkina Faso1 2 Guyana 3 Cambodia1 3   
Cameroon2 3 Honduras 3 Indonesia 3   
Ethiopia1 4 Nicaragua2 2 Pakistan2 4   
Ghana2 1   Sri Lanka 5   
Kenya2 3   Vietnam2 3   
Malawi1 3       
Mali1 2       
Mozambique1 3       
Niger1 2       
Rwanda1 2       
Senegal1 3       
Tanzania1 3       
Zambia1 3       
      1 Least Developed Countries 
      2Other Low Income Countries 
This list of development partners was replaced in 2009 with a commitment by the 
minority Conservative government to the shorter list of 20 countries of focus, which are found in 
Table 6. Similar to the 2005 commitment, the majority are countries with records of committing 
serious human rights violations. While the total percentage of countries with PTS scores of 3-5 
remained essentially the same (72 and 70 per cents, respectively) the gravity of the scores 
became more severe with the total number of 4s and 5s doubling from four to eight on a smaller 
list. Where the 2005 partners list had only 16 per cent of states in these two categories, 40 per 
cent of the 2009 countries of focus had human rights scores at these levels. Besides Afghanistan, 
Canada identified Sudan and South Sudan, Colombia, and Pakistan as development partners. 
Each of these countries are rated as having the worst human rights performance (see Table 6) 
and only Colombia has achieved electoral democratic status.5 Further, 60 per cent of the states 
on the 2009 list were in the least developed and low income countries categories compared to 
                                                          
5 Alan Siaroff, Comparing Political Regimes, 2nd Edition (North York: Higher Education University of 
Toronto Press, 2009), 134-139.  
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76 per cent on the earlier list.6 On the face of it, it would appear the Harper government is 
transitioning to a focus on relatively fewer of the poorest states and at the same time 
supporting more states that commit serious human rights abuses. Focusing bilateral aid on so 
many countries with serious and extreme human rights violations is difficult to reconcile with 
Canadian values and the rhetoric in support of human rights. With the 2009 list, Canada has 
placed emphasis on a third of all countries that have received category 5 ratings.7 On the other 
hand, the Harper government virtually ended bilateral assistance to the higher income ‘Other’ 
category as seen in Table 4. 
Table 6. Canada’s 2009 List of Countries of focus 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
PTS Americas PTS Asia PTS North Africa 
Middle East 
PTS Europe PT
S 
Ethiopia1 3 Bolivia 1 Afghanistan1 5 West Bank 
and Gaza 
4 Ukraine 3 
Ghana2 2 Caribbean 
Regional 
Program 
2* Bangladesh1 4     
Mali1 1 Colombia 5 Indonesia 4     
Mozambique
1 
3 Haiti1 3 Pakistan2 5     
Senegal1 3 Honduras 4 Vietnam2 2     
Sudan and 
South Sudan1 
5 Peru 3       
Tanzania1 2         
     1 Least Developed Countries 
     2Other Low Income Countries 
  * The Caribbean Region includes 13 countries. The overall PTS score is estimated to be category 2.  
 
                                                          
6 These percentages are derived from Tables 5 and 6. The Caribbean region has been treated as a single 
state, despite actually consisting of 13 states. Canada has considered these countries in the Caribbean 
basin as a region and in 2007 proposed to treat this region collectively for bilateral aid. While all except 
Jamaica are very small, none are low income states. Canadian International Development Agency, 
Caribbean Community Strategic Programming Framework, Canadian International Development Agency, 
June 2007, 
http://pioj.gov.jm/Portals/0/ODA/CIDA%20REGIONAL%20STRATEGY%20Caribbean%20Community%20Fra
mework.pdf (accessed June 21, 2012). 
7 Mark Gibney, Lynette Cornett, and Reed Wood, “Political Terror Scale 1976-2010,” 2010, 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ (accessed November 17, 2011). In 2009 there were 12 countries 
rated as category 5. Canada had identified 4 of these countries for preferential bilateral aid relationships 
in contrast to only one such country in 2005.  
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Serkasevich reported a positive correlation between serious human rights violations and 
increased levels of bilateral aid. When looking at all aid for the period 1984-87 a Pearson r 
correlation of 0.2301 was yielded based on 82 countries.8 However, another 30 countries were 
excluded for lack of data. By limiting the sample to countries that had received a minimum 
threshold of an average yearly amount of $1M and $20M of bilateral aid, Pearson r increased to 
0.2542 and 0.5599 respectively.9 In sum, not only were countries with more serious human 
rights violations more likely to receive aid from Canada but they were likely to receive more of 
it.  
Similar tests on all the aid eligible countries in the 1998-00 and 2007-09 periods found 
the same results. For the first period correlating average bilateral aid and PTS scores yielded 
Pearson r of 0.284 p 0.01 based on a sample size of 165 countries. The second period 
demonstrated a stronger correlation with Pearson r at 0.367 p 0.01 with a sample size of 171. In 
both cases, the trend demonstrated that more bilateral aid was allocated to countries with 
poorer human rights performance.  
This also is consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 4, where DAC income levels had 
an inverse relationship with both PTS scores and average bilateral aid. In the 1998-2000 period, 
the Pearson r correlations were -0.247 p 0.01 and -0.200 p 0.05, respectively. In other words, 
the lower the income category the more likely it was for PTS scores to be worse and for bilateral 
aid to be greater. In the second period, the relationship was stronger with Pearson r correlations 
between DAC categories and PTS scores and average aid being -0.369 p 0.01 and -0.306 p 0.01. 
Clearly, these bilateral correlations do not support the thesis that human rights records are a 
consideration in which countries Canada chooses to deliver bilateral aid to. In fact, the statistics 
                                                          
8 Serkasevich, The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Aid and Human Rights Violations, 57. 
9 Ibid., 65-66. However, this was calculated on significantly reduced samples of 51 and 12 countries. 
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point to the exact opposite conclusion where Canada provides more bilateral aid to countries 
that engage in worse human rights practices.  
However, these correlations do not contemplate the influence of the many multilateral 
institutions, the huge disparity in country population or the outliers discussed in the previous 
chapter. To account for these, it was necessary to use regression models.  
 
Multivariate Regression Modeling  
As previously discussed, the 1998-2000 period was marked by fiscal restraint which had 
been felt particularly hard by foreign aid commitments. Canada was also involved in the NATO 
operations in the Balkans and continued to be committed to the development of Haiti, albeit at 
a financially reduced level. While both countries had poor human rights records, Canada’s 
decision to provide bilateral aid to these states was driven by geopolitical, security and 
international image motives. In order to account for these, dummy variables for Haiti and Ex-
Yugoslavia were created to recognize them as specific anomalies of the time.  
Likewise, dummy variables have been introduced to account for the influence 
multilateral memberships have had in the support of regional and cultural, historical 
relationships. These included memberships in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and the 
Organization of American States (OAS). A similar variable for the African Union (AU) was 
introduced, although it was not expected to be relevant in this period because it was not until 
2001-2002 the G-8 formally supported increasing aid relief to Africa. The last, and potentially 
most important, membership was Canada’s role in the OECD. The variable for this was the DAC 
income categorization which was discussed in the correlation analysis.  In completing the 
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variables, population was represented by logpop1997 while human rights records were 
accounted for by PTS ratings in 1997.  
This nine variable model (Table 7) accounts for half of the variance in the level of 
bilateral aid and has an adjusted r2 of 0.508. However, not surprisingly, the AU was not 
statistically significant; but neither was la Francophonie nor OAS. The AU is more easily 
explained by the reduction of Canada’s foreign aid as a consequence of its fiscal restraint. 
Poorer states, of which many are African, were most severely impacted. The insignificance of 
the la Francophonie variable is consistent with the findings in the Van Belle et al study.10 The 
Commonwealth was statistically significant, which suggests the historical roots of British 
colonialism have continued to be strong while the more recent association with la Francophonie 
has not developed a similar bond. With regards to the OAS, Haiti was the only state that 
received sufficient aid to place it in the top 20 recipients (Table 1) and it is the only country in 
the Western hemisphere included on the least developed list. Much of the Canadian aid directed 
to OAS states are to small states in the Caribbean that receive large per capita disbursements 
but relatively small total aid amounts. Therefore, OAS was expected to be of less importance, 
which is confirmed in this model.  
As was anticipated, the Commonwealth and the DAC income categories are significant 
at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively. The income categories have a negative relationship with 
average total aid, indicating that within this model more aid is going to less developed states. 
This is consistent with the Pearson correlation reported for this time period above. As expected, 
the Ex-Yugoslavia and Haiti dummy variables are statistically significant. However, the PTS scale, 
while not statistically significant (0.162), also shows a negative correlation with average total 
                                                          
10 Van Belle et al, Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid. 
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aid. This is the opposite of what was reported for the Pearson correlation but is consistent with 
a thesis of more aid to states with better human rights practices.  Additionally, the logged 
population is statistically significant and is consistent with Neumayer’s findings.  
Table 7. Regressions on Total Bilateral Aid 1998-2000 (Nine explanatory variables) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -32.121 4.684  -6.857 0.000 
Haiti dummy 22.732 7.171 0.181 3.170 0.002 
Ex-Yugoslavia dummy 50.266 6.924 0.401 7.260 0.000 
Commonwealth dummy 3.798 1.300 0.178 2.921 0.004 
la Francophonie dummy 1.432 1.425 0.065 1.005 0.317 
DAC list 1997-1999 -0.983 0.455 -0.143 -2.162 0.032 
logpop1997 6.196 0.719 0.624 8.620 0.000 
OAS dummy 0.513 1.469 0.021 0.349 0.727 
AU dummy -0.996 1.517 -0.047 -0.656 0.513 
political terror scale 1997 -0.855 0.609 -0.104 -1.404 0.162 
a. Dependent Variable: average aid 1998-2000 
N=173                  Adjusted r2=0.508 
 
This model is refined in Table 8 with the variables that are not statistically significant 
being removed except for the PTS scores. PTS is left in as it is the principal variable being tested 
against bilateral aid in this study. The resulting multivariate regression shows a very minor 
improvement in adjusted r2 to 0.513. All of the variables are now statistically significant except 
PTS, which is better but still marginally above the 0.1 level. It is during this period that the 
governing politicians were most strongly and vocally committed to human security.  While this is 
closely linked to human rights, committing to the principle of human security means dealing 
with countries where human rights are being or have been violated. The issue then is should this 
be done through government-to-government bilateral aid or through other multilateral links? 
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Generally, Canadian governments and academics have been reluctant to suggest withdrawal of 
aid on the premise that the people who need it the most will be the ones punished for the poor 
behaviour of their government. This model shows that as a factor, human rights are 
subordinated to these other considerations. 
 
Table 8. Regressions on Total Bilateral Aid 1998-2000 (Six explanatory variables) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -30.977 4.317  -7.175 0.000 
Haiti dummy 24.520 6.905 0.195 3.551 0.001 
Ex-Yugoslavia dummy 50.140 6.863 0.400 7.306 0.000 
Commonwealth dummy 3.452 1.238 0.162 2.789 0.006 
DAC list 1997-1999 -0.935 0.397 -0.136 -2.353 0.020 
logpop1997 6.060 0.701 0.610 8.649 0.000 
political terror scale 1997 -0.905 0.600 -0.110 -1.509 0.133 
a. Dependent Variable: average aid 1998-2000 
N=173                 Adjusted r2=0.513 
 
Finally, Table 9 shows the regression model without PTS which still provides a strong 
explanation for the distribution of total bilateral aid in the 1998-2000 period with an adjusted r2 
of 0.509. All independent variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 level except the DAC 
income variable which is at the 0.05 level.  Despite the fact Canada had greatly reduced its aid to 
African states – many of which are in the least developed category – the income levels were still 
statistically significance.  
Thus, the human rights based thesis is not supported in this period, despite the Chrétien 
government’s emphasis on human security. Multilateralism shows some promise as an 
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independent variable but it provides inconsistent correlations as only certain institutions 
demonstrate statistical significance relative to the dependent bilateral aid variable. 
Table 9. Regressions on Total Bilateral Aid 1998-2000 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -29.668 4.246  -6.987 0.000 
Haiti dummy 25.429 6.906 0.203 3.682 0.000 
Ex-Yugoslavia dummy 49.662 6.883 0.396 7.215 0.000 
Commonwealth dummy 3.720 1.230 0.175 3.025 0.003 
DAC list 1997-1999 -0.770 0.383 -0.112 -2.008 0.046 
logpop1997 5.452 0.576 0.549 9.471 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: average aid 1998-2000 
N=173            Adjusted r2=0.509 
 
The same multivariate regression process was applied to the 2007-2009 period, shown 
in Tables 10 and 11. The membership variables remain the same for the Commonwealth, la 
Francophonie, AU and OAS. The DAC income, PTS scale and logpop factors were revised to 
reflect this time period. The dummy variable for Ex-Yugoslavia was removed because the NATO 
military intervention had ended. However, a new dummy variable was added to reflect Canada’s 
military involvement in the Afghanistan war. The Haiti dummy variable remained as Canada’s 
involvement in Haiti actually increased as a result of domestic imperatives and further political 
unrest in this impoverished Western hemisphere state. These variables assessed against the 
dependent variable, bilateral aid, provide a substantially higher adjusted r2=0.685. As in the 
earlier period, only the Commonwealth and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) multilateral memberships achieve statistical significance.  However, the 
AU is much closer at 0.154 significance, which is not surprising since there had been an 
116 
 
emphasis placed on alleviating poverty in Africa by the G-8. But, even by removing la 
Francophonie and OAS, AU did not reach significance at least to the 0.1 level and consequently 
all three were dropped as the model was refined.  
Table 10. Regressions for Total Bilateral Aid 2007-2009 (Nine explanatory variables) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -48.697 13.386  -3.638 0.000 
logpop2006 9.575 2.116 0.269 4.525 0.000 
Haiti dummy 191.160 20.431 0.421 9.356 0.000 
Afghanistan dummy 280.751 20.053 0.619 14.000 0.000 
AU dummy 6.081 4.248 0.081 1.432 0.154 
Commonwealth dummy 7.075 3.610 0.092 1.960 0.052 
OAS dummy -0.990 4.144 -0.011 -0.239 0.811 
la Francophonie dummy -1.060 3.973 -0.013 -0.267 0.790 
DAC list 2007 -2.647 1.313 -0.109 -2.016 0.046 
political terror scale 2006 0.098 1.949 0.003 0.050 0.960 
a. Dependent Variable: average aid 2007-2009 
N=173           Adjusted r2=0.685 
 
The membership organizations that were not significant have been removed in Table 11 
but the PTS scale is kept despite its lack of significance, as was done in previous period. This 
revised model further improved with an adjusted r2 of 0.686 with only the PTS scale not being 
statistically significant. The Commonwealth has improved to the 0.05 level with all remaining 
variables being significant to the 0.01 level.  
What is strikingly different in this model is the fact there is absolutely no relevance 
provided by the PTS variable with a significance value of 0.939. While PTS did not reach a 
statistically significant level in the 1998-2000 period, it was marginal at the 0.113 level and was 
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negatively correlated with increased levels in bilateral aid received. The 2007-2009 period 
provides no indication that human rights considerations was a factor at all.  
Table 11. Regressions for Total Bilateral Aid 2007-2009 (Six explanatory variables) 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -46.344 12.579  -3.684 0.000 
logpop2006 9.804 2.081 0.275 4.711 0.000 
Haiti dummy 185.936 19.684 0.410 9.446 0.000 
Afghanistan dummy 277.421 19.856 0.611 13.972 0.000 
Commonwealth dummy 7.694 3.449 0.101 2.231 0.027 
DAC list 2007 -3.624 1.134 -0.149 -3.197 0.002 
political terror scale 2006 0.149 1.942 0.005 0.077 0.939 
a. Dependent Variable: average aid 2007-2009 
N=173            Adjusted r2=0.686 
 
Finally, Table 12 presents only statistically significant variables after the PTS variable has 
been removed. An adjusted r2 of 0.688 provides a substantial explanation.  Again the DAC list 
has a negative coefficient confirming that the lower the income level of the recipient country is, 
the more likely it is to receive a greater level of aid. This is consistent with the results in Table 4 
which revealed a clear preference toward providing bilateral aid to low income states in the 
2007-09 period. Not only have all the states in the lowest two categories received some bilateral 
aid, but the average amounts are substantially higher in the lower three categories. However, 
aid to both Afghanistan and Haiti were driven by other factors, although they are also in the 
least developed categories. Both received substantially more aid than other states; these two 
states together averaged $505M in bilateral aid while the next five recipients collectively 
received $520M. Yet, Table 2 also shows that eight of the top 10 benefactors of Canadian 
bilateral aid were least developed countries, suggesting there has been a specific effort made to 
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direct aid to this category irrespective of Canada’s self-interests and security concerns. 
Consequently, the DAC income levels are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.   
Table 12. Regressions on Total Bilateral Aid 2007-2009 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) -46.543 12.274  -3.792 0.000 
Log population 2006 9.902 1.631 0.278 6.072 0.000 
Haiti dummy 186.069 19.549 0.410 9.518 0.000 
Afghanistan dummy 277.657 19.557 0.612 14.198 0.000 
Commonwealth dummy 7.696 3.439 0.101 2.238 0.027 
DAC list 2007 -3.650 1.076 -0.150 -3.393 0.001 
a. Dependent Variable: average aid 2007-2009 
N=173          Adjusted r2=0.688 
 
Tables 9 and 12 indicate Canada has made poverty reduction a priority in selecting 
countries for bilateral aid and that this commitment has become sharper in the most recent 
period of time. These regression models also show that Canada continues to demonstrate a bias 
toward Commonwealth countries. There is also a strong indication of support for NATO 
initiatives.  
Despite the ongoing references to human rights in discussions about foreign aid, these 
do not factor into the decision-making process in allocating bilateral aid. There continues to be a 
disconnect between the government rhetoric on human rights issues with actual aid-giving 
practices. If there is no meaningful requirement to have improved the human rights of a 
recipient state in order to receive more funding, then there is no international pressure for that 
recipient state to actually make serious efforts to improve its human rights performance. 
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Consequently, Canadian bilateral aid is supporting regimes that are violating the rights of its 
citizens.  
Worse still, by supporting such regimes Canada loses the opportunity to provide greater 
aid to other states that have demonstrated good human rights stewardship. Many of these 
states have significant poverty issues too. Aid is a finite resource and when it is spent on states 
that routinely violate human rights, other opportunities are lost. While it is clear from the 
correlations between PTS scores and the DAC income categories that a poverty reduction 
agenda will inevitably result in greater support for restrictive and oppressive regimes, there are 
varying degrees to which this may be the case. Table 5 showed the government’s commitment 
to support poverty reduction in a group of development partner states. Only one of the states 
was scored as a category 5 and three were rated in category 4. This is in contrast with the results 
in Table 6 where the minority Conservative government, in 2009, declared it will focus on four 
countries with brutal human rights records scored as category 5 and four more in the very 
serious category 4, making up 40 per cent of the list of twenty states.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis set out to confirm a correlation between Canada’s bilateral aid and the 
human rights records of recipient states in two specific periods. Given the rhetoric and policy 
statements of all governments since the 1980s it was hypothesized that a statistical significance 
would be evident such that relatively more aid would be given to states with better human 
rights scores assuming government actions were consistent with the rhetorical commitment to 
human rights and good governance. But no such bivariate correlation was found for either of the 
periods, 1998-2000 or 2007-2009. In fact, the findings in both cases were the opposite as 
Canada tended to give more bilateral aid to countries with worse human rights scores. These 
findings and trends are consistent with the outcomes from an earlier 1984-1987 study. The fact 
that three discrete periods in a twenty-five year span representing the policies and practices of 
three different governments have confirmed the same result provides some degree of 
confidence to conclude Canada has not included negative human rights performance in its 
decisions on which countries it will allocate bilateral aid, nor is there any quantitative evidence 
Canada factors human rights in its determination as to the individual amounts for its aid-giving.  
However, this thesis anticipated there would be other, competing drivers that mitigated 
a correlation between human rights records and the level of aid-giving. Canada’s strong 
commitment to multilateralism has been an underlying motive for government foreign policy 
and action. Canadian governments have long considered its image as a good international 
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citizen a priority and have strove to maintain its status amongst the major developed countries.1 
To test the effects of these key relationships, multilateral memberships were introduced in a 
regression model along with the human rights variable to determine their effect on bilateral aid. 
The variables included were based on Canada’s historical and geographic memberships in the 
Commonwealth, la Francophonie and the Organization of American States (OAS), security – 
represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – and normative values evaluated 
through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) income levels, 
and were tested in these same specific periods.  
The regression model results, however, again failed to identify a statistically significant 
connection for human rights records. Despite the emphasis placed on the related human 
security agenda by the Chrétien government, the 1998-2000 period showed only a marginal, but 
not statistically significant, correlation. However, the second period showed no connection at all 
as the Harper minority government significantly increased its commitment to states with some 
of the worst human rights scores. Consequently, no evidence was found connecting human 
rights to bilateral aid decision-making. To many this may seem to be unsurprising, as this 
quantitative analysis simply confirms the existence of a ‘rhetoric-practice’ gap in the 
government’s actions. But this leaves unanswered the question ‘if human rights are not a factor, 
then what does affect the government bilateral aid decisions?’ The regression models do 
provide some insights. Some multilateral relations were statistically significant, while others 
were not. Why was the Commonwealth significant, but not la Francophonie and the OAS? Why 
the OECD, but not the G-8? And, why was there support for Afghanistan and not for African 
                                                          
1 Brown, “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives,” 470; Kim Richard Nossal, 
“Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The decline of ‘good international citizenship’ in Canadian foreign policy,” 
International Journal (Winter 1998-9): 88-105; Morrison, Aid and Ebb tide.  
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nations? Obviously international institutions are important but not consistently so and thus are 
not the independent variable.  
The underlying motives are best considered in the qualitative context of international 
relations theory. Liberal institutionalism (LI) provides insight into Canada’s enthusiasm for 
multilateralism as a means of pursuing power and self-interests, yet still subscribing to certain 
normative values. Security for Canada is enhanced by its membership in NATO. Compared to 
other multilateral institutions, NATO membership entails clearer commitments and obligations. 
Canada’s military involvement in the former-Yugoslavia and Afghanistan were direct results of 
threats made to other NATO members. While the degree to which Canada commits to support 
the action taken in such situations may be a point of discussion, choosing to not participate 
would have drawn heavy criticism, loss of political influence and placed reciprocal support for 
Canada in jeopardy. Military involvement invariably leads to bilateral aid outlays, as occurred in 
both of these examples. Aid support for these two initiatives was not driven by humane 
internationalism. It was responding to Canada’s self-interests, its own military security, and the 
preservation of its international image among peers.  
The Commonwealth membership initiated Canada into the development assistance field 
some six decades ago. There has been an even longer relationship with Great Britain and with 
individual Commonwealth members. The other two regional organizations have not had the 
same sense of community or presented the same opportunities. La Francophonie is based more 
on bilateral arrangements with France than relations amongst members. And this connection 
has been driven more by the domestic pressures from Québec. Canada’s involvement with OAS 
members has primarily been in the Caribbean, which largely overlaps with the Commonwealth, 
and with Haiti, which is motivated by domestic self-interest driven by attention to the Haitian 
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diaspora and Québec’s international involvement. Otherwise, the relationship with OAS has 
been hesitant. While a more in depth analysis of Canada’s role in these organizations may 
produce further insight, it is clear Canada has has conferred a preferred status on its 
Commonwealth role.  
Canada’s commitment to the OECD is based on alignment with its own long held 
normative views and the preservation of its international image. The OECD’s focus has been on 
alleviating poverty in developing countries and promoting liberal principles of democracy and 
good governance. These precepts align with Canada’s humane internationalism. Active 
participation in the OECD has allowed Canada to promote itself internationally as a middle 
power and good global citizen. At the same time, it has aligned its economic interests with its 
development assistance.2 The commitment to humane internationalism and economic self-
interest has played out through conflicts between government departments from the beginning 
of Canada’s development assistance program. Canada also values the OECD because this 
organization also supports the neo-liberal views Canada subscribes to which tie economics, 
democracy and good governance to development assistance. In contrast, the G-8 has become 
committed to a region of the world, Africa, that has held little opportunity for Canada. In this 
case, participation has been driven more by the opportunity to demonstrate itself as a 
significant actor on an important international stage. Here, self-interest was related more to 
image and less to the economics.  
Canada’s early development assistance efforts were driven by economic self-interest 
and its interest to be seen as a middle power. There has been a push-pull between humane 
internationalism and economic opportunities, but self-interest has been ever present. Stephen 
                                                          
2 Despite Canada’s earlier commitment to untie all aid by 2013, the Harper government is now 
considering providing aid through Canadian private industry initiatives in developing countries. This is a 
clear example of pursuing economic self-interest and neo-liberalism through aid.  
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Brown and Rosalind Raddatz point out that the government’s approach to foreign aid has 
oscillated between altruistic concerns and commercial and national self-interest. 3 The question 
becomes which interests will dominate at any particular point in time and why? Examples of 
how this conflict has played out within the government bureaucracy and cabinet have been 
shown to go back to the very beginning of Canada’s involvement in development assistance. 
Certainly this balance has changed with different governments and different Prime Ministers. 
The Mulroney government was the most direct on human rights issues, although this did not 
translate into a consistent pattern of action. The Chrétien government, with Lloyd Axworthy was 
Foreign Affairs minister, took an aggressive position on the human security agenda, but this too 
did not translate into a cogent approach to development assistance based on human rights 
violations. And again, Jean Chrétien’s support in of poverty reduction in Africa did not address 
human rights issues. These three examples, where normative values have been prominent, have 
resulted in little headway on the human rights agenda. All governments, including the current 
one, have played the human rights card in support of decisions made for self-interest or security 
reasons, but with little evidence of actual commitment to human rights. Little more than hand-
wringing and inconsistent action has taken place regardless of the government in power.  
So what does this mean for the human rights agenda? Canada’s rhetorical commitment 
to human rights reflects Canadian values. Yet, in bilateral aid decisions Canada has demonstrably 
failed to act on some of the most egregious human rights violators. Human rights concerns are 
not integrated in Canada’s development assistance processes. Nor will they likely be unless 
these issues rise to a level of significant self-interest for the government. This will only happen if 
pressure is placed on the government; otherwise, economic, security and power factors will 
                                                          
3 Stephen Brown and Rosalind Raddatz, “Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” in Struggling for Effectiveness: 
CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid, ed. Stephen Brown (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2012), 335. 
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continue to dominate. Altruistic motives have not been persuasive to any of the Canadian 
governments, which is consistent with an LI theory.  
But some of the quantitative studies cited here have suggested a connection between 
negative media publicity and the reduction of aid. While this variable was not within the scope 
of this thesis, it may warrant further study as this is an appeal to state self-interest. No 
government wants to be publicly linked with atrocities or serious human rights violations. For 
this reason, connecting Canada’s bilateral aid as support for a regime that commits serious 
human rights abuses has the potential to bring pressure to bear on the Canadian government to 
reduce bilateral aid to that state. This, however, requires a broad domestic response. To reduce 
aid to countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo in favour of more aid to the Congo or 
Sierra Leone, as was previously discussed, would require a communications campaign aimed at 
the atrocities of Canada’s aid partner and an increased awareness of the conditions in these 
other African states. However, this would place the plight of two groups of African people at 
odds over the same money. This would be a difficult argument to make.  
The Harper government has instead signalled a shift of bilateral aid from Africa to the 
Americas. From these American countries of focus only Bolivia and the Caribbean region have 
acceptable human rights records. Rather than states like Nicaragua, Guyana or Costa Rica, which 
have good PTS scores, the Americas focus will continue to be on Haiti, with the addition of 
Columbia, Peru and Honduras.  While there is some hope Haiti has returned to an acceptable 
human rights level, none of these additional states have acceptable human rights records. Of 
the 20 countries of focus, the government has only identified Bolivia and the Caribbean region 
from the Americas, along with Ghana, Tanzania and Vietnam as countries that have acceptable 
PTS scores.  There is nothing that leads one to expect that these five are going to received 
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preferential treatment because of their human rights as this government’s actions clearly 
support an economic agenda.  
Approaching the issue from a multilateral perspective, raising awareness of the human 
rights agenda through multilateral institutions, particularly the Commonwealth, the OECD and 
NATO, may have some potential. Canada has responded over time in varying degrees to its 
perceived international image. But, this would be a long-term enterprise based on the hope 
these institutions would become more receptive to a human rights priority than they have 
previously demonstrated and that Canada would eventually embrace such views as these 
became dominant internationally. There is little reason to believe this will occur. 
What is perhaps more actionable is for the government to finally act upon the promise 
to reduce the total number of countries to which it provides aid. While Canada has made 
positive strides to direct the majority of bilateral aid to first the 2005 Partners list and the 
countries, it has not made much progress on reducing the total number of recipients. With the 
Harper government’s shift in focus from Africa to the Americas, a strategy that would encourage 
selectively ending aid relationships with some of the least developed and lower income 
recipients could reduce the number of regimes with serious human rights violations. The freed 
up bilateral aid might then be redirected to equally needy states that have demonstrated 
positive human rights performance but lack the capacity to improve their condition.  
Consolidating bilateral aid would allow Canada to exercise greater influence and it would most 
likely find it is actually in its self-interest to do so. Countries that are able to raise their standard 
of living and achieve good governance, have a better chance of being economic trading partners 
with a country that has established bilateral relations.  However, this again requires that the 
government include human rights in the decision-making process for bilateral aid, which it has 
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consistently shown an unwillingness to do. Even under the most favourable conditions during 
the Mulroney government when human rights were topical and the government made explicit 
commitments to address human rights violations, action was inconsistent at best. The Harper 
government has given muted support to human rights in connection with development 
assistance and its actions indicate a different set of priorities. At the same time, the humane 
internationalism supported by many scholars and much of civil society has lost its vigour.  
Unfortunately, without some motivation for the government to act there will not be a 
focus on human rights. What has not and will not work is for critics to simply focus on human 
rights from an ‘ought to’ moral perspective, without addressing the self-interest, security and 
power motives that drive Canada’s international relations.   
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APPENDIX I – POLITICAL TERROR SCALE LEVELS 
 
 5  : Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits 
on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. 
 4  : Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. 
Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this 
level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 
 3  : There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. 
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or 
without a trial, for political views is accepted. 
 2  : There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few 
persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare. 
 1  : Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture 
is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
 
From: Gibney, Mark, Lynette Cornett and Reed Wood. "Political Terror Scale 1976-2010." 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php  accessed November 17, 2011.  
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APPENDIX II – CANADIAN HISTORICAL ODA ($ millions) 
Fiscal year  Total bilateral Total multilateral  Total ODA  ODA:GNI (%) 
1949-1950  0   12.99    12.99   0.08 
1950-1951  0.01   12.49    12.49   0.07 
1951-1952  26.16   0.97    27.12   0.12 
1952-1953  5.58   2.26    7.83   0.03 
1953-1954  12.34   2.11    14.44   0.05 
1954-1955  13.11   3.34    16.45   0.06 
1955-1956  26.93   2.44    29.37   0.10 
1956-1957  22.46   7.27    29.73   0.09 
1957-1958  58.15   3.94    62.08   0.18 
1958-1959  66.94   5.23    72.17   0.20 
1959-1960  62.35   7.34    69.69   0.19 
1960-1961  53.11   22.86    75.98   0.20 
1961-1962  37.86   22.74    60.6   0.15 
1962-1963  29.57   28.59    58.15   0.13 
1963-1964  42.74   21.79    64.53   0.14 
1964-1965  66.52   34.38    100.89   0.20 
1965-1966  88.31   34.74    123.05   0.22 
1966-1967  165.56   48.03    213.59   0.34 
1967-1968  142.2   50.4    192.6   0.29 
1968-1969  154.6   57.48    212.08   0.28 
1969-1970  207.38   71.02    278.41   0.34 
1970-1971  277.95   68.17    346.12   0.40 
1971-1972  296.77   99.89    396.66   0.41 
1972-1973  356.34   157.85    514.19   0.47 
1973-1974  405.11   190.95    596.06   0.46 
1974-1975  543.86   205.24    749.1   0.49 
1975-1976  571.89   337.78    909.67   0.53 
1976-1977  544.38   427.31    971.69   0.49 
1977-1978  624.99   424.35    1,049.35   0.49 
1978-1979  650.93   489.03    1,139.95   0.49 
1979-1980  789.14   496.63    1,285.76   0.47 
1980-1981  795.14   516.44    1,311.57   0.43 
1981-1982  947.47   543.69    1,491.16   0.43 
1982-1983  1,084.03   592.52    1,676.55   0.46 
1983-1984  1,124.85   672.24    1,797.08   0.45 
1984-1985  1,420.46   684.1    2,104.56   0.49 
1985-1986  1,382.99   864.62    2,247.61   0.47 
1986-1987  1,598.65   953.11    2,551.77   0.50 
1987-1988  1,785.70   838.36    2,624.06   0.48 
1988-1989  2,017.82   928.78    2,946.60   0.49 
1989-1990  1,937.41   912.47    2,849.88   0.45 
1990-1991  2,063.13   972.22    3,035.36   0.45 
1991-1992  2,118.23   1,064.23    3,182.46   0.49 
1992-1993  1,949.55   1,023.15    2,972.70   0.44 
1993-1994  2,028.92   1,046.35    3,075.27   0.44 
1994-1995  2,116.33   976.13    3,092.46   0.42 
1995-1996  1,779.39   904.16    2,683.55   0.36 
1996-1997  1,813.67   862.78    2,676.44   0.34 
1997-1998  1,618.68   905.88    2,524.56   0.30 
1998-1999  1,758.15   832.99    2,591.14   0.30 
1999-1900  1,832.39   916.87    2,749.26   0.29 
2000-2001  1,821.41   765.57    2,586.98   0.25 
2001-2002  2,024.97   875.74    2,900.71   0.27 
2002-2003  2,428.32   874.48    3,302.80   0.29 
2003-2004  1,969.86   749.91    2,719.77   0.23 
2004-2005  2,595.55   1,549.14    4,144.68   0.32 
2005-2006  3,271.94   1,188.37    4,460.31   0.33 
2006-2007  3,352.70   881.38    4,234.08   0.28 
Statistical Report, Fiscal Year 2006-2007 Page 10 
  
130 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Allendoerfer, Michelle Giacobbe. "When Do Human Rights Matter? Finding a Place For Human 
Rights In Foreign Policy." PhD diss., Deep Blue University of Michigan, 2010. 
http//deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78938/1/mallendo_1.pdf (accessed 
July 15, 2011). 
Annan, Kofi. "Foreword." In Human Security and the New Diplomacy: protecting people, 
promoting peace, edited by Rob McCrae, and Don Hubert. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2001. 
Barratt, Bethany. "Canadian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights." In Handbook of 
Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O'Reilly Patrick James, 
235-264. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. 
—. Human Rights and Foreign Aid: For love or money? New York: Routledge, 2008. 
Black, David. "Canada, G-8, and Africa: The Rise and Decline of a Hegemonic Project?" In 
Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd ed., edited by 
Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 487-502. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 
2011. 
—. "Leader or Laggard? Canada's Enduring Engagement with Africa." In Readings in Canadian 
Foreign Policy: Classic Debates & New Ideas, edited by Duane Bratt & Christopher J. 
Kukucha, 379-394. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
—. "Between Indifference and Idiosyncrasy: The Conservatives and Canadian Aid to Africa." In 
Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Stephen 
Brown, 246-268. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012.  
Black, David R., Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Andrew Clark. "Moving with the Crowd: Canadian Aid 
to Africa." International Journal 51, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 259-286. 
Boucher, David. Poltical Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Brown, Stephen. "Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives." In 
Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd ed., edited by 
Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 469-486. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 
2011. 
—. "CIDA under the Gun." In Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre?, edited 
by Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, 91-107. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2008. 
131 
 
Brown, Stephen, and Rosalind Raddatz. "Taking Stock Looking Ahead." In Struggling for 
Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2012.  
Brown, Stephen, ed. Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid. Montréal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012.  
Bull, Hedley. "Does Order Exist in World Politics." In International Relations Theory, 4th ed., 
edited by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, 268-270. New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 
2010. 
Campbell, Tom. Rights: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy 
Review 1995. n.d. http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp 
(accessed December 1, 2011). 
Canada, Parliament of. Bill C-293. n.d. Parliament of Canada 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3116967&Language=
e&Mode=1 (accessed September 29, 2011). 
Canadian International Development Agency. Canada Fully Unties its Development Aid. 
September 5, 2008. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-
9583229-GQC (accessed May 22, 2012). 
—. Canada making a difference in the world: A policy statement on strengthening aid 
effectiveness. Hull: Government Services Canada, 2002. 
—. Canada Moves on Another Element of its Aid Effectiveness Agenda. February 23, 2009. 
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-223132931-PPH 
(accessed May 22, 2012). 
—. Canada's International Policy Statement (2005). 2005. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ips-
development (accessed November 21, 2011). 
—. Caribbean Community Strategic Programming Framework. June 2007. 
http://pioj.gov.jm/Portals/0/ODA/CIDA%20REGIONAL%20STRATEGY%20Caribbean%20C
ommunity%20Framework.pdf (accessed June 21, 2012). 
—. Caribbean Regional Program Evaluation. April 2004. 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/0/35420504.pdf. (accessed June 21, 2012). 
—. CIDA announces new Development Partners: developing countries where Canada can make a 
difference. April 19, 2005. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/JER-
324115437-MU7 (accessed March 18, 2012). 
132 
 
—. CIDA's Policy on Poverty Reduction. January 1996. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-
cida.nsf/eng/STE-42484628-GZF#pdf (accessed August 24, 2012). 
—. CIDA's Strategic Overview. July 18, 2012. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-
cida.nsf/eng/NAT-911133132-NK9 (accessed August 24, 2012). 
—.Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good 
Governance. 1996. http://www.u4.no/document/showdoc.cfm?id=135 (accessed 
November 11, 2011). 
—. Sharing our Future: Canadian international development assistance. Hull: Government of 
Canada, 1987. 
—.Statistical Report on International Assistance Fiscal Year 2006-2007. Gatineau: Canadian 
International Development Agency, 2009. 
—. Statistical Report on International Assistance: Fiscal Year 2007-2008. Gatineau: Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Canada, 2010. 
—. Statistical Report on International Assistance: Fiscal Year 2008-2009. Gatineau: Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Canada, 2010. 
—. Statistical Report on International Assistance: Fiscal Year 2009-2010. Gatineau: Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Canada, 2011. 
—. Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance Fiscal Year 1998-1999. Gatineau: 
Canadian International Development Agency, 2000. 
—. Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance Fiscal Year 1999-2000. Gatineau: 
Canadian International Development Agency, 2001. 
—. Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance Fiscal Year 2000-2001. Gatineau: 
Canadian International Development Agency, 2002. 
—. Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance Fiscal Year 2001-2002. Gatineau: 
Canadian International Development Agency, 2003. 
—. Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance Fiscal Year 2002-2003. Gatineau: 
Canadian International Development Agency, 2004. 
—. Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance Fiscal 2003-2004. Gatineau: Canadian 
International Development Agency, 2005. 
—. Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance Fiscal Year 2004-2005. Gatineau: 
Canadian International Development Agency, 2006. 
133 
 
—. Statistical Report on Official Develpment Assistance Fiscal Year 2005-2006. Gatineau: 
Canadian International Development Agency, 2008. 
Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1962. 
Cermakian, Jean. "Canada’s role in the foreign aid programmes to the developping nations : a 
geographical appraisal." Cahiers de géographie du Québec 12, no. 26 (1968): 225-234. 
Chapnick, Adam. "The Canadian middle power myth." International Journal 55, no. 2 (Spring 
2000): 188-206. 
Clarkson, Stephen. "The Choice to be Made." In Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic 
Debates and New Ideas, edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 76-92. Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
de Vattel, Emmerich. The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law. Translated by Joseph 
Chitty. Philadephia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co, 1883. 
Department of Finance. Helping the Poorest - An Update on Canada's Debt Relief Efforts. 
Government of Canada. January 2005. http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/2005/cdre0105_-
eng.asp (accessed July 9, 2012). 
Dewitt, David B., and John J. Kirton. "Three Theoretical Perspectives." In Readings in Canadian 
Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd ed., edited by Duane Bratt and 
Christopher J. Kukucha, 52-69. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Donnelly, Jack. "Relative Universality of Human Rights." Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 2 (May 
2007): 281-306. 
—. "Repression and Development: The Political Contingency of Human Rights Trade-offs." In 
Human Rights and Development: International Views, edited by David P. Forsythe, 305-
328. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 
—. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 
Doyle, Michael W. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." In International Politics: Enduring 
Concepts and Contemporary Issues, edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, 95-107. 
Toronto: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
—. "Kant's Perpetual Peace." In Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International 
Relations, 3rd ed., edited by Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein and Jay M. Shafritz, 19-
32. Canada: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006. 
—. "Liberalism and World Politics." In International Relations Theory, 4th ed., edited by Paul R. 
Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, 150-159. New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2010. 
134 
 
Dufresne, Robert. An Act Respecting The Provision of Official Development Assistance Abroad 
(Official Developmnet Assistance Accountability Act). Library of Parliament. October 8, 
2008. http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0631-e.htm 
(accessed June 21, 2012). 
Dunne, Tim. "Liberalism." In The Globalization of World Politics: an introduction to international 
relations, edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 108-123. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. 
English, John. "In The Liberal Tradition: Lloyd Axworthy and Canadian Foreign Policy." In Canada 
Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy, edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Norman 
Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, 89-107. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy 
Review 1995." Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. February 17, 2003. 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp (accessed 
December 1, 2011). 
Forsythe, David P. Human Rights in International Relations. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
Freedom House. "Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Country ratings and 
status, FIW 1973-2011." Freedom House. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 (accessed November 17, 2011). 
Gibney, Mark, Lynette Cornett and Reed Wood. "Political Terror Scale 1976-2010." 2010. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ (accessed November 17, 2011). 
Gillies, David. Between Principle and Practice: Human Rights in North-South Relations. Montréal 
& Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996. 
—. "Export Promotion and Canada Development Assistance." In Canadian International 
Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, edited by Cranford Pratt, 186-209. 
Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996. 
Greenhouse, Steven. "Poland is Granted Large Cut in Debt." New York Times. March 16, 1991. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/16/business/poland-is-granted-large-cut-in-
debt.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed August 1, 2012). 
Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionism." International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 485-507. 
Gulrajani, Nilima. "Improving Canada's Performance as a Bilateral Donor: Assessing the Past and 
Building for the Future.” In Struggling for Aid Effectiveness: CIDA and Canada Foreign 
135 
 
Aid, edited by Stephen Brown, 53-78. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2012. 
Hampson, Fen Osler, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, eds. Canada Amongst Nations 
2001: The Axworthy Legacy. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Holmes, John W. "Most Safely in the Middle." In Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by 
Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 9-21. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Howard, Rhoda E., and Jack Donnelly. "Human Rights in World Politics." In International Politics: 
Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, 
29-46. Toronto: Addison-Welsey Educational Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
Ignatieff, Michael. Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001. 
—. The Rights Revolution. Toronto: House of Anansi Press Inc, 2007. 
Ishay, Micheline R. The History of Human Rights: From Ancient to the Globalization Era. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. 
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morality. Translated by H.J. Paton. New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2009. 
Keating, Tom. Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. 
2nd ed. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
—. "Promoting Democracy in Haiti: Assessing the Practical and Ethical Implications." In Ethics 
and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Rosalind Irwin, 208-226. Vancouver: 
UBC University Press, 2001. 
—. "Update Canada and the New Multilateralism." In Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: 
Classic Readings and New Ideas, edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 21-
26. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Keenleyside, T.A. "Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Human Dignity." In Canadian 
International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, 2nd ed., edited by Cranford 
Pratt, 240-267. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996. 
—. "Canadian Aid and Human Rights: Forging a Link." In Human Rights, Development and 
Foreign Policy: Selected Perspectives, edited by Irving Brecher. Halifax: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 1989. 
—. "Development Assistance." In Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Robert O. 
Matthews and Cranford Pratt, 187-208. Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1988. 
136 
 
Keohane, Robert O. "From Interdependence to Institutions." In International Relations Theory, 
4th ed., edited by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, 160-169. New York: Longman, 2010. 
—. International Institutions and State Power. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989. 
—. "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics." In Neorealism and its Critics, edited by 
Robert O. Keohane, 1-26. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. "Realism and Complex Interdependence." In The 
Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A Reader, edited by George T. 
Crane and Abla Amawi, 133-139. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Power and Interdependence. 4th ed. Boston: 
Longman, 2012. 
Kirton, John. Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Toronto: Nelson, 2007. 
Kirton, John J. "Canada as a G8 and G20 Principal Power." In Readings in Canadian Foreign 
Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, 2nd ed., edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. 
Kukucha, 157-174. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
—. "Canada as a Principal Power 2010." In Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates 
and New Idea, 2nd ed., edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 69-75. Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Knight, W. Andy, and Tom Keating. Global Politics. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Lamy, Steven M. "Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism." In 
The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations, edited by 
John Baylis, Steven Smith and Patricia Owens, 124-141. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
Lauren, Paul Gordon. The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen. Philadephia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. 
Little, Richard. "International Regimes." In The Globalization of World Politics: an introduction to 
international relations, edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 297-310. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.  
MacLean, Sandra J., David R. Black, and Timothy M. Shaw. A Decade of Human Security: Global 
Governance and New Multilateralisms. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006. 
Matthews, Robert O., and Cranford Pratt. "Conclusion: Questions and Prospects." In Human 
Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, 
285-311. Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988. 
137 
 
—. "Introduction: Concepts and Instruments." In Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, 
edited by Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, 3-20. Kingston and Montréal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1988. 
Matthews, Robert, and Cranford Pratt. "Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principles and 
Canadian Practice." Human Rights Quarterly 7, no. 2 (May 1985): 159-188. 
McCrae, Rob, and Don Hubert, eds. Human Security and the New Diplomacy: protecting people, 
providing peace. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001. 
Mearsheimer, John J. "The False Promise of International Institutions." International Security 19, 
no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995): 5-49. 
Media Relations Office. Canada Moves on Another Element of its Aid Effectiveness Agenda. 
Canadian Interanational Development Agency. February 23, 2009. , http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/NAT-223132931-PPH (accessed May 23, 2012). 
Meyers, Diana T. Inalienable Rights: A Defense. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. 
Moravicsik, Andrew. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-553. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 4th ed. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967. 
Morrison, David. Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance. 
Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998. 
Morrison, David R. "The Choice of Bilateral Aid Recipients." In Canadian International 
Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, 2nd ed., edited by Cranford Pratt, 123-
155. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996. 
Neumayer, Eric. "Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Qualitative Analysis of 
21 Donor Countries." Social Science Quarterly 84, no. 3 (September 2003): 650-666. 
—. The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance. New 
York: Routledge, 2003. 
Nossal, Kim Richard. "Cabin'd, Cribb'd, Confin'd?: Canada's Interest in Human Rights." In Human 
Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, 59-
76. Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988. 
—. "Mixed Motives Revisited: Canada's Interest in Development Assistance." Canadian Journal 
of Political Science 21, no. 1 (March 1988): 35-56. 
—. "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: the decline of 'good international citizenship' in Canadian foreign 
policy." International Journal 54, no. 1 (1998): 88-105. 
138 
 
—. The Politics of Canadian foreign policy. 3rd ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc, 1997. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “Convention on the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development”. Organization for the Economic Cooperation 
and Development. http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,en_2649_201185_ 
1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html . (accessed December 1, 2011). 
—. History of DAC Lists of aid recipient countries. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/historyofdaclistsofaidrecipientcountries.htm 
(accessed February 9, 2012). 
—. About the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). n.d. 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(accessed May 19, 2012). 
Pandey, Saroj. "Human Rights: Historical and Developmental Perspective." In Human Rights: 
Emerging Issues, edited by Sudha Malhotra, Pratibha Upadhayay, Meenu Gupta, 
Ranjana Srivastava, and Saroj Pandey, 1-18. New Delhi: Ratan Press, 2005. 
Paton, H.J. "Analysis of the Argument." In Immanuel Kant. Groundwork of Metaphysic of 
Morality. Translated by H.J. Paton. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009. 
Performance Review Branch. Caribbean Regional Program Evaluation: synthesis Report. 
Canadian International Development Agency. April 2004. http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/inet/images.nsf/vLUImages/pdf/$file/Final-Synthesis-Report.pdf (accessed 
August 8, 2012). 
Pratt, Cranford. "Canadian Development Assistance: A Profile." In Canadian International 
Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, 2nd ed., edited by Cranford Pratt, 3-24. 
Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996. 
—. "Humane Internationalism and Canadian Development Assistance Policies." In Canadian 
International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, edited by Cranford Pratt, 
334-380. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996. 
—. "Moral Vision and Foreign Policy: The Case of Canadian Development Assistance." In Ethics 
and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Rosalind Irwin, 59-76. Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2001. 
—. "The Limited Place of Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy." In Human Rights, 
Development and Foreign Policy: Canadian Perspectives, edited by Irving Brecher, 167-
178. Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989. 
139 
 
Rioux, Jean-Sebastien. "Canadian Official Development Assistance: Juggling the National Interest 
and Humanitarian Impulses." In Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy, edited by Patrick 
James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc O'Reilly, 209-233. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. 
Roth, Kenneth. "Human Rights and Canada's Foreign Policy." In Canada Among Nations 2009-
2010: As Others See Us, edited by Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker, 333-339. 
Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010. 
Scharfe, Sharon. Complicity: Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy. Montréal: Black Rose 
Books, 1996. 
Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Boos, 2000. 
Serkasevich, Nola Ann. "The Relationship Between Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights 
Violations: An Empirical Analysis." Master thesis, University of Windsor, 1989. 
Shamsie, Yasmine. "It's Not Just Afghanistan or Darfur: Canada's Peacebuilding Efforts in Haiti." 
In Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities, edited by Andrew Cooper and 
Dane Rowlands, 209-231. Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2006. 
Shue, Henry. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980. 
Siaroff, Alan. Comparing Political Regimes. 2nd ed. North York: Higher Education University of 
Toronto Press, 2009. 
Sikkink, Kathryn. "The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and 
Western Europe." In Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, 
edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 139-170. Ithica: Cornell University 
Press, 1993. 
Singh, Sonali. Reinterpreting Human Rights: A Third World Perspective. Varanasi: Ganga Kaveri 
Publishing House, 2004. 
Smillie, Ian. "Foreign Aid and Canadian Purpose: Influence and Policy in Canada's International 
Development Assistance." In Canada Among Nations 2008: 100 Years of Canadian 
Foreign Policy, edited by Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin, 183-208. Montréal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008. 
Spicer, Keith. A Samaritan State? Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966. 
Stairs, Denis. "Canada and the New Order." In Canada and the New World Order: Facing the 
New Millennium, edited by Michael J. Tucker, Raymond B. Blake, and P.E. Bryden. 
Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2000. 
140 
 
—. Confusing the Innocent with Numbers and Categories: The International Policy Statement and 
the Concentration of Development Assistance. Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign 
Affairs Institute, 2005. 
Therien, Jean-Philippe, and Carolyn Lloyd. "Development assistance on the brink." Third World 
Quarterly 21, no. 1 (2000): 21-37. 
Tomasevski, Katarina. Developing Aid and Human Rights Revisited. London: Pinter Publishers 
Ltd., 1993. 
U.S. Census Bureau. International Data Base Country Ranking. n.d. 
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/rank.php (accessed January 
17, 2012). 
United Nations. List of Least Developed Countries. 2011. 
http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/profile/ldc_list.pdf (accessed November 17, 
2011). 
—. Vienna Declaration and Progamme of Action. 1993. 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en, (accessed 
December 11, 2010). 
Upadhayay, Pratibha. "Human Rights: Concepts and Contrarities." In Human Rights: Emerging 
Issues, edited by Sudha Malhotra, Pratibha Upadhayay, Meenu Gupta, Ranjana 
Srivastava, and Saroj Pandey, 19-36. New Delhi: Ratan Press, 2005. 
Van Belle, Douglas A., Jean-Sebastien Rioux, and David M. Potter. Media, Bureaucracies and 
Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
France and Japan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
Verner, Josée. Speech of the Honourable Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation, for 
International Cooperation Days. October 10, 2006. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-
cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/RAC-1030163913-TE3 (accessed March 18, 2012). 
Vincent, R.J. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986. 
—. Nonintervention and International Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. 
Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. International Relations Theory, 4th ed. New York: Longman, 
2010. 
Waltz, Kenneth. Man, The State and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 
141 
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." In Classic Readings and 
Contemporary Debates in International Relations, 3rd ed., edited by Phil Williams, Donald 
M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, 63-73. Canada: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006. 
Wood, Reed M. and Mark Gibney. "The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and 
Comparison." Human Rights Quarterly 32, no. 2 (May 2010): 367-400. 
Young, Oran. "The Rise and Fall of Intenational Regimes." International Organization 36, no. 2 
(Spring 1982): 277-297. 
 
 
